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This thesis examines the Circassian history starting from their deportation in 
1860s from Russian Empire to Ottoman lands to the present day. Although the 
Circassian minority constitutes a significant part of Turkey’s population, the 
actual history of this small nation is disproportionately not well known both within 
the Circassian diaspora and the Turkish population at large. This thesis 
investigates the evaluation of Circassian identity and diaspora during late 
Ottoman Era and during the Republic of Turkey from a theoretical, historical and 
practical view and evaluates the role of the various domestic and international 
factors in the course of current diaspora structure in Turkey. This thesis also 
traces the role of Circassian association and organizations over the 
establishment of diaspora identity and representation of this ethnic group both 
within the Turkish population and within the state structure.   
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A. THE GOAL OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The central objective of this thesis is to explore the role of civil society 
organizations in shaping Circassian identity during the Turkish diaspora, and how 
these groups influenced Turkish foreign policy in the North Caucasus. This 
research will attempt to provide answers to the following questions: What is the 
impact of Circassian organizations within the Circassian population in Turkey? 
What kind of activities have they employed to influence discussion of national 
identity in Turkey? How should one interpret the significance of Circassians 
within Turkish politics? How do Circassian organizations reflect trends and 
tensions within the development of Turkish civil society and the evolution of 
Turkish nationalism? To what degree have these organizations been successful 
in influencing the direction of Turkish foreign policy? To answer these questions, 
this study will provide a short history of the Circassian people in Turkey and will 
examine the organizations that have influenced the historical development of this 
diaspora. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Circassians constitute one of the largest ethnic minorities living in Turkey. 
As a result of the Ottoman settlement policy, Circassian people were settled 
throughout the greater Middle East, including Turkey. Today, Circassians live in 
many countries, and Turkey, as the heir of the Ottoman Empire, has the largest 
population in the world. Only rough estimates can be made about the population; 
however, Kemal Karpat estimates that two million Circassians immigrated to 
Turkey between 1856 and 1876.1 Today, perhaps five million Circassians live in 
Turkey, although only two million still consider themselves Circassian (rather 
than “of Circassian descent”) and, unfortunately, less than one million can still 
                                            
1 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 68–69.  
 2 
speak the Circassian language.2 According to the Caucasian Foundation, the 
Circassian population reaches to seven million in Turkey.3  
Since there is no established definition about who Circassians are, 
different theories identify these people from various perspectives. The term 
Circassian refers to the people of the North Caucasus region whose self-
designation is Adyge, and they are identified by different names in different 
countries. In Russia, they are identified with the names of the autonomous 
republics where they live: Adyge people in the Adyge Republic, Cherkess in 
Karachay-Cherkessia, and Kabardin in Kabardino-Balkaria. However, in Turkey, 
“Circassian” has become a cover term that embraces all the displaced people of 
the North Caucasus. In this manner, the terminology encompasses the group in a 
social and historical manner rather than an ethnic distinction.4 Amjad Jaimoukha 
summarizes the various concepts about Turkish Circassians under three main 
categories. First, Circassian is an umbrella term for all North Caucasus people 
living in Turkey. Second, Circassian is a term for the Northwest Caucasian 
people, such as the Adyge, Abkhaz, Abazin, and Ubykh who are ethnically and 
linguistically related. Third, Circassian is a term that specifies the ethnic Adyge.5 
“Every Adyge is Circassian, but every Circassian is not Adyge,” according to 
Circassian intellectual Ismail Berkok’s definition.6 The first usage of the term 
Circassian dates back to thirteenth century Turkish records denoting the Adyge-
speaking tribes of the Western and Central North Caucasus; it has gained a 
widespread use since.7 
                                            
2 Walter Richmond, The Circassian Genocide (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2013), 130. 
3 Kafkas Vakfi, Diaspora, Turkiye, accessed on 10 December 2013, 
http://www.kafkas.org.tr/diaspora/turkiye.html. 
4 Arsen Avagyan, Osmanlı Imparatorluğu ve Kemalist Türkiye’nin Devlet-İktidar Sisteminde 
Çerkesler (Circassians in the State and Power Structures of the Ottoman Empire and Kemalist 
Turkey) (L. Denisenko, Trans.) (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2004), 18. 
5 Amjad Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 11.  
6 Gonul Ertem, “Dancing to Modernity: Cultural Politics of Cherkess Nationhood in the 
Hearthland of Turkey,” PhD Dissertation (Texas: University of Texas, 2000), 150.  
7 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 20.  
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The Circassian people and their war with Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth 
century are not well-studied subjects. As a result of the Russian conquest of the 
North Caucasus and the suppression of the local population, most of the region’s 
Circassian population was forcibly deported from their homeland to the Ottoman 
Empire. At first, the Ottoman Empire voluntarily received Muslim Caucasian 
refugees, who were known as good fighters and loyal subjects of the sultan.8 
However, the mismanagement of the deportation and the Russians’ brutal 
campaign to get rid of non-Russian people created a tragedy. In addition to the 
thousands of people who died in the Caucasus while resisting Russian troops, 
thousands more died on the way to their new lands or from starvation and 
disease during the course of their resettlement in the Ottoman Empire. The 
violence committed against Circassians in the Caucasus and the suffering they 
experienced during the course of their resettlement in the Ottoman Empire have 
not gained much attention, compared to other studies of genocide or ethnic 
cleansing. 
Examining Circassians within the political discourse of the late Ottoman 
era and contemporary Turkey contributes to the literature of diaspora identities 
and ethnic nationalism. Since diasporas are living communities and political 
groups, they should be examined not just as particular groups that are formed 
vis-à-vis the nation state, but also as political bodies that are evaluated through 
several discourses, such as nationalism, identity, citizenship, loyalty, and 
militarism. Starting with the idea that not all states are nation-states, this thesis 
contributes to the general understanding of nationalism without a nation-state by 
examining the question of how the nation is imagined as their homeland and by 
creating multiple attachments to attain these homelands as their own state. The 
meanings and examples that pertain to ethnicity and citizenship should be 
understood not only through the eyes of assimilation, suppression, conflict, and 
tension between a superior nation and an ethnic minority, but also within their 
                                            
8 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 32. 
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own complexity, with the recognition of the multiplicity of actors and forces that 
are shaped by the terrains of nationalism, ethnicity, identity, and citizenship. 
The definition problem is also linked with the identity problem of the 
Circassian people, as well as the other minorities under the rule of the Republic 
of Turkey. The role of ethnic identity within the imagined binding term of “Turkish 
National Identity” was suppressed until the democratization movements during 
the 1960s. Generally, they have been situated at different societal levels. 
Ethnicity has been observed through “minority” cultures, whereas nationalism 
has been interpreted through state ideology. While all minorities were 
represented under the term of Ottoman Muslim during the late years of the 
Ottoman Empire, Kemalist nationalist definition did not encompass ethnic groups 
during the first decades of the Republic. Hence, national identity was structured 
by banning the use of ethnic languages and banning the demonstration of ethnic 
cultural figures in the community.  
With the latest democratization efforts in Turkey during the last decade, 
ethnic minorities, such as Circassians, have gained many rights, such as 
television broadcasts and education in minority languages. Circassian groups 
and organizations have significant roles to create and solidify Circassian identity 
and culture in many towns in Turkey. In recent years, it also seems apparent that 
Circassian social organizations may play a significant role for the construction of 
cultural identity, and also to influence Turkish foreign policy, vis-à-vis relations 
with Russia.  
Circassian exile and their sufferings under the Russian regime have 
received more attention with the announcement of the 2014 Sochi Winter 
Olympics. Elements of the Circassian diaspora, particularly in Turkey, have 
attempted to bring the attention of the world to their history of exile and 
sufferings. News accounts of these efforts appearing in the pages of world-
famous publications are an important issue. With the upcoming Sochi Winter 
Olympics, Circassian associations have organized efforts, both in the North 
Caucasus region and diaspora countries, to protest the games. Some have 
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suggested that this opposition to the games may threaten the security of the 
Olympics. Others have hoped that Russia would acknowledge the history of 
violence against North Caucasians.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis examines Circassian exile and Circassian organizations in 
Turkey. Although the Circassian minority constitutes an important part of 
Turkey’s population, the actual history of this small nation is disproportionately 
not well known, within the Circassian diaspora and the Turkish population at 
large. One of the hypotheses of this study is that the Circassian minority in 
Turkey occupies a loyal and peaceful niche compared to the other minorities. 
This loyalty to the existing regime is a unique cultural characteristic of the 
Circassians, which has developed as a result of their history.  
Defining the Circassian people in Turkey from their massive deportations 
to the current date is a complicated subject. There are pro-Circassian people 
who mention the bravery of their ancestors during the wars of the late Ottoman 
era and the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) era. Circassian 
participation in the War of Independence was very high compared to the other 
ethnic nationalities. Eleven out of twenty leaders promoted to the rank of veteran 
were of Circassian origin, and nearly all of the Defense Ministers were of 
Circassian origin during the CUP administration.9 On the other hand, the 
outbreak of the Anzavur rebellion among Circassian communities along the 
southern coast of the sea of Marmara and the aborted assassination attempt on 
Mustafa Kemal in Izmir in 1926 were signs of disloyalty to the state that 
blemished Circassian loyalty, as well as the little-known actions of the “Special 
Organization” (Teskilat-i Mahsusa) led by another controversial Circassian figure, 
Esref Kuscubasi.10 According to Avagyan, Circassians were also a special threat 
                                            
9 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 277–281. 
10 Ryan Gingeras, “The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey and the North Caucasus Diaspora, 
1914–1923,” European Journal of Turkish Studies (2011), 12.  
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with their great contribution to the War of Independence, since the state was 
attempting to present the collective efforts of the war as a pure Turkish nationalist 
movement on which the Republic would be built.11  
Secondly, there is a dichotomy of the ideas within the Circassian 
community, which represents the independent characteristics of a small nation. 
In history, they could not manage to create a long-lived state structure, and 
basically lived in a separate manner. Today, it is possible to see such variety in 
formal organizations and informal groups in Turkey. A previous lack of collective 
action shifted to an opposition against the Sochi Winter Olympics with the help of 
Circassian organizations, especially when the Caucasian Associations 
Federation (Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu or KAFFED) stimulated identity 
within the Circassian community and turned into a uniting force.  
Thirdly, because of the lack of unity in actions and rhetoric, Circassian 
organizations could not go far from the cultural perspective in Turkey. Their 
political influences have not created enough stimuli among the population and 
have not been represented at high levels in the Turkish administration.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Circassians, similar to Kurds and Alevis, are one of the major ethnic 
groups in Turkey. They have maintained their traditions until today and reflected 
their cultural differences to the Anatolian culture. However, their struggle under 
Russian rule and the tension to create a Circassian identity under the Ottoman 
Empire and the Republic of Turkey are not examined in detail. Lack of 
institutionalization among Circassians throughout history, and different policies 
about the ethnic nations under Ottoman and Modern Turkey, can be shown as 
the main reasons for the lack of literature about Circassians. During their first 
years under the Ottoman regime, Circassians managed to establish some 
organizations and published magazines to preserve their culture, language, and 
different identity. However, with the process of creating a “modern nation state” 
                                            
11 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 256. 
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under Kemalist policy, all organizations were closed down and all publications 
were restricted, as well as other implications of this policy between 1925 and 
1946. This policy has changed from the 1990s onwards, and therefore most of 
the publications are relatively new.  
Most of the literature dating before the “great Exile of 1864” is based on 
the accounts or reports of travelers, businessmen, and some government 
personnel, such as the British diplomats D. Urquhart, E. Spencer, J.S. Bell, and 
J. Longworth.12 Since they lived among the Circassians, their works are 
invaluable contributions to the social structure of the community during their visit. 
Justin McCarthy’s book13 is one of the first well-documented and comprehensive 
western accounts of the treatment of Ottoman Muslims from the 1820s to the 
creation of the Republic of Turkey. The second chapter of the book covers the 
Circassian wars, in which over half a million people were killed and the 
Abkhazian nation was decimated.  
Walter Richmond’s two books provide a great deal of history of the 
Circassians in their homeland and in Turkey.14 These two sources, as well as 
Amjad Jaimoukha’s book,15 are well-written introductory documents to 
understand who the Circassians are, and what makes them different within a 
historical concept. 
Recent literature about the Circassian population and the ethnic diversity 
of Turkey helps us understand the role of Circassians during the creation phase 
                                            
12 David Urquhart was the British agent appointed by the British foreign Minister Lord 
Palmerston to prepare a document about the North Caucasus region based on the British interest 
over the region. Later he was appointed as the secretary to the British ambassador in Ottoman 
Empire and he set up contacts with the early deported Circassians in Istanbul. He travelled to 
North Caucasus many times and Edmund Spencer, James Stanislaus Bell, and John Augustus 
Longworth companied him during his different visits. They all wrote about their observations and 
these are one of the first writing about the region. See. The Circassians: A Handbook, 70–73. 
13 Justin McCartey, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of the Ottoman Muslims, 1821–
1922 (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1995), 23-58. 
14 See Walter Richmond, The Northwest Caucasus (New York: Routledge, 2011) and The 
Circassian Genocide (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013).  
15 See Amjad Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
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of the republic and the consequences of ethnic diversity in current Turkish 
politics. The two works of Professor Gingeras liberate us from approaching 
Turkey as a monolithic whole.16 Moreover, Gingeras’ Sorrowful Shores17 
presents the shared history of Western Anatolia between the outbreak of the 
Balkan Wars in 1912 and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. During 
these time periods, both ethnic minorities were quite influential in the 
contemporary structure of the region, as well as other parts of the country where 
they were deployed during this period. Arsen Avagyan also provides a unique 
and not well-known history of Circassians acting as a corporate group with stated 
communal goals under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid and the CUP, and the use 
of ethnic solidarity for mass mobilization during the period between 1919 and 
1922.18 
The search for identity became the source of tension in the Ottoman 
Empire and the Republic of Turkey. In his article, Kemal Karpat presents the 
complex nature of political identity and political legitimacy during the late 
Ottoman Era. He defines how three pre-existing identities—Ottoman, Muslim, 
and Turk—evolved into a single “national” identity during the late Ottoman era 
and in the Republic of Turkey. Three identities were used interchangeably until 
the time of the republic; however, the ethnic Turkishness did not answer all of the 
identities when the state refused the other two in the early 1930s.19 The usage of 
the term “Turk” emerged during the late Ottoman era. “By the mid-1890s the 
elites regarded the term “Turk” expressing both their affiliation with the state and 
                                            
16 See Ryan Gingers, “Notorious Subjects, Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to 
the Turkish National Movement in Northwestern Anatolia, 1919–23,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 89–108. http://search.proquest.com/docview 
/59813618?accountid=12702; Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End 
of the Ottoman Empire, 1912–1923 (New York : Oxford University Press, 2009). 
17 See Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman 
Empire, 1912–1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
18 See Avagyan, Çerkesler. 
19 Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and 
Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2. 
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their Islamic and Ottoman identity without affecting their special Albanian, 
Circassian or even Arab ethnic identity.”20 
Kemal Kirisci and Soner Cagaptay have deemphasized previous studies 
to understand the development of Turkish nationalism using state practices as 
the key elements to understand the articulation of nationalism by the state elite. 
The ethnic identity of the Turkish Republic is defined as “Turkishness” in Kemal 
Kirisci’s article.21 Although the citizenship was defined as “Turks” in the 1924 
constitution, the government aimed to embrace all different ethnic and religious 
groups, which were once identified as Ottoman or Muslim, under the single term 
of “Turkishness.” Cagaptay argues that in the inter war period, Kemalist 
secularism was very successful in eliminating religion from the public sphere, as 
well as other ethnic identities, in Turkey, leaving the Turkish National Identity 
devoid of religious and multi-ethnic concepts.22 
Turkish national identity, in Geller’s words, is defined as “an 
unselfconscious blend of Kemalist republicanism and urban Islam fusing Turkish 
and Muslim identity in an apparently seamless web of symbol and sentiment, as 
Ottoman and Muslim may blend once again.”23 Also, Gellner defines nationalism 
as “a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social 
bond. Whatever principles of authority may exist between people depend for their 
legitimacy on the fact that the members of the group concerned are of the same 
culture.”24 According to this definition, nationalism arises from intense identity 
and identity arises from the cultural solidarity on which the Turkish State was 
established. From this perspective, supporting Circassian cultural and linguistic 
                                            
20 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, 9. 
21 See Kemal Kirisci, “The EU as a Vehicle of Post-national Transformation,” In Turkey 
Beyond Nationalism, Towards Post-nationalist Identities, Edited by Hans-Lukas Kieser (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
22 See Soner Cagaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is Turk? 
(New York: Routledge, 2006).  
23 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, 3. 
24 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 3–4. 
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activities under well-organized structures will promote the rise of identity; 
Circassian organizations have been successful with this issue so far.  
Erik Jan Zurcher examines the emergence of Turkish national identity 
between the last era of the Ottoman Empire and the first fifteen years of the 
Turkish Republic. He attempts to define the binding forces on which the Ottoman 
Empire and Turkey were built in three different eras: Before the Young Turks 
period, the Young Turks period, and the Kemalist era. During the first era, being 
an Ottoman and being a Muslim was the binding force, while during the second 
era the term “Ottoman Muslim” became the identity. During this period 
Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism were not rejected totally and were used as 
supplementary elements of the new identity. Therefore, as mentioned by Bernard 
Lewis, Turkish speaking Ottoman Muslims of Balkan and Caucasian descent 
played a considerable role in the national movement.25  
Hakan Yavuz labels the national identity that has come to dominate 
Turkey as Neo-Ottomanism, the current state identity that has arguably been 
widely adopted by the ruling Party of Justice and Development (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi or AKP). He states that, “in recent years, Ottoman-Islamic 
origins of Turkish nationhood in particular have become more assertive and 
effective in conditioning and shaping the state’s policies and society’s perception 
of ‘self.’”26 Yavuz describes how new neo-Ottoman identity has come to 
challenge the traditional post-Ottoman Turkish national identity, which is a 
current example of the changing and evolving notion of identity. Thus, Yavuz’s 
article aids this study by presenting how identity is important for foreign policy 
and how it serves the direction of foreign policy. Yavuz supplements his ideas of 
neo-Ottomanism and makes connections with national identity and foreign policy 
                                            
25 Erik Jan Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims, and Turkish Nationalists; Identity 
Politics 1908–1938,” In Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, Ed. Kemal H.Karpat, 150–179 
(Leiden: Brill, 2000), 172–173. 
26 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-
Ottomanism,” Middle East Critique 7, iss.12 (1998): 22. 
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throughout his books: Islamic Political Identity in Turkey,27 The Emergence of a 
New Turkey,28 and Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey,29  
To summarize the works concerning the Circassian ideologies and 
organizations in Turkey, Celikpala provides a detailed description of the “United 
Caucasianism” as an ideology in his PhD thesis.30 When the revolution of 1917 
swept away the old Tsarist Russia, the North Caucasus people of the region tried 
to create a sovereign confederation in the region. However, the confederation 
was short lived, and in May of 1919 it dissolved; later, in 1922, the region 
became part of the Soviet Union. This short-lived attempt is a good example to 
show the differences in the region, and also in the cultural characteristics of the 
Caucasian independent people. At the same time, Young Turks were dealing 
with the uprising led by the Circassian gang leader Ahmet Anzavur in the 
southern Marmara region of Turkey. However, this attempt did not end 
successfully, since the wartime policies of the Young Turks exacerbated the 
economic situation of the deported Circassians. “Poverty, hunger, political 
alienation, and the fear of extermination a la the Armenians were concerns that 
defined the mood of many North Caucasian communities along the Marmara 
region.”31 The supporters’ desire for autonomy ended with the death or exile of 
supporters to eastern provinces of Turkey.32  
                                            
27 See M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
28 See M. Hakan Yavuz, The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). 
29 See M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
30 Mitat Celikpala, “Search for a Common North Caucasian Identity: The Mountaineers‟ 
Attempts for Survival and Unity in Response to the Russian Rule. PhD Dissertation (Ankara: 
Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, 2002), 59–104. 
31 Ryan Gingers, “Notorious Subjects, Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to the 
Turkish National Movement in Northwestern Anatolia, 1919–23.” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 103. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/59813618?accountid=12702. 
32 Ibid, 104. 
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Sufian Zhemukhov focuses on the problem of nationalist movements 
among Circassians all over the world by comparing different approaches of the 
Circassian people, such as nationalist, sovereigntist, centrist, culturalist, and 
accommodationalist.33 This classification is helpful to understand the level of 
ambition between different groups and organizations in the diaspora and the 
homeland. For example, some organizations in Turkey, such as Patriots of 
Circassia, Caucasus Forum, and the Samsun United Caucasus Association, are 
the supporters of sovereignist movements and usually oppose the culturalist 
policy of KAFFED toward North Caucasus. Some extremist units, on the other 
hand, especially in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, support more nationalist 
policies on the issue, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union forced ethnic 
Russians to leave the region gradually.34 
Walter Richmond describes these movements as divided into two main 
categories. A Circassian revival began in the 1970s with the creation of two 
political platforms. The revolutionaries (Devrimciler) believe a socialist revolution 
in Turkey would be the best option to protect Caucasian peoples’ (Circassian, 
Abkhazian, Chechen, etc.) rights, while the returnist (Dönüşçüler) supported 
repatriation to North Caucasus. The revolutionists met resistance and eventually 
lost support with the coup of September 1980, while returnists were still active 
until the early 1980s.35  
Celikpala’s other work examines the influence of the North Caucasus 
diaspora in Turkey with a historical perspective.36  He defines the negative and 
positive effects of associations and foundations on Turkish foreign policy, and 
their reactions and expectations from the Turkish government starting from the 
                                            
33 Sufian Zhemukhov, “The Birth of Modern Circassian Nationalism.” Nationalities Papers 40, 
no. 4 (2012): 503. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1152166568?accountid=12702. 
34 As Sochi Approaches, Ethnic Russians Continue to Leave the North Caucasus, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41480&tx_ttnews%5
BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=d6094a9180658edbac2303ba9e91970d#.UlzBpha5fFI. 
35 Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 130. 
36 Mitat Celikpala, “From immigrants to Diaspora: Influence of the North Caucasus Diaspora 
in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 3 (2006): 423–446. 
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early 1950s and especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He examines 
the historical creation of Circassian diaspora organizations in Turkey, focusing 
much of his attention on the Abkhazian case. In the 1990s, The Caucasus-
Abkhazia Solidarity Committee and Caucasus-Chechen Solidarity Committee 
played more of an active role to shape Turkish foreign policy with the outbreak of 
the Abkhazian War and Chechen Wars.37 These organizations provided policy 
papers to high officials before their visits to the region. Moreover, the provocative 
declarations of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) members were 
striking compared to the current situation in Turkey. In 1995, the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Karayalcin, said that, “We have family relations with Chechnya. For this 
reason we can’t see this problem as an internal problem of another country.”38 
Also in the same manner, the head of the TNGA Husamettin Cindoruk declared 
that, “If the Caucasus is Russia’s back garden it is also Turkey’s front garden.”39 
Despite these supportive declarations, Turkey has supported the territorial 
integrity of the region. Celikpala’s work about the organizations until 2006 
brought a different perspective of an ethnic minorities’ contribution to state policy; 
however, the direct link, or the creation of a common idea to influence state 
policy, is not clearly mentioned in his work. Also, he mostly writes about the 
Abkhazian case and mentions little about the other North Caucasus groups.  
Lars Funch Hansen’s article tells us about the renewed ethnic mobilization 
among Circassians in the North Caucasus region that has emerged since the 
second half of the 2000s.40 His article describes the establishment of new civil 
society organizations and Internet-based groups in North Caucasus. A similar 
trend is found among associations and individually published web pages, mostly 
based on cultural figures in Turkey. He discusses the increase of youth activism 
                                            
37 Celikpala, “From Immigrants to Diaspora,” 432–437. 
38 Ibid, 438. 
39 Ibid, 438. 
40 Lars Funch Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization in the North Caucasus 20-Years 
After the Fall of the Soviet Union.” JEMIE - Journal on Ethno politics and Minority Issues in 
Europe 11, no. 2 (2012): 103. 
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in the Caucasus, especially on social media. This mobilization is not just ethnic 
and the promotion of ethnic separation in the region, but cultural, indigenous, and 
minority rights related with goals to get more attention from homeland and 
diaspora. The upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi has played an important 
role to increase support among Circassians to force Russia to recognize the 
nineteenth century exile as an act of genocide. In this respect, international 
events, such as the Sochi Olympics, are a great opportunity for the Caucasus 
peoples to create more radical or politicized understanding about their situation. 
While describing increased activism in the region, Hansen fails to show the 
importance of the organization’s role for shaping society and forcing society to 
shape state politics.  
Alexsandre Toumarkine, Erol Taymaz, and Ayhan Kaya have studied the 
structures, policies, and activism of Circassian organizations in Turkey. 
Toumarkine undertakes a comparative analysis of North Caucasian and Balkan 
organizations, and underlines the differences between these two groups in terms 
of ideology and relations with the Turkish state.41 Also, he separates North 
Caucasus organizations from Kurd and Alevi organizations with their loyalty to 
the Turkish state and pan-Turkist ideology. Furthermore, with democratic 
changes in the state structure since 2001, there has been a significant change in 
Ankara towards non-Turkish organizations. Government officials now 
increasingly designate non-Turkish communities in Turkey as “brother” 
communities. In spite of his insightful comments on the creation of the 
organizations in Turkey from a historical and ideological perspective, he does not 
specifically examine North Caucasus organizations and their relationships with 
the Turkish state. Considering the time in which the article was written, and the 
many changes that have taken place since then, there is a need to examine the 
political roles of North Caucasian organizations more deeply and critically. 
                                            
41 Alexandre Toumarkine, “Balkan and Caucasian Immigrant Associations: Community and 
Politics.” In Turkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetcilik (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001), 425–450. 
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Erol Taymaz examines the historical evolution of the North Caucasian 
organizations between 1908 and 2001.42 After examining the historical 
background of these organizations, he posits an optimistic portrayal about the 
efforts of these organizations and their possible contribution to Turkey’s 
accession to the European Union. Cultural influences of the organization and 
their role to preserve ethnic identity are the main topics of his article, with little 
mentioning of returnist policies in the 1970s. However, Ayhan Kaya’s book 
Turkiye’deki Cerkesler carries a survey that shows the dominant idea of returnist 
policy to homeland, although most of them have not been in the region and with 
no clear information about the region. Moreover, he does not mention United 
Caucasianism and Islamic activism in Circassian organizations—especially 
Kafkas Vakfi—as a different perspective.  
Ayhan Kaya identifies the effect of globalization on the different political 
strategies within the Circassian community before 2004.43  He defines the 
changing structure of Circassian politics from the perspective of minority politics 
under Turkification policies to diasporic structure after the early 1990s. He bases 
his analysis of the Circassian diaspora movement on Patrick R. Ireland’s 
Institutional Channeling Theory, which is an alternative theory of ethnic and race-
based dichotomies. According to Ayhan Kaya, Circassian organizations can be 
understood as a “non-ethnic” social movement until the 1990s, since the names 
of the organizations reflect regional ties rather than ethnic. However, the role of 
the organizations under this theory is not explored very clearly. He associates all 
North Caucasian people under the Circassian name (including Chechens, 
Dagestanis, and others) and uses Circassian as an umbrella term for all North 
Caucasian deportees in Turkey, as do United Caucasianists.  
                                            
42 Erol Taymaz, “Kuzey Kafkas Dernekleri-North Caucasus Associations,” In Turkiye’de Sivil 
Toplum ve Milliyetcilik (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001), 451–460. 
43 Ayhan Kaya, “Political Participation Strategies of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey.” 
Mediterranean Politics 9, No. 2 (2004): 221. 
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In another study, Ayhan Kaya examines minority–majority relations in the 
framework of the production of the other nationalities in Turkey.44 He describes 
contemporary diaspora identities and how identities differentiate diaspora 
formations. He asserts that contemporary diasporas are found into two main 
pillars: modern communicative circuitry, and acts of exclusion by receiving 
societies. He claims that Circassians in Turkey created distinct cultural identities, 
depending on how they were recognized by their neighbors and by the state. 
Cultural activities become the main practice of the diaspora group taking them 
away from the misunderstandings and prejudices that may cause their exclusion 
from the public.  
When Turkey changed its official policy towards the Chechens and 
implemented a rapprochement strategy with Russia intensifying economic and 
political relations, Circassian organizations in Turkey withdrew their support 
partly to Chechens, so as not to conflict with official state policy. Also, after the 
rise of common opposition to fundamentalist Islam—especially in Chechnya—
Circassian associations, such as KAFDER (later KAFFED), and the Circassian 
Democratic Platform started underlining their secular characters.45 He defines 
the importance of the culture for the creation of diasporic identity in two 
perspectives. First, it is a way of dealing with the conditions without engaging 
state law. Second, it serves the regeneration of the self within the community that 
provides a ground for further activities.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will discuss Circassian history and their different political 
movements in their homeland and in the diaspora. It will follow a historical path 
and, in the organizations part, the hypothesis is based on historical theories 
about Circassian movements in Turkey. In this part, Kafkas Dernekleri 
                                            
44 Ayhan Kaya, “Cultural Reification in Circassian Diaspora: Stereotypes, Prejudices and 
Ethnic Relations.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 1 (2005): 129. 
45 Kaya, “Cultural Reification in Circassian Diaspora,” 143. 
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Federasyonu-KAFFED and Circassian Trust (CT) or Circassian Foundation 
(Kafkas Vakfi), and the other organizations and groups in Turkey will be 
examined in a historical concept and ideological perspective.  
The historical dimension of this thesis will be based on secondary 
sources, such as books and articles both in English and Turkish, as well as some 
primary sources, such as memoirs (David Urquhart, Evliya Celebi, J. Longworth, 
Edmund Spencer), and the latest revealed Ottoman Archives (Osmanli 
Belgelerinde Kafkas Gocleri-I ve II). The second part of this thesis will also 
include electronic sources and newspaper articles about contemporary events in 
Turkish history concerning the Circassians. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will examine the Circassian exile and Circassian organizations 
in Turkish history. The first chapter will start with the definition of Circassian 
people, their culture, religion, language, as well as the literature about 
Circassians. 
Chapter II will briefly introduce Circassian history from pre-historic times to 
the modern Turkish Republic. In this part, the author will specifically point out 
Russian rule in Caucasus and the difficulties that the Circassian people faced. 
The exile of 1864 is not a well-known situation in the world. While even less 
violent activities are recognized by many organizations as genocide or a human 
rights violation, the Circassian issue still is not a well-known issue, despite 
deaths and losses reaching millions.  
Chapter III will cover identity politics in the late Ottoman era and the 
Republic of Turkey, and the change of Circassian identity politics during these 
periods. This chapter will discuss how the Ottoman Empire and Turkey applied 
different policies to bind the people together and aimed to survive the wellbeing 
of state and their methods.  
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Chapter IV will cover the role of formal Circassian associations with 
Turkish political life and their influence over the diaspora group in Turkey. The 
contemporary structure of Circassian organizations and their activities to 
rejuvenate the Circassian identity in Turkey will be investigated.  
G. WHO ARE THE CIRCASSIANS?  
The term Circassians, the English equivalent of the Turkish version 
“Cherkess or Cerkes” denotes all or part of the indigenous people of the 
Caucasus region who live at the north side of the Caucasus Mountains, which 
divides the North Caucasus Autonomous regions from Transcaucasia, where 
three independent countries continue their sovereignty. 
There is no clear agreement as to whom, exactly, those nations refer. 
There are three basic denotations widely used. First, the most comprehensive 
denotation includes all the natives of the North Caucasus region. The more 
specific denotation excludes the Northeast Caucasus people and encompasses 
the Northwestern Caucasians: The Adyges, Abkhaz-Abazas, and Ubykhs and 
other minor northwest communities. The most restrictive definition refers only to 
the Adyges, who are composed of many tribes and speak mutually intelligible 
dialects that make up Adygabze, the Circassian language. Adyge and 
Circassian(s) will be used interchangeably in this thesis (Adyge refers to the self-
designation of the people and Circassian is used generally by outsiders). In 
Turkey, Cherkess (Cerkes) is used to reference all descendants of the peoples 
who came from North Caucasus during the nineteenth century and afterwards. 
1. People and Country 
Throughout history, the North Caucasus has been a refuge for many 
disparate groups trying to escape from the dominance of different states, 
especially the three big empires: The Russians, the Ottomans, and the Persians. 
This region is an important stronghold for them and the power struggle to control 
the region has been an important issue. Thus, boundaries between various local 
tribes and ethnic groups have stayed unclear and continuously changing. The 
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historical homeland of the Circassians is located in the NW Caucasus region. 
Although its boundaries are not clear, in the course of history it is possible to 
delineate historical Circassia before the Russian-Caucasian War during the 
eighteenth century. Its boundaries encompassed the land between the Black Sea 
to the west, the river Sunzha to the east, the Caucasus Mountains to the south, 
the steppes north of the Kuban, and the Pyatigorsk plains to the north.46   
The Circassians, together with the genetically and linguistically related 
Abkhazians of Abkhazia, Abazins of the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, and 
the nearly extinct community of Ubykh, made up the indigenous population of the 
NW Caucasus. However, their languages were not mutually intelligible. The 
Adige were by far the largest nation of the NW Caucasus before their exile to 
Ottoman lands, and composed of many tribes: in the eastern part Kabardins and 
Beslanays; in the western part Abzakh, Shapsugh, Bzhedugh, Nartkhuaj, 
Kemirgoi and Hatuqwey.47 The Shapsugh also had their national area within the 
borders of Krasnodar Region until its abolition in 1945.48  
2. Demography 
There is no clear estimate for the current population of the region, yet 
reliable estimates put the total number at more than 800,000.49 According to the 
Russian 2010 census, 719,000 Circassians live in North Caucasus: 516,826 
were registered as Kabardian, 124,835 as Adygheyan, 73,184 as Cherkess, and 
3,882 as Shapsugh.50 It is difficult to establish the exact numbers of Circassians 
living outside of the Caucasus, since they suffered many deportations as 
consequences of state policies and war. Various estimates give different figures 
for the size of the Circassian community in Turkey, which is the largest in the 
                                            
46 Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook, 19. 
47 Ibid, 19. 
48 Ibid, 95.  
49 Ibid, 21. 
50 The official results of the 2010 All-Russia Population Census can be reached at 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_10.php (Accessed 16 October 2013). 
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world. However, 3 to 7 million Circassian descendants live in many cities and 
nearly 900 villages spread throughout the country.51  
There is a significant number of Circassians living in Syria (100,000),52 
Jordan (111,000),53 Iraq (30,000),54 and Israel (over 4,000).55 Secondary 
diaspora communities are also found in the United States (around 9,000), and in 
Western Europe, especially in Germany and the Netherlands (around 40,000).56  
The Karachay-Cherkessia Republic was first established as an 
autonomous oblast in 1923, and transformed to the republic in 1993. It 
encompassed only 0.3 percent of Russia’s overall population. There are 
Russians (40 percent of the population); the Karachai, an indigenous ethnic 
Turkic group (36 percent of the population); The Circassians (9.7 percent of the 




                                            
51 The Caucasus Trust (CT) and the Federation of the Caucasus Associations (KAFFED), 
the two of the most prominent Caucasian organizations in Turkey, give the figure of seven million 
for the number of people in Turkey with Caucasian ancestry with the majority of them being 
Circassian (Caucasus Trust, n.d.). A prominent researcher speaks of two to three million 
Circassians (Papsu, 2005), Nart Ajans, 
http://www.nartajans.net/site/haberler_5573_turkiye_deki_cerkes_koyleri.html. 
52 Moshe Gammer, The Caspian Region: The Caucasus (Routhledge, 2004), 64 ; Center for 
Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (Ortadogu Stratejic Arastirmalar Merkezi-ORSAM), “Syrian 
Circassians,” ORSAM Report No: 130 (2012): 4. 
53 Ethnic People Groups of Jordon,” Joshua Project, accessed on 15 October 2013, 
http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php?rog3=JO. 
54 Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (Ortadogu Stratejic Arastirmalar Merkezi-
ORSAM), “Iraqi Circassians,” Report No: 134 (2012): 10. 
55 Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (Ortadogu Stratejic Arastirmalar Merkezi-
ORSAM), “Israeli Circassians,” accessed on 15 October 2013, 
http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=3852 
56 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, accessed on 10 December 2013, 
http://www.unpo.org/members/7869. 
57 Glen E. Howard, Volatile Borderland: Russia and the North Caucasus (Washington, DC: 
Jamestown Foundation, 2012), 299–308. 
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Kabardino-Balkaria is a federated republic and a component part of the 
Russian Federation. According to the census of 2002, there are about 500,000 
Kabardin, 225,000 Russians, and 100,000 Balkars, another ethnic Turkic group, 
residing in the republic.58  
The autonomous Republic of Adyge is situated in southern Russia on the 
northern foothills of the Caucasus Mountain range, and the Krasnodar Region of 
Russia encompasses the republic, which is populated mostly by Russian 
citizens. Over 80 ethnic groups live in the republic, yet three major groups make 
up the majority of the population: 64.5 percent Russian, 24.2 percent Adyge, and 
3.4 percent Armenians.59  
3. Language 
Some linguistic research suggests that more than 5,000 years ago all 
Northwest Caucasians spoke proto-west Caucasian. However, because of 
geographical differences the original language divided into three basic 
categories. Circassian is one of the three basic groups of the North West 
Caucasian language group, the other two being Abkhaz-Abaza language, and 
the extinct Ubykh language.60  
The Circassian language has many dialects, which can be categorized 
into two mutually intelligible groups called the western and eastern dialects. 
Shapsugh, Temirgoi, Bzhedugh, Abzakh, Hatuqwey and many other dialects are 
part of the Western Circassian group, whereas Besleney and Kabardin are part 
of eastern Circassian. These particular dialects also have many sub-dialects.61 
Another language group in the Caucasus is South Caucasian or 
Kartvelian: Georgian, Mingrelian, Svan, Adjar, and Laz, all of which are spoken 
by about 4.5 million people in Transcaucasia. Some linguists dispute the 
                                            
58 Howard, Volatile Borderland, 310. 
59 Ibid, 346. 
60 Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook, 245. 
61 Ibid, 246. 
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existence of any genetic link between North and South Caucasian, and for many 
specialists suggested links between the Caucasus languages and other 
languages spoken around the region are open to serious doubt.62 
4. Religion 
The Circassian approach to religion was also quite different. Religion was 
centered on polytheism, paganism, and animism with some Christian and Muslim 
influence until the beginning of the nineteenth century.63 After the nineteenth 
century, Circassians were caught in the middle of a power struggle between 
Orthodox Russia and Muslim Turkey to convert to either Christianity or Islam. 
This was met with only superficial success. The true “religion” of the Circassians 
was and still is to some degree Adygage, which translates as “to be Adyge.” The 
main principles of Adygage are the memory of ancestors, consciousness of 
Circassia as the home of those ancestors, and tolerance of other ways of life and 
religious beliefs. The practical manifestation of Adygage was the Circassians’ 
legal–ethical code by which they regulated their society, “Adyge Habze (or 
Xabze).”64 
Circassians are nominally Sunni Muslims. There is a small Christian 
community in Mozdok in North Ossetia. The two most powerful forms of the 
Circassian system of beliefs are the ancient animistic-pagan religion, and the 
code of conduct, Adige Xabze, which also has regulated mundane life. Religious 
persecution during the Soviet period and great attachment to traditions, a 
characteristic of the Circassians, has resulted in a superficial knowledge and 
practice of religion. There is no tradition of religious fanaticism. 
                                            
62 Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook, 246. 
63 Ibid, 137. 
64 Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 6. 
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5. Socio-Political Structure 
The social structure of the northwest Caucasus was a mixture of a feudal, 
clan-based, semi-democratic societies, and slavery. According to the Circassian 
traditional social structure65 there was a prince (or Pshi) at the top of the 
pyramid. Below the Pshi, there were vassals forming the lesser nobility called 
“uork.” Below uork, there were free peasants, and at the lower level there were 
slaves, the “azat.”66 However, with the arrival of Imam Shamil’s deputy, 
Muhammed Emin in the Abzakh region, Islam separated in the Abzakh and 
Shapsugh regions and later influenced the conversion of the socio-political 
structure from a feudal version to a more egalitarian system throughout the 
region.67 Thus, egalitarian and feudal structures continued in the region for a 
while. The feudal system came to an end when Russian forces started to 
conquer Circassia, and the Tsar issued an edict prohibiting slavery on 31 July 
1864.68 Although the end of slavery in diaspora is not known clearly, there are 
records showing that it continued many years in the Ottoman lands among the 
Circassians.69 
The geography of the northwest Caucasus has had a tremendous impact 
upon the evolution of society in the region. Restrictions of travel and 
communication have impeded the integration of the numerous tribes and ethnic 
groups into a larger political structure. Different tribes emerged from the division 
of groups within themselves. The Besleney tribe, created when a clan broke off 
from the Kabardians, lived to the west. In similar fashion, the Temirgoys broke 
from the Besleneys to become a separate tribe, and the Hatukays broke from the 
Temirgoys. Some tribes, such as the Mahosh, Hamysh, Bjedukh, and 
                                            
65 Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook, 157. 
66 Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 4. 
67 Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook, 164. 
68 Ibid, 156. 
69 Ibid, 169. 
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Cherchenay, developed independently from the Kabardians, and possessed 
similar, but weaker aristocratic hierarchies.70 
In terms of the political structure, the government was the institution of 
popular assembly in east and west parts of the region, called the Hase (Xase), a 
rudimentary form of congress at which hundreds of “delegates” would assemble. 
Another assembly, the zafes, was called less frequently and dealt with more 
critical issues. Both the hase and zafes suffered from several shortcomings, such 
as a lack of organization, unity, enforcement mechanism in assemblies and 
wisdom that turned out to be fatal in the war with Russia.71 Under these 
assemblies, peasants owned their own lands yet paid tribute to the princely 
families, who, in turn extracted the services of the lesser nobility to provide 
protection for the villages and settlements of the former.  
Traditional Circassian society was martial in nature and the offspring of 
the upper-classes were required to go through a very harsh training regime. The 
code of chivalry had respect for women and elders, hospitality and blood-revenge 
as its trinity. Avoidance customs, as when a man, wife, and siblings are 
proscribed from associating in public, were manifestations of the severity of 
social relations. Women, especially of the upper class, enjoyed a relatively high 
social status. The position of Circassian women is significantly better in many 
respects than the Russian average.  
6. Xabze (Habze) 
Circassian culture, tradition and codes of behavior always prioritized 
elders over younger generations. This is known as the unwritten code of conduct 
of Circassian tradition (xabze), and is still one of the most important aspects of 
Circassian identity and way of life. This unwritten traditional conduct regulated 
military affairs, communal courts, crime and punishment, blood-feuds, the 
interaction between social classes, marriage, sexuality, and gender-relations. It 
                                            
70 Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 4. 
71 Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 6. 
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also required that some qualities included the love of fatherland and its defense 
to the last, idolization of honor, bravery and concomitant abhorrence of 
cowardice, observance of the code of chivalry, loathing of oppression, loyalty to 
the clan and kin, fealty to bonds of comradery, care and fidelity to one’s horse.72  
Reverence for age was one of the basic requirements of the Xabze 
alongside the concept of respect to the Thamede, who had shown leadership 
qualities in war, in peace, and managed to combine mature age and wisdom in 
their personalities. Another important communal characteristic of tradition is the 
Circassian concept of hospitality: Anyone who turned up on a Circassian’s 
doorstep was treated like one of the family. This was most likely a result of 
necessity; the traveler, hungry and exhausted from the trials of mountain travel, 
could count on safe harbor at any household he came across.73 
While the Xabze has changed under the influence of many forces in 
diaspora and has adopted the local traditions of the superior nation, the 
observance of various aspects of it is still acknowledged by almost all Circassian 
communities around the world; Xabze meetings, respect to thamades, wedding 
ceremonies, seating arrangements in large meetings among the Circassians, 
conduct of funerals according to the Circassian tradition, and many other notions 
of culture have survived in diaspora.  
7. Economy 
Despite the upheavals that have rocked the economy of the region since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Northwest Caucasus remains relatively peaceful 
and a stable economic structure. However, it could be better when stereotypes 
about the region are gone and foreign investors start to inject their money into 
the region.  
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Throughout their history, trade played an important role in the economy of 
the Northwest Caucasus. The products of the fertile soil and mild climate of the 
region were traded at the coastal towns of the region. There was also a slave 
trade, which contributed to the economy and which was, until the Russian 
conquests, quite common in the region.74 Raising farm stock is a principal 
economic activity. Horse breeding, especially in Kabarda, has thrived as an 
economic activity with the export of these special horses to various countries. 
These horses became a part of Russian cavalry units after the Russian 
conquest.   
The Soviet period was characterized by centralization of the economy and 
the policies after the 1920s, based on nationalization and collectivization that 
destroyed many traditional economic activities. The post-World War II period was 
characterized as the stability and stagnation era until Gorbachev’s dual concept 
of perestroika and glasnost, which ignited hopes of private ownership and a 
market economy. However, the situation deteriorated in Caucasus. Being heavily 
dependent on federal subsidies, the region had a hard time reviving its economy. 
By the end of 1993, the Kabardino-Balkaria and Adige republics were classified 
as “depressed nations,” while Karachay-Cherkessia was defined as a “stagnant 
economy.”75 Although Russian cash flow dried up during the Chechen conflict, 
which turned to a full war in December of 1994, Russian economic support to the 
region has continued, which has created huge demonstrations in the country in 
recent years.76  
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II. A SHORT CIRCASSIAN HISTORY 
The Circassians that refer to themselves as Adyge are the indigenous 
people of the Northwest Caucasus region. Throughout history they were 
composed of many tribes and clans, each of whom had a different dialect, 
traditions, and folklore. The Caucasian people, primarily the people known as 
Circassians and Abkhazians, are not Turks, yet they share common religious 
bonds with Turks as a predominantly Sunni Muslim population. Most Circassians 
are Sunni Muslims, though remnants of earlier Animism and Christianity were 
strong until the eighteenth century, when Muslim emissaries from Crimea were 
able to spread Islam in the region.77 However, there are still Christian elements 
in the region, coming from Greek Byzantium influence between the fourth and 
sixth centuries and Georgian influence between the tenth and thirteenth 
centuries.   
Since the beginning of their history, they lived on their lands in a tribal or 
clan structure and organized their societies according to their traditions and 
customs. Circassians were forced to leave their homelands by Russian armies, 
and they first became part of the Ottoman population, and later the Turkish 
Republic. Using the term Circassian as a historical category of identification, this 
chapter’s goal is to explore the history of Circassians in general, and explore the 
factors that contribute to the creation of Circassian identity in the later phase, 
specifically the relations between the Circassians and the state, and their view of 
the state starting from the medieval ages to the contemporary status of the 
nation.  
A. FROM 1ST MILLENIUM BC TO 18TH CENTURY 
Circassians have been known throughout their history, yet the first 
referrals to them date back to the first millennium BC. Civilizations attributable to 
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the ancestors of Circassians can be traced back to the third millennium BC.78 
The first bearers of the population were aboriginals in the Caucasus, who 
crossed the Don at the time of great Sarmatian Migration, together with the Ants, 
Zikhis (Kissis), Chorvats, Vals, and other small tribes.79 They coexisted with the 
Slavs and established primitive tribal organizations. From the seventh century 
BC, the Greeks developed a colonial empire along the shore of the Black Sea 
and maintained contact with the locals. The evidence of Greek archeological 
reports suggests that the ancestors of present day Circassians formed similar 
strategic settlement patterns stretching from the Taman Peninsula to the river 
Laba.80 Later, the Kaskians, who had connections with the Hattians, formed a 
conglomeration of martial tribes that lived in the northern part of the Hattian 
lands, and it was suggested that they came from the Caucasus about 3,800 
years before.81 
In the early first millennium BC, Cimmerians, ancestors of Alans and 
Ossetians, occupied the central part of the Caucasus. Later, between the 
seventh and fourth centuries, Maeotian-Scythian tribes lived in the region. In 480 
BC, the Greeks established the Bosporan Kingdom in the Eastern Crimea, and 
starting from 438 BC the kingdom pushed eastward and subjugated the 
Maeotians and Sinds.82 Subsequently, Zyghoys settled in the Caucasus starting 
from 64 AD;83 in the third century, Goths established a state in the Northwest 
Caucasus. The Huns invaded the region in 374 AD. This caused the Maeotians 
to remove to the safety of the mountains, but those on the Black Sea’s coast 
were undisturbed.84 In the fourth century AD, Christianity was introduced with the 
Byzantine Empire’s rule in the region.  
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There is a lack of clear reference to Circassians from the seventh to tenth 
centuries. Circassian groups began to take more modern shape as a coherent 
coalition of kindred tribes and clans during the tenth century AD.85 During the 
tenth century, Abkhazians and Zkhis lived on the coastal side of the Black Sea, 
and Papaghis and Kasakhs lived in the hinterlands. During the 11th century, 
Russians took part in the routing of the Khazar to cross the Taman Peninsula.86  
B. THE RUSSIAN-CIRCASSIAN WAR TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
SOVIET UNION 
At the beginning of the 16th century, the Northwest Caucasus was not 
formally a part of any state in the region. Gradually, the North Caucasus became 
the center of imperial competition between Russian and Ottoman forces. The 
Ottomans did not deal directly with the Circassians, and used the Crimean Tatars 
after completing the subjugation of Crimean lands by 1475.87 The Crimean 
Khanate collected tribute on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and generally left 
them untouched in the region. During that time, Northwest Caucasus tribes were 
scattered in the area without a sovereign structure; however, in the eastern part 
of the North Caucasus Prince Inal and his successor Idar established a more 
democratic state structure and ruled the region. In 1519, Kabarda accepted the 
suzerainty of the Crimean Khanate and accepted to pay tribute after many 
attacks of the Crimeans.88 Upon Crimean domination, Temruk, son of Idar, 
offered his symbolic submission to the Russian Tsar to become the Great Prince 
of Kabarda and married his daughter to the Tsar Ivan the Terrible.  
After destroying the Empire of the Golden Horde at the end of the 16th 
century, Russia began to push south towards the northern steppes of the 
Caucasus. During that same century, Cossacks made their first appearance in 
the region. Initial good relations between Cossacks, who settled in the steppes of 
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the river Sunzha and Terek, and the peoples of the North Caucasus grew more 
sour during the 18th century. In 1712, The Terek Cossacks submitted to Peter the 
Great and became part of Russian expansionist policy.89 Russia’s rulers grew 
more antagonistic towards the North Caucasus after 1557 and eventually set out 
to conquer the region.90 In 1736, a war broke out between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire due to a dispute over Kabarda. The war was settled by the 
independence of Kabarda guaranteed with the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. 
However, the actual effect of the treaty was to leave Kabarda completely 
defenseless and vulnerable against aggression from both sides.91 
Russian pressure increased in Caucasus after a relaxation of the 
European front with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1763. Once 
Catherine the Great decided to invade the northeastern shores of the Black Sea 
in the 1760s, the Russian military worked to expel Circassians from the region 
bit-by-bit until they were surrounded in the high mountains.92 After the second 
war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1768, the Ottomans were forced 
to cede Crimea and North Caucasus to Russia after the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca in 1774. In 1779 Empress Catherine instructed the Governor General 
of Astrakhan, Prince Potemkin, to pacify Kabarda by fair means or foul. After the 
Kabardan Army was defeated by Russian forces in 1779, Russian rule began to 
take root in Kabarda. The situation became worse when Russian troops occupied 
Kuban in 1781 and Crimea in 1784.93 
The mythical warrior, Sheikh Mansur made his first mark on the history of 
the North Caucasus in 1785. He was a Chechen follower of the Naqshabandi 
brand of Sufism, and according to written history he was the first leader who 
considered a united North Caucasian front against Tsarist Russia. He fought 
against Russian rule with North Caucasian troops and in coordination with 
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attacks by the Ottoman military. However, according to one account, he was 
imprisoned in a fortress in 1791 where he died three years after.94  
By 1801, the Russians reduced Georgia to a protectorate and formed a 
vice around the North Caucasus tribes, which sealed the fate of Circassians. 
Eventually, Russia increased its authority in the region, and in 1810 conducted a 
campaign in which many Circassians were killed, and approximately 200 
Circassian villages were burned.95 
In the following years, Circassian attempts to reacquire previous territories 
were conducted, but Russian troops were able to suppress them each time by 
killing many North Caucasian people, and by burning their villages. Kabardins 
suffered much from these attacks and their numbers fell from 350,000 in the 
1770s to a mere 50,000 in 1818.96 The title of the great Prince of Kabarda was 
abolished in 1822, and Russian pressure in the region increased through 1825. 
During this time period many Kabardin immigrated to western Caucasus and 
continued their war against Russian forces. Although Russian forces subjugated 
Kabarda, Kabardans searched for allies to continue their fight instead of 
accepting defeat. Thus, they maintained contact with Shamil.  
The religious and mystical Sufi sect of Islam was a widespread belief in 
the Northern Caucasus at the end of the eighteen-century with the leadership of 
Imam Mansur, Gazi Muhammed, Hamzat-bek, and Shaykh Shamil. They 
believed that the jihad (fight against the enemy of Islam) would contribute to the 
creation of an independent Caucasus. Imam Mansur managed to unite a 
significant amount of Circassians, especially the Chechens and Dagestanis, 
under the idea of a Motherland and religion until in 1791 when he was taken as a 
prisoner by the Russians. Later in 1794, Imam Gazi Muhammed organized 
another resistance under the name of Gazavat, the synonym of jihad, and this 
movement was carried on by Hamzat and Shamil. In 1834, Shamil was chosen 
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as the leader of this movement and became the symbol of Circassian resistance 
until his imprisonment on 6 September 1859.97 
After the defeat of Ottoman forces during the Russo-Ottoman Battle of 
1828–29, the treaty of Adrianople, in 1829, forced Ottoman troops to leave their 
forts on the Circassian coast of the Black Sea. Article 4 of the treaty contained 
the following stipulation: “All the coast of the Black Sea from the mouth of the 
Kuban to the wharf of Saint Nikolai inclusive shall enter into the permanent 
possession of the Russian Empire.”98  Thereafter, Russia embarked on a vicious 
war of attrition, which caused the fierce resistance of Circassians for 35 years. As 
a part of their strategy, Russia, on one hand made attempts to co-opt the 
Circassian elite, and on the other hand, used brute force tactics to subdue 
Circassians, which hardened the resolve of the hearty Adige.99 
Circassia was never part of Ottoman territory. When Russian pressure 
increased in the region and Russia demanded Circassians recognize its rule over 
the region; Circassians rejected. Starting from the 1830s onwards, tensions and 
fights between Circassian Units and Cossacks increased. In 1835, General 
Velyaminov, at the head of 12,000 Russian forces, led a bloody campaign 
against Circassians and Abkhazians that resulted with the deaths of many 
locals.100  
The looming shadow of Russia and its gradual encroachment into 
Circassian territory convinced many Circassians of the importance of tribal 
solidarity. British envoys were influential, especially Urquhart, with fostering the 
unity of tribes. North Caucasians established a federation that included twelve 
tribes, and this attempt of cooperation and optimism culminated in their 
declaration of independence; Circassia became a landmark in Circassian history.  
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This declaration was published in 1836 in a British Journal closely associated 
with the British government. In 1838, England recognized the independence of 
Circassia.101 
C. THE WAY TO 1864, AND THE FINAL BATTLE 
When the Caucasus became the subject of clashes between the Ottoman 
Empire and tsarist Russia, the immigration of Circassians to Ottoman lands in 
great numbers, called the “Great Exile” by Circassians, took place after the 
Crimean War (1853–1856) at the peak of Russian expansionist policy.  
The year 1840 was an important milestone in the history of Circassians. 
Struck by famine and harsh conditions of winter, and surrounded by a Russian 
cordon, western Circassians found themselves in a corner. Feeling that they had 
nothing to lose, they resolved to mount concerted attacks at Russian forts to 
break the stranglehold. Initially, they gained some of the forts by the southern 
coast of the Black Sea; however, Russian counter-offensives took the forts back 
and razed thirteen Shapsugh villages to the ground as revenge for this 
attempt.102 
From 1840, Imam Shamil tried to organize a unity among all Circassians 
in the North Caucasus. On one hand, he attacked Russian forces on the western 
front; on the other hand, he sent envoys to the Kabardins to organize unity in the 
region. However, effective cooperation between the two flanks of the North 
Caucasus was never obtained. The Russians were aware of Circassian 
indifference to Sufism and the disinclination of many of them to join forces with 
Shamil to organize unified attacks. Therefore, Russians lived in the luxury of 
being able to concentrate their attacks on one front without compromising their 
position on the other.  
The Crimean War of 1853–1856 created great hope for Circassians that 
Western powers, especially England, would intervene on their behalf and deliver 
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them from the claws of Russia. The expectation reached its peak after the 
Russian defeat; however, at the negotiations Russians managed to buy off the 
Ottomans and secure a free hand in the Northwest Caucasus. The fate of the 
North Caucasus was entrusted to the delicate care of Russians with the approval 
of the Western Powers. The only gain for Circassians from the Crimean War was 
that they were spared Russian aggression for three years, while Russia turned to 
vengeance on the mountaineers, whose morale had reached its nadir.103 
The flight from the Caucasus started during the 1820s on a small scale 
and gained speed during the early 1860s. A campaign of Russification and 
Christianization began in 1843, when the “Caucasus Spiritual Consistory” was 
created in Stavropol and started to sever the cultural and religious ties of the 
region with the Ottomans.104 Within the atmosphere of Russian pressure, 
Circassians had no chance to flee “to escape the forced sedentarization and 
Christianization programs of the Tsarist Russia.”105 Immigration reached its peak 
during the mid-1860s after Russia issued a decree commanding Circassians to 
abandon their homelands.  
In 1859, after a bitter guerilla war that lasted thirty years, Shamil 
surrendered after the capture of the mountainous stronghold of Gunib.106 After 
this cessation, Russian forces in Chechnya turned westward. In 1861, the 
western tribes of the Caucasus organized a national meeting in Sochi to 
construct a civilian administration to fight against Russian forces. First, they sent 
a delegation to England to seek help. However, the British government realized 
that there was no way to stop Russian forces. They left the Circassians to their 
fate, despite their numerous attempts to influence the region in line with British 
interests. The final pacification of the Northern Caucasus and the great exodus of 
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locals came in 1864. Finally, Russia was able to crush eastern Circassians in 
1859, and then the western Circassians in 1864.107 
D. RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF CIRCASSIANS 
The Russians organized a lethal combination of attacks on the North 
Caucasus. The new and more effective methods included the wholesale 
destruction of villages and crops in the region. Many clans and tribes were forced 
to resettle in more tractable and vulnerable areas. Some researchers defined this 
stage of war as nothing less than organized genocide, according to the UN 
convention on genocide definition.108 
At the end of the 1850s, the Russian government started to create legal 
grounds for forced immigration to prepare a consensus with the Ottoman Empire. 
At the meeting in 1859 between the Russian envoy and the Ottoman 
government, the Ottoman government requested a limitation of immigrations to 
Ottoman lands due to a lack of sufficient places to locate them and the 
organizations to handle the immigration in a moderate fashion.109  
In 1860, Brigadier General Loris Melikov, representing the Russian 
government, was sent to Istanbul to make an agreement with the Ottoman 
government for the emigration of up to 40–50,000 Circassians onto Ottoman 
lands.110 It seems that the Ottoman government made some preparations to 
organize the immigration to Ottoman lands upon this agreement. For example, 
on 31 January 1861, the governor of the Salonika (Thessaloniki) Husnu urged 
the local administration to identify suitable ports near local settlements and not to 
spend much time at the ports where the Circassians would arrive, according to 
the directives of the Ottoman state.111 However, the number of refugees that 
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reached the Ottoman ports were around 80,000 by 1863, according to reports 
from the Commission of General Administration of Immigrants (Idare-I Umumiye-I 
Muhacirin Komisyonu), which was higher than the expectations and capabilities 
of the Empire.112 An Ottoman state report dated 12 May 1861 mentioned the 
total number of immigrants from the Caucasus and Crimea as being around 
150,000, and defined the measures that were taken by local authorities 
concerning the requirements of the immigrants.113 More tragically, the number of 
immigrants during the spring of 1864 alone was nearly 400,000.114 
On 14 April 1864, Prince Mikhail met with leaders of the western 
Caucasus in Sochi and ordered them to leave the high mountains to settle in the 
plains. He gave those who refused to leave for Ottoman lands one month to 
emigrate, or otherwise be treated like war prisoners. Covertly, Russians started 
an organized and systematic campaign where all villagers were forced to leave 
and their properties were burned to the ground. Seeing Russian brutality, 
Circassians decided to immigrate to Muslim Ottoman lands, instead of accepting 
the Russians’ order. On 21 May 1864, Prince Mikhail proclaimed the end of the 
Caucasus War. Russian officer Ivan Drozdov described the scene around Sochi 
while the Russians were celebrating: “On the road our eyes were met with a 
staggering image: corpses of women, children, and elderly persons, torn to 
pieces and half-eaten by dogs; deportees emaciated by hunger and disease, 
almost too weak to move their legs, collapsing from exhaustion and becoming 
prey to dogs while still alive.”115 
During this last campaign, hundreds of thousands of hungry, desolate, and 
disease-ridden Circassians and Abkhazians were forced to leave their homeland 
for the Ottoman Empire from the coastal cities of Anapa, Novorossisk, Tuapse, 
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Sochi, Adler, and Sukhumi.116 They were transported on chartered vessels 
across the Black Sea to the Ottoman ports Trabzon, Samsun, Sinop, Constanta 
(in present day Romania), Varna and Burgas (in present day Bulgaria). 
During the Russian-Circassian campaigns, the Northwest Caucasus fell 
into ruin, many tribes were completely wiped out, and as many as 800,000 
people died. A total of as many as 1.2 million Muslims may have emigrated, or 
fled, from the Caucasus.117 According to one estimate the number of immigrants 
to the Ottoman Empire was around two million.118 Justin McCarthy mentions in 
his work that 800,000 Circassians survived, while approximately 400,000 died 
between 1864 and 1867.119 Those who remained in the region after the great 
exile, between 150,000 and 200,000, were completely resettled to the plains of 
the North Caucasus, where they were easily controlled by the Russians.120 The 
northeast coast of the Black Sea was cleansed of Circassians and was ripe for 
Slavic and Cossack colonization. During the tsarist period, Circassia remained 
desolate in the region, and there was an influx of Slav colonists, especially in the 
coastal regions.  
After the great exodus of 1864, in the Northwest Caucasus, which was 
firmly ruled under Russian control, immigrations lingered into the 1920s, with a 
sporadic period of intensification in 1877–1878, and again from 1890 to 1908.121 
After the deportation of the great majority of locals, the region found itself 
neglected and forgotten until the demise of the Soviet Union. In 1877, war 
erupted between the Ottomans and the Russians. North Caucasians, whose 
memories were still fresh at that time, joined the Ottoman forces to fight against 
the Russians. A contingent landed at Sukhumi and occupied it. However, in 1878 
Russian forces counter-attacked and retook Sukhumi and set out south, 
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defeating the Ottoman forces and taking Kars. Later, the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 
gave Russia the last remnants of the North Caucasus. The same treaty 
compelled all Circassian refugees, around 300,000, residing in the Balkans to 
immigrate once again to the inner parts of Anatolia and the Middle Eastern parts 
of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state established another commission to 
handle the huge amount of Circassians accumulated at the piers of Istanbul, 
Salonika, and Varna, and ordered the transportation of immigrants to Halep, 
Damascus (Sam), Adana, Sivas, Ankara, Diyarbakir, and Samsun.122 Significant 
numbers of Circassians were settled in Syria during this second immigration 
wave.  
E. OTTOMAN POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH CAUCASUS 
There were many reasons for the Ottoman government to receive 
Circassians onto Ottoman lands based on previous perceptions about the North 
Caucasus people. The goals behind this welcome were to homogenize the 
population in the areas where Christians lived, to use them as a power multiplier 
in the Ottoman military, and especially to learn the war tactics they used during 
their war against Cossacks and organized Russian forces.123 The very first 
request of the initial Kabardin refugees to enroll in the Ottoman Army and their 
pledge of allegiance to the Muslim Ottoman state, on 29 January 1860, increased 
Ottoman acceptance of the Muslim refugees.124 Also, Anatolia was suffering 
from a population shortage during the nineteenth century, and large areas of 
potentially arable land went undeveloped. The Ottoman government hoped that 
Circassians could colonize these areas and increase agriculture. This idea 
motivated the Ottoman government to settle many Circassians in a quagmire 
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area, which also deteriorated their situation.125 Moreover, the Ottoman Empire 
was losing territory from all directions during these years, and their tax base was 
steadily declining. Thus, new populations would be a source of additional 
revenues that could be used to save the Empire.126 
There were some methods used by the Ottomans to increase the number 
of émigrés in addition to the Russian-Ottoman policies to exile them to the North 
Caucasus. Religious propaganda, promoting exile under the name of Hajj, 
personal relations especially based on slavery, social structure of the 
Circassians, and the notorious behaviors of Russians towards Circassians 
increased the number of deportations.127 
Circassians, who embodied the idea of jihad symbolized in Shamil’s 
personality throughout the years in the Caucasus, emigrated to the “Dar-ul Islam” 
(the Ottoman Lands) due to their belief system. Islam was one of the common 
identities among the Circassians in the North Caucasus, and the war against 
Russian forces under the concept of jihad was contributory to creation of Muslim 
identity.128 
During this period, the Ottoman Empire used propaganda techniques by 
mullahs and agents to sustain the cultural and religious ties between Ottomans 
and Circassians. They repeated the difficulties of life in unbelievers’ lands, 
making analogies between Muhammed’s leaving Mecca under difficult conditions 
and the conditions in the North Caucasus. This encouraged future victories with 
the help of the Ottoman state, and expressed the ethnic perspective of dying on 
infidels’ territories, and its religious perspective.129 They also tried to attract 
Circassians by making false promises, such as ensuring that the Ottoman 
government would provide housing for immigrants. Also, Russian ambassador  
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Alexey Labanov-Rostovsky asserted that Turkish emissaries were spreading 
rumors in Circassia that the two empires were exchanging their Christian and 
Muslim populations.130 
Another important propaganda method was the promotion of the Hajj to 
attract North Caucasians. Many believers were expecting to visit the sacred 
lands easily under Ottoman rule, and requested permission from local 
administrations. They were expecting to return to the homeland after this 
religious duty. However, the Russian government provided passports to North 
Caucasians, usually valid only for six months, and sent them to Ottoman lands. 
When they arrived in the Ottoman Empire, either local administrator took their 
passports directly or after the six months period they were replaced with Ottoman 
passports, called hamidiye.131  
The perception of high-level Circassians in the Ottoman government to 
accept Circassians in large numbers also increased the size of the immigration. 
Many Circassians, even before the Great Exile, reached high administrative 
levels in the Ottoman Empire. The Grand Vizier Ozdemiroglu Cerkes Osman 
Pasha, governor of Trabzon Cecenzade Haci Hasan Pasha, Cerkes Hafiz 
Mehmet Pasha, and Cerkes Ismail Pasha were some of the notable Circassian 
figures in the Ottoman state before the 1860s. The commander of the Ottoman 
Navy and later the Grand Vizier Husrev Mehmet Pasha, an Abkhazian slave, was 
an influential figure in the Ottoman government.132   
The change in Circassian social structure in the North Caucasus also 
attracted Circassians to immigrate onto the Ottoman lands. With the Russian 
conquest in 1864, Tsarist Russia abolished slavery and changed the feudal 
social structure in the region, which was important for Circassians. Thus, many 
Circassian tribal leaders refused to emancipate their slaves and immigrated to 
Ottoman lands with them. For example, when the Abkhazian prince Acba was 
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forced to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire, approximately a thousand peasants 
and slaves followed him.133 
Finally, Russian police forces and Cossacks were brutal with their 
behaviors against Circassians who refused to immigrate. The Russian 
government was also reluctant to react to the demands of Circassians, and the 
idea of being defenseless and alone in their homeland with the eventually 
increasing pressure of the security forces increased deportations to Ottoman 
lands. 
F. LIFE IN THE OTTOMAN LANDS 
The initial immigrations caused many casualties during the journey from 
Russian ports onto Ottoman lands due to the lack of organization and the huge 
numbers of refugees, especially between 1863 and 1865. Refugees dispatched 
from Novorossiysk, Anapa, Taman, and Sochi reached the Ottoman ports 
throughout the spring and summer of 1864. Later, they were carried to other 
parts of the Empire. The first wave of boats left Trabzon in early January, the 
worst possible time of year on the Black Sea.134 
Circassians were dying in large numbers from typhus and smallpox, and 
the epidemics followed them into the boats. The conditions on the shore were 
even worse, and that caused deaths in huge numbers at the Ottoman ports. 
Each day, 180 to 250 Circassians died at the Ottoman ports, according to the 
reports of the Russian Consulate at Trabzon.135 
Initially, the Ottoman government planned to settle the Circassians in the 
places where Armenian and Russian populations were considerably high. The 
Porte hoped that Circassians would be grateful and become loyal subjects, 
serving as models for less cooperative peoples, especially the non-Muslim 
population in the empire. However, the Ottoman government was prevented from 
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settling Circassians wherever it thought suitable for them. The Russian 
government made it clear that the Circassians should be settled at a significant 
distance from Russian borders and no closer than the lines of Erzincan, Tokat, 
Amasya, or Samsun.136 Also, the Russian government insisted that some of the 
refugees should be settled in Syria.137 Also, some Circassians settled in Rumelia 
and Bulgaria as a counterweight to the Christian populations who were clamoring 
for independence.138 
The cultural change that Circassians faced was also enormous in Ottoman 
lands. The language was totally different and it made the incorporation of 
Circassians into society more difficult. The structure of the Ottoman central 
government was also quite different than their previous pastoral life. The 
survivors of the Great Exile were the hardiest and most determined of their 
people, and they mostly believed that the method for survival could only be 
achieved through the use of violence.139  
Unfortunately, the integration of Circassians into Ottoman society did not 
go smoothly. The tension between Circassians and Ottoman locals, among 
whom Circassians were settled, was a task that required large numbers of well-
trained forces, which the Ottomans did not have at that time. Also, previous 
unsuccessful settlement experiences of the Tatars in the Balkans increased the 
negative approach towards the Circassians. This animosity among the people 
created many labels for Circassians, such as barbarians, brutal, and nomadic.140 
Circassian slavery was another factor affecting the immigration of 
Circassians to Ottoman lands, since it was banned in the North Caucasus with 
the Russian conquest. Although slavery took on a number of interrelated forms,  
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there were actually two basic forms: agricultural slaves and domestic (or Harem 
and Porte) slaves, which had the same legal status and belonged to the 
Circassian slave class.141  
Agricultural slavery was marginal in the Ottoman Empire during the 1860s. 
However, the exile of Circassians in huge numbers changed the context of 
agricultural slavery. In 1867, among the Circassian immigrants, there were 
150,000 Circassian slaves, which later caused many problems in the Empire. 
First, slave-master relations hampered Ottoman settlement policies, since some 
slaves voluntarily followed their masters and often formed extended groups 
where their masters were settled. Second, many slaves asserted that they were 
free in Ottoman lands and this created disputes between slaves and their 
masters. Third, the mass immigration and the consequences created sufficient 
conditions for abuses committed by powerful and privileged immigrants to sell 
young Circassians to wealthy families and captains for the transportation of 
Circassians. Fourth, slave trade among individuals was controlled and spread 
wide through the control of some slave dealers.142  
In rural areas, where Circassians were located in groups, there were many 
fights among these groups. With the absence of determination of the Ottoman 
administration to implement strict rules, or perhaps the inability to formulate a 
solution to the problem in regards to Circassian slavery, there was no peace 
among the immigrants, which later influenced the local security where they 
settled. Even the authorities were often obliged to extinguish the outbreak of fires 
they failed to prevent beforehand.143 
Circassians were incorporated into the Crimean and Ottoman military 
service and many members of the Crimean and Ottoman ruling class married 
with Circassian women.144 However, slavery among Circassians dates back to 
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earlier times. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Circassia supplied 
most of the slave soldiers of the Mameluke dynasty of Egypt. The Ottoman 
conquest of Egypt in 1517 did not change the role of Circassians, leaving the 
system more or less intact under Ottoman rule. The Circassians played a similar 
role in the Safavid Empire of Iran. From about 1550 to the end of the dynasty, 
they were a major component of the ghulam, the slave-soldiers of the Shah and 
in the harem, playing a major political role in both capacities.145 
Circassian women were a political figure in Circassian-Russian relations 
before their increased role in the Ottoman Porte. Both men and women slaves 
also took part in the Russian government starting from the 1550s. In 1558, the 
Kabardin prince Temriuk sent his young son to Moscow to serve the Tsar. Three 
years later, he also sent his daughter Kuchenei (baptized Maria) as a bribe to the 
Russian tsar. Maria’s sister also was also wife of the Astrakhan Tsarevich 
Bekbulat. Eventually, many Circassians took part in important elite positions in 
Russia. From the 1550s to 1650s Circassians seemed to be invisible, not as 
individuals, but as Circassians. They played an important role in Russian politics, 
while simultaneously retaining their ties with the Kabarda.146 Their genealogies 
attest to the maintenance of their relations with Kabarda, and the circulation of 
information about those ties, since the Circassian murzas (beys or begs), were 
also the Russian prince Cherkasskii (Circassian lands) and were recognized 
loyal to both sides for the well-being of the Circassians. 
The Ottoman Harem policy, which had a significant role over state policy 
since its abolition in 1908 with the Committee of Union (CUP) government, also 
increased both the numbers of Circassians in politics and their power in the 
administration. The increase of the Circassian women in the Porte caused the 
marriage of the nearly all Ottoman Sultans starting from Mustafa III (1757–1773)  
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with Circassian girls. Strong blood relations among Circassians caused 
accumulations of family members with the ones who managed to be part of the 
Porte before.  
Circassians recognized themselves as protectors of the Ottoman state. In 
defeating an attempt to dethrone the Ottoman Sultan in the nineteen century, a 
relative of Sultan Cerkes Hasan killed all the coup plotters at a house meeting.147 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Circassians could be found 
everywhere within the social leadership. One of the major reasons for the rise of 
Circassians was the change in the Ottoman central government and specifically 
the abandonment of the devsirme system of recruitment, and reduced role of the 
“palace school,” which facilitated Circassian ties in the upper echelon of the 
state.148 Recruitment of slaves by prominent slaves (kullarin Kullari) became a 
common phenomenon from the seventeenth century onward,149 forming the 
important components of the household of the Ottoman state. “Almost all the 
youth of the both sexes in Circassia insist upon being conveyed by their parents 
to Istanbul where the road to honor and advancement is open to everyone.”150 
Because of Circassian tribal ties, as well as sheer numbers, many of them who 
became the part of Ottoman society sought favor for their relatives, especially 
during the late nineteenth century when Circassians were arriving in huge 
numbers. Their patronage networks reached into the highest levels of the state 
structure. Mehmet Husrev Pasha, who started as a palace-reared slave and 
ended as admiral of the Ottoman fleet and Grand Vizier, recruited and placed 
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forty to fifty slaves, most of who were Circassians.151 About thirty of them 
elevated to the rank of pasha in the Ottoman military.152  
However, later the position of slavery and the need for military force for 
the empire created contradictions. About 10 percent of the Russian-forced 
emigration, as unfree agricultural workers on Ottoman lands, were suitable for 
enrollment into the military. In 1882, the Ottoman government took the first steps 
to facilitate the conscription of Circassian slaves along with emancipated 
agricultural slaves. Such a step was necessary, because only free men could be 
drafted into the military. Also measures were taken to reduce the traffic of 
Circassian children, mostly girls, from the mid-1860s onward.153 
Besides the social consequences of Circassians’ immigration into the 
Ottoman Empire, the conditions that the government provided were not suitable 
for them, even in terms of basic living requirements. Those who managed to 
survive the journey saw that the Ottoman government was completely 
unprepared to deal with the half million or more sick and starving people who 
arrived at Ottoman ports. The shortfall of resources was so great that even the 
British ambassador at Istanbul proposed that the British government supply 
either financial or material aid.154 Many citizens of the empire, including the 
Sultan and high-level administrators, made donations, yet this was far from 
meeting requirements. 
There was no sufficient place to treat sick people and set up quarantine 
zones at first. Sanitary conditions quickly deteriorated, and diseases continued to 
spread as it had on Circassian shores.155 The refugees were placed in temporary 
camps or left to their fate. Eventually, epidemic spread wherever Circassians 
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were settled and locals begun to suffer from the epidemic, which also 
deteriorated relations between Circassians and natives. 
Problems between refugees and natives broke out frequently. The 
Ottoman government sent refugees farther inland to places “famous for their 
unhealthy climates.”156 Mismanagement of settlement, corruption among local 
administrations, food shortages, and disease brought the Circassians to abject 
poverty in a short time. They were begging, working for menial jobs, or selling 
their children as slaves to survive. Others, primarily young people who lost their 
parents and had no other options, turned to banditry to survive. This created fear 
throughout the empire that Circassians would start looting wherever they were 
settled. This determined the perception of the locals towards them. 
Many Circassians were settled toward the western and interior parts of the 
Anatolia.157 The Uzunyayla plateau in central Anatolia, and some under-
populated nearby areas that had agricultural potential, were the popular 
locations. Many were unhappy about the conditions that the government 
provided and unhappy being separated from their families and friends. Thus, 
many Circassians fled where were settled. Homeless and technically in violation 
of Ottoman law, many resorted to begging and banditry, which caused the 
stereotype of Circassians as bandits among society. Fear of Circassians became 
so great that Muslim and Christian communities alike protested whenever a plan 
was announced to move Circassians into the region.158 
The entire burden of supporting the refugees fell on the villagers 
themselves. Ottoman policy was to settle refugees in villages at a ratio of no 
more than one Circassian family for every five Turkish families, so that the 
Circassian families would be assimilated. This policy meant that Circassian clans 
and even individual families were broken up and settled far from one another.159 
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After the realization of the situation in the Ottoman Empire, which was not 
the promised land of propaganda, many Circassians tried to go back to the North 
Caucasus. However, Ottoman and Russian precautions to keep them on 
Ottoman territory impeded any return to the homeland. On 3 April 1865, the 
Russian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Ignatyef, issued an order to the 
consulates not to accept the request of the Circassians to return to their 
homelands, upon the order of the Russian Tsar.160 After the rejection of the 
demands of the Circassians and their deteriorated living conditions in Ottoman 
lands, in 1902 a group occupied the Russian consulate in Samsun.161  
After the initial chaos, Ottoman authorities organized to deal with the 
requirements of refugees. For example, at the beginning of December 1864, 
around 7,000, and at the end of the same month 7,400, Circassians were 
transported from Trabzon to Varna without any casualties on the way.162 Later, 
many Circassians were settled in Sofia, Thessaloniki, Vidin, and many parts of 
Kosovo in the Ottoman Balkans.163 According to Ottoman refugee reports 
concerning the Circassian deportation between 1857 and 1866, about one million 
Circassians were settled in Anatolia, 200,000 to 400,000 were settled in the 
Balkans, 25,000 were settled in Syria and Jordan, and 10,000 were settled in 
Cyprus.164 
In response to the Bulgarian nationalist uprising, the Ottoman Empire 
used irregular troops called the basibozuk to suppress the rebellion and to 
secure the Muslim population. Some of the units were composed of Circassian 
émigrés and their responses to the Bulgarians were similar to the Russian 
response to Circassians during the 1860s.165 
                                            
160 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 44. 
161 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 44. 
162 Ibid, 63. 
163 Karpat, Ottoman Population, 68. 
164 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 66. 
165 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 68; Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 106.  
 49 
The Circassian settlements in Anatolia during the second wave, especially 
in 1877–78, accumulated into two basic areas. The first was the belt from 
Samsun at the north to the Hatay in the south, combining the basic cities of 
Tokat, Amasya, Sivas, Kayseri, and Adana. The second group was scattered to 
the 400 villages of Duzce, Adapazari, Izmit, Bursa, Balikesir, and Biga covering 
the east and southern coast of the Marmara region.166 Later, from 1881 until 
1914, there were further emigrations from Russia, approximately half a million 
more Circassians, along with a large number of Muslims from Kazan and the 
Urals.167 During the Second World War period, around 600,000 North 
Caucasians were accused of collaboration with German forces and were forced 
to settle in Turkey.168  
One of the disputes among the Circassians in Turkey today is the question 
of whether Circassians were forced to exile or they migrated in a semi-voluntary 
manner. Since the 1990s, Caucasian associations in Turkey have used the exile 
discourses and named it the “Great Circassian Exile” (Büyük Çerkes Sürgünü), 
which has been symbolically commemorated in Turkey starting from the 125th 
anniversary of the exile, on May 21. However, there are recently published books 
and articles placing this event into a genocide concept.169 
G. ABDULHAMID II AND CIRCASSIANS 
The role of Circassians in the Ottoman state structure and especially their 
role to suppress the nationalist uprisings increased during the Abdulhamid II 
reign (1876–1909).170 Circassians occupied many critical positions in the state 
structure (as did Albanians and Kurds) during the Abdulhamid era, which later 
                                            
166 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 69–71. 
167 Karpat, Ottoman Population, 70. 
168 Lowell Bezanis, “Soviet Muslim Emigrés in the Republic of Turkey,” Central Asian Survey 
13(1) (1994): 63. 
169 For such an argument of Circassian genocide, see for instance Antero Leitzinger, “The 
Circassian Genocide,” Euroasian Politician (October 2000);  Walter Richmond, The Circassian 
Genocide (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
170 Avagyan, Cerkesler, 95. 
 50 
became propaganda figures among the Young Turks against the sultan. The 
Circassian policy of Abdulhamid can be categorized under four pillars.  
First, Abdulhamid followed a policy of bringing Circassians to critical 
positions in the Empire. Second, he promoted the active participation of 
Circassians in the military and promoted many Circassian commanders to 
General. Third, he encouraged the immigration of Muslim North Caucasus 
populations onto Ottoman Lands and settled them in the places where Christian 
and Armenian populations lived. Also, Circassians were the most efficient ethnic 
group for Abdulhamid to use to suppress the uprising of other ethnic minorities. 
And, fourth, he aimed to use Circassians for pan-Islamic propaganda in Russia. 
Circassians filled many critical posts during the Abdulhamid era. Mahmut 
Cemalettin Pasha, of Circassian descent, was a close friend of Abdulhamid from 
his childhood. The head of the military schools Hasan Hacimukov, head of the 
secret police Ahmet Pasha, interior Minister Cerkes Memduh Pasha, head of the 
special Dagestan Battalion Gazi Muhammed, provocateur of the Sultanist 
uprising on 31 March 1909 Cerkes Mehmet Pasha, and Ferik Ahmet Cemalettin 
Pasha were all Circassians.171 Circassians were particularly used as cavalry 
forces in the Ottoman Army, starting from the preparation phase of the 1877–78 
War between Russians and Ottomans. After the defeat in this war, the Ottoman 
government ordered the creation of Hamidian Regiments based on the cavalry 
forces to fight against Russian Cossacks.172  
Circassians were the most suitable population for these regiments. The 
Ottoman government used every method to enroll Circassians as commanders of 
the newly formed regiments by providing them with honorary titles and money.173 
The Circassians ruled most of the regiments, although those were mainly 
composed of Kurds. Moreover, Circassians played an important role for the 
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creation of the gendarme forces of the Ottoman Empire, and Circassian officers 
commanded many of them. 
Finally, Circassians were an important element for pan-Islamist Ottoman 
policies for igniting Islamic ideas in Russia and for preserving Muslim populations 
from foreign influence.174 Increasing Islamic populations and their ties with the 
caliphate would create a sufficiently loyal local population in the Caucasus that 
could be used as a buffer zone for Russian invasions.  
H. CONCLUSION 
On 21 May 1864—later labeled the “Circassian Day of Mourning,” 
celebrated by all Circassian communities, and even turned into a public holiday 
in the Circassian republics under pressure from Circassian nationalists—Russia 
proclaimed the end of the Caucasian War. Russia’s consistent attacks and brutal 
policy to control the region was the primary reason for the huge losses, yet the 
lack of state structure or lack of organized fighting among Circassians, and the 
lack of statesmanship to reduce the brutality through bargains and arrangements, 
also contributed to this brutal act.  
The initial chaos of the immigration into the Ottoman lands created a very 
difficult environment for Circassians. They died in huge numbers from disease 
and hunger at the Ottoman ports. When they were settled into the inner parts of 
the Anatolia, their integration to the society became an important determination 
for their identity in the eyes of the locals. Some of them took part in notorious 
activities, such as selling their daughters, banditry, theft, etc., which created a 
negative portrayal against Circassians. The terms attached to them at that time 
continued for many years, and Circassians tried hard to erase these perceptions 
from the people’s mind. Parallel to this notorious identification, the suppressed  
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and dissolute Circassians in small villages created a small and introverted175 
network of relations among themselves without information from the others in 
Anatolia and the North Caucasus. 
Despite many troubles and unfortunate events, most Circassians began to 
integrate themselves into Ottoman life, since they had no other opportunity. The 
first methods they used to survive in the new lands was applying for positions in 
the government and military. Starting from 1860 on, the Ottoman government 
started to enroll Circassians into military colleges. The Ottoman government 
created several Circassian cavalry regiments, usually with a five-year term of 
duty.176 While on one hand the Ottoman government promoted military service 
among Circassians, on the other hand, they forced them to integrate into social 
life by rejecting their customs, by rejecting their demands for resettlement, and by 
forcing them to learn Turkish.  
The “Great Exile” from the North Caucasus was the critical experience for 
creating Circassian identity. Circassians have lived in Turkey since the “Great 
Exile” of 1864, and so far generations of “Turkish Circassians” who are born in 
Turkey continue the legacy of their ancestors. Listening to stories about the 
homeland and exile creates emotional ties between these people and their 
homeland. However, this common theme of exile compelled Circassians, 
speaking different languages and belonging to different tribes, to think about one 
another as members of the same community.  
With both men and women in slavery, the concept of being kul to the 
Sultan took an important part in Circassian history under Ottoman rule. Female 
slavery, the foundation on which Ottoman slaveholding rested, helped the 
increase of Circassian politics with women in the Sultan’s harem, since access to 
females was a cornerstone of elite male privilege and entitlement. Eventually, 
Circassians started to affiliate themselves with the Sultan and his administration. 
However, the abolition of slavery impeded the privileged positions of Circassians 
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and reduced their role in the administration. The ban of slavery was the 
destruction of a political, social, and economic institution, but also the erosion of 
several collective identities, such as the faithfulness of people to the Empire and 
sultan, simultaneously with the emergence of other identities, mainly official and 
nationally based.177 
As Muslims in the Ottoman lands, like all other subjects of the Empire, 
Circassian immigrants were entitled to the full benefit of Ottoman citizenship, 
among which freedom was the most important value.178 Muslim identity was one 
of the important figures for Circassian identity, since their jihad under the 
leadership of a mythological individual against their war with the Russians. 
Therefore, the identity of Circassians cannot be defined with only referencing 
diasporic identification, slave background, and totally Muslim identity. All 
complementary discussions and studies about Circassians have to be 
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III. CIRCASSIAN IDENTITY FROM LATE OTTOMAN ERA TO 
PRESENT 
This chapter’s goal is to examine the politics of diaspora identity starting 
from the late Ottoman era to the present day within the Republic of Turkey. This 
chapter will look at the politics of identity and how Circassians identify 
themselves among the Turks and other ethnic communities (Muslim and non-
Muslim), the relations of Circassians with the Turkish nation and Turkish state 
structure, and how Turks see Circassians within the evolution of Turkish national 
identity.  
In Turkey, the Circassian diaspora is not constructed on a single idea. The 
idea of collective identity or “common we” in diaspora is a constantly changing 
term. Examining the persons and factors in historical sequence that contributed 
to the creation of different identities throughout Turkish history is important to 
understand the contemporary diaspora politics. Diaspora nationalism assumes 
that diasporic communities are the actors that shape the “common we” by 
negotiating, narrating, supporting, and sometimes resisting within the concepts of 
homeland, diaspora (or host country), and internal and international dynamics. 
That is why this chapter examines the Circassians in Turkey as a diaspora that is 
not homogeneous, but composed of many blocks and cliques. To define diaspora 
nationalism, these different groups will be examined in terms of their 
perspectives of nationalism within the nationalistic concept of the Republic of 
Turkey. Despite a lack of consensus on many subjects, and even on the naming 
of the group in Turkey, there are some constructed ideas that Circassian activists 
deal with in terms of nationalism. 
Since the Circassians were mentioned as one of the ethnic minorities by 
the state and society, the relationship of Turkish nationalism with one of the 
Muslim, non-Turkish, Circassians will constitute the main focus of this chapter. 
To examine the place of Circassians in Turkish nationalist discourse, Turkish 
nationalism should be analyzed with its different forms, such as Turkish 
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nationalism under Ottoman rule, Kemalist nationalism, and extreme ethnic 
Turkish nationalism throughout history after describing diaspora life in Turkey. 
A. CIRCASSIANS AS A DIASPORIC COMMUNITY 
Circassians were sometimes seen as vagabond fighters in the military and 
sometimes as outcasts (serseri) in provincial communities throughout the 
Ottoman Empire. This same divide, as with many other instances, continues in 
the republican phase. For Circassians in Turkey, their contribution to the War of 
Independence alongside the Kemalist elite, and the Cerkes Ethem affair, as well 
as the Anzavur uprisings, constitute the turning points which have been 
constantly narrated in both Turkish and Circassian perspectives of Turkish 
history. Later, with the creation of the Republic and to protect its solidarity, the 
new regime took some precautions to create the Circassian rebellions, as well as 
other ethnic rebellions, such as the Seyh Said Rebellion179 in the eastern 
provinces. This was recognized as a major issue that needed to be solved. 
During the first years of the Republic, many suspected they could never be 
integrated into the new Turkish society. However, the fact that Circassians were 
Sunni Muslims, and there were elite officers and officials who were loyal (Rauf 
Orbay, Fuat Cebesoy, Recep Peker) helped to mitigate accusations of being 
“disloyal” to the state, particularly in comparison to Alevi, Kurds, or Arabs.  
Within the Circassian community, courageous and privileged positions on 
one hand and notorious positions on the other hand in Turkey relate to 
Circassian relations with the Turkish community and the state structure of 
Turkey. Examination of these relationships is important to understand Circassian 
diaspora in Turkey in particular and diasporic communities in general, but also 
the ways the Turkish state considers other ethnic groups in Turkey.  
For example, Kemal Karpat states that Circassians, after their immigration 
from their homelands, integrated into Ottoman society peacefully while the upper 
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elite became identified with the state elite.180 Soner Cagaptay places Circassians 
in a superior position than the other ethnic minorities in Turkey.181 Ayhan Kaya 
describes Circassians as the most privileged ethnic group in Turkey in his 
analysis of political participation strategies.182 Baskin Oran also defines 
Circassians as a group that is far from questioning and opposing Turkish 
identity.183 Likewise, Kemal Kirisci states that, starting from the early years of the 
Republic until today, Circassians are considered among the ethnic groups that 
melted in to the superior identity and have been assimilated successfully.184 In a 
similar rhetoric, Mitat Celikpala presents Circassians as a group that lives in 
harmony within Turkish society compared to the other groups, although there has 
been an increased diaspora formation starting from the beginning of the 
1990s.185 Such perspective considers Circassian as an ethnic group that is more 
accommodationist to the state policy and does not resist the state, like the Kurds. 
Life in Turkey was still difficult for Circassians during the Republican era. 
The approach to them changed from being equal subjects based upon Islamic 
solidarity to being an unwanted minority that was targeted for assimilation into 
the state ideology of nationalism.186 Moreover, more than ten thousand officers 
were purged from the military between 1908 and 1913, and minorities were the 
primary targets. Their organizations were closed, and many Circassians migrated 
to Turkey after the Balkan wars. 
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One important issue for émigrés to the Ottoman Empire was the idea of 
returning to the homeland. Many Circassians in the Ottoman Empire maintained 
ties between their places of origin and, when conditions allowed, frequently 
returned.187 The first return demands started in large numbers in the early 1860s. 
Sometimes, these demands occurred just after months of immigration and 
sometimes after a span of several years. Frequently, émigrés applied to Russian 
consulates elsewhere to return or simply showed up at the Russian border 
requesting to return to Russia to live.188 Sometimes people returned because of 
the severity of conditions on Ottoman Lands, sometimes to work in the Caucasus 
after gaining an education within the Ottoman Empire, and sometimes for 
personal and financial matters. Besides Circassians, many people continued 
their ties with the homeland for years with short visits.189  
For Circassians in Turkey, the War of Independence and the Cerkes 
Ethem Affair carries a significant importance for the diaspora. Within the Turkish 
War of Independence there were different groups that followed different 
ideologies. There were two basic groups: one who was supporting the 
independence movement with the Kemalist regime, and one who supported the 
Sultan and Caliphate. These two groups will be covered in detail in further pages. 
And, there was one group that tried to establish an independent state in Ottoman 
lands. 
Stripped of their protected status and under assault once again by the 
regime, some 22 Circassians met at a coffee house in Izmir on 24 November 
1921.190 At the end of the meeting, which included one of the important figures of 
the Committee of Union and Progress leader Cerkes Resit and his brother 
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Cerkes Ethem, this group called themselves members of the Association for the 
Strengthening for the Near Eastern Circassians Rights (Sark-I Karib Cerkesleri 
Temin’I Hukuk Cemiyeti), and released a document called “The General 
Statement of the Circassian Nation to the Great Powers and the World” 
demanding the recognition of their national existence, presenting a danger to the 
Circassian nation from Turkey, and demanding to live under Greek protection 
rather than Turkish.191 Their devotion to Islam did not prevent them from 
collaborating with Rums and Armenians on this issue, and for the group there 
was no need to embrace Ottomanism or Islamism as an identity.192 
Many Circassians, especially the Simali Kafkas Association in Istanbul 
and nationalist movement in Ankara, protested this attempt. They declared that 
Strengthening the Near Eastern Circassians Rights Association did not represent 
the Circassians, and they were labeled as traitors.193 
The concern of the Kemalist government about Circassians who might 
have sided with the Greeks continued, and focused particularly upon the south 
Marmara region. Between 28 May and 21 June of 1923, local authorities ordered 
the deportation of the locals of the fourteen villages194 in the countries of Gonen 
and Manyas to the eastern parts of Anatolia.195 A second group of villages were 
also forced to sell their properties and wait for deportation.196 Upon these, 
Mehmet Fertgesoy Soenu published a paper about the deportation and sent it to 
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every member of the parliament. According to one account, Rauf Orbay secured 
the return of the Circassians, but many of them who returned found their homes 
ransacked or destroyed.197 For Soenu, this attitude towards the Circassians 
meant physical exile of the community, but also the abuse (to the point of death) 
that accompanied exile, which increased the impression towards Circassians as 
traitors, bandits, and rebels.198 
The fight against the Circassians continued with the declaration of a list of 
150 names (Yuzellilikler) who were labeled as the “traitors of the fatherland” and 
expelled from Anatolia.199 Of the names in the list, nine of were Cerkes Ethem 
and friends; 18 of them were members of Sark-I Karib Cerkesleri Cemiyeti; 40 of 
them friends of Anzavur; 11 of them were military and government personnel 
who abused their duties; and 8 of them were supporters of the Ottoman Sultan. 
In total, 86 of 150 on the list were Circassians.200  
The prosecution of the Circassians during the Independence Tribunals 
(Istiklal Mahkemeleri) was another attempt to discriminate against Circassians. 
Many of the decisions to sentence prominent Circassians figures, such as Rauf 
Orbay, Bekir Sami Kunduk, Cerkes Ethem and his brothers, into jail were 
overturned by subsequent trials or amnesty. The head of the court was accused 
of killing Circassian Deli Halit Pasha in the corridors of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, but this event was covered up quickly, which constituted 
doubts for the attitude of the court towards Circassians.201 
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B. CIRCASSIANS IN NATIONALIST DISCOURSE 
There is growing literature and academic interest questioning the 
established notion of Turkish national identity and the boundaries of Turkish 
citizenship. Turkish nationalism has experienced a long evolutionary process, 
starting from the late Ottoman era. The official formulation of Turkish national 
identity denies the ethnic and cultural diversity in the country, the only exception 
being the religious minorities that were recognized in the Lausanne Treaty of 
1923,202 where Turkey was finally recognized internationally as a sovereign 
state.203 A society that is traditionally known as multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
would be transformed into a uniform Turkish nation-state. During this discourse, 
Muslim identity has preserved itself and this was acknowledged by Turkish 
authorities to be the key to achieving Turkishness. Likewise, non-Muslims were 
seen as an obstacle to achieving Turkishness. It is generally known that Turkish 
governments have interpreted the term “Turkish descent and culture” to cover 
Turkish-speaking groups or ethically Turkish groups, but also Albanians, 
Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, and Tatars, particularly from the Balkans.204 
The inclusion of non-Muslim groups in Turkish politics and society in the 
process of nation building was conditional and complex since many of the 
politicians and contemporary scholars presented different arguments about the 
theory. As mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty, non-Muslims were rejected almost 
totally, and non-Turkish groups were not exempt from the means of exclusion. 
Mesut Yegen defines the openness of the definition of Turkishness to Muslim 
ethnic groups based on their “actual and assumed loyalty to the Ottoman-Turkish 
state.”205 Furthermore, he questions the Turkishness of Kurds after their revolt 
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against the state in 1925.206 Circassians have similarities with the Kurds, under 
this definition and since the revolt of Cerkes Ethem, which will be covered later in 
this chapter, against the state. Because of this, the perception of ethnic Turks 
against Circassians is still an important landmark in identity studies.  
C. CIRCASSIANS AND TURKISH NATIONALISM DURING THE 
OTTOMAN ERA 
The search for identity became a source of tension in the Ottoman Empire 
and the Republic of Turkey. Kemal Karpat defines how three pre-existing 
identities—Ottoman, Muslim and Turk—evolved into a single “national” identity 
during the late Ottoman era and in the Republic of Turkey. Three identities were 
used interchangeably until the time of republic; however, ethnic Turkishness did 
not answer all identities when the state refused the other two in the early 
1930s.207 The usage of the term “Turk” emerged in the late Ottoman era. “By the 
mid-1890s the elites regarded the term ‘Turk’ expressing both their affiliation with 
the state and their Islamic and Ottoman identity without affecting their special 
Albanian, Circassian or even Arab ethnic identity.”208 
Ottomanism and Islamism provided greater structure under which Turks, 
Arabs, Albanians, Circassians, and other ethnic groups integrated themselves 
into a larger social group. Ethnic Turkishness then developed in similar terms 
with the other two as one of the integral parts of Turks’ modern identity. All these 
identities were intended for the survival of the state, rather than the welfare and 
happiness of society.  
Erik Jan Zurcher examines the emergence of Turkish national identity 
between the last era of the Ottoman Empire and first fifteen years of the Turkish 
Republic. He defines the binding forces on which the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkey were built in three different eras: before the Young Turks period, the 
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Young Turks period, and the Kemalist era. During the first era, being an Ottoman 
and being a Muslim were both used as binding forces, while during the second 
era the term “Ottoman Muslim” became an identity. During this period 
Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism were not rejected totally and were used as 
supplementary elements of the new identity. Therefore, as mentioned by Bernard 
Lewis, Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims of Balkan and Caucasian origin 
played a considerable role in the national movement.209 In the third era, the 
Turkish state, through reforms in many fields, especially in the political structure 
of the country, took measures towards becoming a ‘‘nation-state’’ with a 
centralized administrative structure, a modern education system, and a new 
conception of rights and duties for its subjects based on the idea of Turkishness. 
Yusuf Akcura, another prominent Turkish nationalist, states that Turkish 
nationalism emerged as a linguistic movement in the late nineteenth century, and 
later it developed into the first embodiment of Panturkism, a manifestation of 
Turkish nationalism.210 The transformation of a cultural movement to a political 
ideology started in the beginning of the twentieth century as a response to 
multiple crises of the empire, rising nationalism among the ethnic groups under 
the Ottoman umbrella, and the failure of previous identities—Islamism and 
Ottomanism—to overcome disintegration during the nineteenth century. 
According to Akcura, the first two ideologies already influenced the Ottoman 
State, whereas the third one—Turkism—was a new idea.211 For Akcura, 
Ottomanism was bound to fail and Islamism was difficult, whereas taking the 
direction towards a racially based Turkish nationalism appeared to be inevitable.  
The failure of French nationalism also influenced the course of nationalist 
ideas in the Ottoman and Republic eras. Ottomanism was the effort to create a 
new nation called the “Ottoman State” within the existing borders of the Empire, 
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and to share the same rights and equalities between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
The policy of creating an Ottoman nation began under the Sultan Mahmud II era 
when nationalist ideas were still under the influence of the French revolution, 
based on “will’ (vicdani istek) rather than “descent and race” (soy ve ırk). Sultan 
Mahmud II and his followers were deceived by the notion of the French 
Revolution for nationalism to keep different races and religious groups under the 
notion of equality and freedom. Thus, the defeat of Napoleonic France and the 
rise of race-based Germany in Europe had an impact on Ottoman nationalism. 
The Ottoman policy of empire based on the notion of “will” lost its legitimacy.212 
Within these concerns, Turkish nationalism was the youngest of the 
current ideologies and not one, but two different movements. The older 
movement was Panturkism, which originated among the Tatars of Kazan, Crimea 
and Azerbaijan, and was brought to the Ottoman Empire by Russian émigrés 
after 1908, and the other movement was the Turkish nationalist movement 
romantically idealized by the Anatolian peasants as the “real Turks” whose 
virtues should be rediscovered and adopted by the Ottomans.213 
After 1912–13, the state tried to make Turkism the formal identity of the 
state while upholding the other two. However, with the abolition of the monarchy 
in 1922, and Caliphate in 1924, Turkish national identity emerged as the only 
superimposed structure to combine the nation together. This new identity refused 
the old two forms to break free of historical romanticism, nostalgia, and 
irredentism; and the new political regime became the guardian of the new identity 
and secular modernism. Since the old two were rejected in the new republic, 
strict rules were required to protect it.214 
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The ethnic identity of the Turkish Republic was defined as “Turkishness” 
by Kemal Kirisci.215 Although citizenship was defined as “Turks” in the 1924 
constitution, the government aimed to embrace all different ethnic and religious 
groups, which were once identified as Ottoman or Muslim, under the single term 
of “Turkishness.” Kurdish rebellions and Islamist fundamentalist uprisings, as well 
as the Circassian rebellions in the northwest part of Turkey, can be considered 
as reasons for the identity problems or the consequences of it. Therefore,  
the identifying features of ‘Turkishness’ were not solely Turkish 
ethnicity but the ability and willingness to adopt the Turkish 
language and membership of Sunni Muslim ethnic groups closely 
associated with past Ottoman rule. Hence, Bosnians, Circassians, 
Pomaks, Tatars and so on were definitely included in this definition, 
while Gagauz Turks, who are Christian, and members of other 
Christian minorities, Alevis and unassimilated Kurds were 
excluded.216  
Turkish national identity, in Geller’s words, is defined as “an 
unselfconscious blend of Kemalist republicanism and urban Islam fusing Turkish 
and Muslim identity in an apparently seamless web of symbol and sentiment, as 
Ottoman and Muslim may blend once again.”217  
Under the Kemalist regime, there was a clear decision to seek a new 
Turkish national and secular corporate political identity to replace the “Ottoman 
Muslim;” therefore, Kemalists’ concept of nationality firmly based on language, 
culture, and common purpose (ideal) was placed into practice with the necessary 
means. However, in April of 1920 the new Turkish Grand National Assembly was 
not ready to embrace this idea. Thus, during the opening speech of the Assembly 
Mustafa Kemal said: 
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It should not be assumed that there is only one kind of nation from 
the communities of Islam inside these borders. Within these 
borders, there are Turks. There are the Çerkes; as well as other 
Muslim communities.218 
Later, with the reforms, the new government started to create a new 
national identity. It started with the ban of the use of the terms Kürt (Kurd), Laz, 
Çerkes (Circassian), Kurdistan and Lazistan.219 Thus,  
asking Kurds, Arabs or Circassians to adopt the Turkish culture is 
an impossible demand even in the eyes of Kemalist ideology. Since 
the adaptation of Turkish culture was a prerequisite for being a 
member of the Turkish nation and biding force for the newly 
established republic, cultural and linguistic privileges of the ethnic 
minorities had to be rejected to construct the identity.220 
Atatürk’s view at that time, perhaps quite understandably judging by the 
trials from which the Turks had just emerged, was that the only way the nation 
could succeed was to create homogeneity. However, 
when the Turkish republic was created in 1923, a large proportion 
of its population consisted of recent immigrants of Slavic, Albanian, 
Greek, Circassian, Abkhaz, and Chechen origin, whereas people 
that could claim descent from the Turkic tribes that had come from 
Central Asia were certainly a minority of Anatolia’s population. It 
was in this complex setting that Ataturk and his associates aimed to 
create a modern nation-state, an integrated, unitary polity of the 
French type. For that reason, the model of the nation that Ataturk 
and his associates adopted was civic… to be a Turk meant to live 
within the boundaries of the republic and thereby be its citizen.221 
and 
there was even a discussion about describing the people of the 
new Turkey as ‘Türkiyeli’, as the land of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, 
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Circassians, etc., reserving the term ‘Turk’ for the ethnically 
Turkish. Turk was retained but with the same kind of meaning as 
British or American.”222 
Mustafa Kemal created Turkey out of the Ottoman Empire ruins in 1923; 
there is an unshakable sense of both Turkish identity, and the need to defend it. 
That is why: 
becoming a Turk entailed the suppression of an individual’s own 
ethnic identity. In other words, Atatürk’s maxim was generous in 
allowing everyone who desired to do so to become a Turkish 
citizen, but it did not provide a solution for those who were not 
prepared to abandon their previous identities in favor of the new 
national idea.223  
In summary, the Kemalist regime packaged Turkish identity in a uniform 
term, a homogeneous understanding that would continue to shape Turkish 
thinking for decades to come. 
D. KEMALIST DEFINITION OF NATIONALISM AND CIRCASSIANS 
Within the creation of the new identity from the heritage of the Ottoman 
state, yet not embracing all politics of the old, Mustafa Kemal created the new 
identity independent from religious bonds and ethnic terms, basically covering all 
citizens under the ideology of Turkishness. It was started with close cooperation 
of further values and embraced religious and ethnic motives. However, with the 
abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924, religious influence significantly 
decreased over the government.  
On the other hand, the initial positive attitude towards ethnic minorities 
changed eventually with subsequent events of the Circassians, as well as the 
other ethnic minorities in the newly established republic, starting from the War of 
Independence. Anzavur’s and Ethem’s disloyalty to the government, and later the  
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assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal, created the symptoms of deeper 
insecurity among some within society and the elite towards immigrants in 
general.  
Starting from the War of Independence to the mid-1920s, the Ottoman 
legacy of nationalism based on previous identifications was inherited and 
employed by Mustafa Kemal. Throughout the War of Independence and the initial 
aftermath of the war symbols of religious identity and the national identity of 
“Ottoman Muslim,” not of Turks, remained as the national identity.  
Ziya Gokalp’s thoughts about Turkish nationalism, with his corporatist 
approach of Islam and Turkish nationalism, helped define mainstream political 
discourse and action until the early 1930s. He criticized his contemporaries for 
confusing concepts with each other and devoted his energy to developing a 
sociological definition of nationalism: 
Nation is not a racial, ethnic, geographical, political, or voluntary 
group or association. Nation is a group composed of men and 
women who have gone through the same education, who have 
received the same acquisitions in language, religion, morality, and 
aesthetics. The Turkish folk express the same idea by simply 
saying; ‘‘the one whose language is my language, and whose faith 
is my faith, is of me’’. Men [sic] want to live together, not with those 
who carry the same blood in their veins, but with those who share 
the same language and the same faith. Our human personality is 
not our physical body but our mind and soul.224  
Parallel to this idea, Mustafa Kemal mentioned the importance of multi-
ethnic identity in terms of creating “national borders:” 
These borders have not been drawn only with military 
considerations, they are national borders. They have been set as 
national borders. But it should not be assumed that there is only 
one kind of nation within the Islamic element inside these borders. 
Within these borders, there are Turks; there are the Cerkes 
(Cherkess); as well as other Muslim elements. These borders are 
national borders for kardes¸ [sibling] nations that live in a mixed 
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way and that have totally unified their goals. [In the article 
concerning borders], the privileges of each of the Muslim elements 
within these borders, which stem from their distinct milieu (muhit), 
customs (adat) or race (ırk), have been accepted and certified with 
sincerity and in a mutual fashion.225 
In a subsequent speech, Mustafa Kemal reiterated his ideas about who 
made up the “Nation:” 
Gentlemen…What we mean here, and the people whom this 
Assembly represents, are not only Turks, are not only Çerkes, are 
not only Kurds, are not only Laz. But it is an intimate collective of all 
these Muslim elements….The nation that we are here to preserve 
and defend is, of course, not comprised of one element. It is 
composed of various Muslim elements…We have repeated and 
confirmed, and altogether accepted with sincerity, that [each and 
every element that has created this collective] are citizens who 
respect each other and each other’s racial, social, geographic 
rights. Therefore, we share the same interests. The unity that we 
seek to achieve is not only of Turks or of Çerkes, but Muslim 
elements that include all of these.226 
However, the “sibling nations that live in a mixed way and that have totally 
unified their goals”227 was replaced by the mononational identity starting from the 
1920s. Ziya Gokalp’s cultural nationalism was replaced by a dominant ethnic 
identity. Thus, the 1920s emerged as a crossroad for Circassians for inclusion 
into the nation. The civic definition turned to a more ethnic nation, the position of 
the non-Turkish Muslims became questioned, and these groups were under 
close examination.  
Anatolia in 1923 was a completely different place from what it was in 1913 
in terms of identity. The Crimean War of 1853–1856, the great exile of 
Circassians to Ottoman territory in 1864, Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, and 
the Balkan War of 1912–13 brought hundreds of thousands of refugees to 
Ottoman lands. Finally, under the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, the 
                                            
225 Altinay, The Myth of the Military Nation, 19. 
226 Ibid.  
227 Ibid.  
 70 
remainder of the Greek Orthodox population of Anatolia, about 900,000 people, 
was exchanged against the Muslims from Greece who numbered about 400,000. 
After all these population exchanges, the larger Christian communities were 
practically gone, and Anatolia, which was 80 percent Muslim before the Balkan 
Wars, was approximately 98 percent Muslim in 1923. Linguistically, only two 
large groups were left: the Turks and the Kurds, with many smaller groups 
(Greek, Armenian and Syriac-speaking Christians, Spanish-speaking Jews, and 
Circassian, Laz and Arabic-speaking Muslims), as well as immigrants from the 
Balkans.228 
Mustafa Kemal wanted a uniform society—not a melting pot. The Ottoman 
Empire made its mistakes by being too much of a mixing pot of people, 
languages, cultures, and races, and it was time to homogenize. It was far too 
scattered and patched together, and the new republic could only be formed by 
consolidation and a more realistic sense of boundary. And, from Atatürk’s view at 
that time, perhaps quite understandably judging by the trials from which the 
Turks had just emerged, the only way the nation could succeed was 
homogenously. However, when the Turkish republic was created in 1923, a large 
proportion of its population consisted of recent immigrants of Slavic, Albanian, 
Greek, Circassian, Abkhaz, and Chechen origin, whereas people that could claim 
descent from the Turkic tribes that came from Central Asia were certainly a 
minority of Anatolia’s population. It was in this complex setting that Ataturk and 
his associates aimed to create a modern nation-state, an integrated, unitary 
polity of the French type. For that reason, “the model of the nation that Ataturk 
and his associates adopted was civic…To be a Turk meant to live within the 
boundaries of the republic and thereby be its citizen.”229  
However, a civic identity was not readily acknowledged by the people. He 
had to rally them around a different central commonality: Islam. Despite Kemal’s 
future secular goals, this homogeneity was a Muslim-centered one. With no 
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unifying identity, culture, or Turkishness yet in place in Anatolia, Islam was the 
only flag around which they could unite. A report from the Erzurum congress 
mentions this identity as “the Muslim majority consisting of Turks and Kurds who 
for centuries have mixed their blood in an intimate relationship and who form the 
community (ümmet) of one prophet.”230 The same congress report defines the 
constituency of the nationalist as:  
It purports to speak on behalf of ‘the Muslims who form one nation 
(millet), consisting of Turks and Kurds’ and ‘the Muslim majority 
consisting of Turks and Kurds who for centuries have mixed their 
blood in an intimate relationship and who form the community 
(ümmet) of one prophet.’ The statutes of the society organizing the 
Erzurum congress are even more explicit: they speak about ‘all 
Islamic elements of the population’ and say that ‘all Muslim 
compatriots are natural members of this society.’231 
The Muslim identity of the period before 1923 was a genuine popular 
movement, which made possible the mobilization of the masses during difficult 
times, yet it was unsuitable as a binding force to hold together a society 
modernizing itself on the basis of secularism and positivism defined by the 
“leader.”232 Turkish nationalism was based on “an organic view of Turkish 
culture” and not fully on a voluntarist/legalist concept of nationality.233 However, 
this was not sufficient to shape the newly created republic and led politicians to 
some measures to assimilate the “others” within the “new identity.” 
Foreign understanding of Turkish nationalism and its vulnerabilities in the 
creation phase of Turkey also created strong impacts on the assimilation or 
exchange of ethnic minorities after the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Riza Nur, then 
the Minister of Health, Minister of Education, and representative of the Republic 
at the treaty discussions, mentions the European view as: 
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Europeans know three types of minorities for us: racial minorities 
(irkca ekaliyet), linguistic minorities (dilce ekaliyet), and religious 
minorities (dince ekaliyet). This is a very fatal danger for us. With 
the concept of race they are going to put Circassians, Abkhazians, 
Bosnian, Kurds together with Rums and Armenians. With the 
concept of language they are going to put Muslim groups with other 
languages minorities. With the concept of religion they are going to 
make 2 million Alevites who are pure Turks minorities. That is they 
are going to break us apart. When I heard about this division, I got 
the shivers. I tried a lot, yet with a lot of discussions, I abolished 
them from the treaty. 
Here is the lesson we have concluded: leaving no person of any 
race, language, religion is the most essential, just and crucial task. 
….That’s why, scattering the Circassian and Albanian to the 
villages where Turks are predominant to assimilate them into the 
Turkish identity is the foremost task.234 
After the Lausanne conference Riza Nur sharply criticized the Ministry for 
inappropriate settlement of the Circassians and immigrants from Crete and the 
Albanians, as well as Bosnians.235 Approximately one month after this debate, 
on 11 December 1924, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction, and Settlement 
was closed and its duties were delegated to the Department of Settlement 
created under the Ministry of the Interior.236 
The 1924 constitution was an important milestone for the creation of 
national identity. After long debates about the meaning of Turkishness, the First 
National Assembly agreed on “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion 
and race would, in terms of their citizenship, be called Turkish.”237 There is 
something more in this definition when compared to former and later 
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counterparts. The 1876 constitution of the Ottoman state defines citizenship as: 
“Whatever religion or sect they are from all individuals subject to the Ottoman 
State, without exception, would be called Ottomans.238 
The “In terms of citizenship” condition does not exist in the 1876 
constitution since Ottomanism was enough to cover all identities in the state; 
Turkishness was unable to hold the same ground. Article 54 of the 1961 
constitution states: “Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship 
ties is Turkish.”239  
There is a difference between the 1924 constitution and the 1961 
constitution, since Turkishness is defined as a more authentic idea of political 
citizenship. To understand the real meaning behind the article, the evaluation of 
the constitution writing process has to be examined. When the article was 
introduced to the National assembly it read as follows: “The people of Turkey 
regardless of their religion and race would be called Turkish.”240 
This definition was quite similar to the 1876 constitution, yet unable to 
include minorities in the Republic. Later, a deputy of Bozok (Yozgat), Ahmet 
Hamdi Bey, suggested the article be amended as follows: “Of Turkish people, 
who admit (assimilate into) the Turkish culture would be called Turkish.”241 
According to these definitions, the tension is evident that the Assembly 
was not content to take Turkishness as a status achieved by citizenship, which is 
defined in political and territorial terms. The same article today is stated to be a 
signifier of the existence of a “more authentic Turkishness other than  
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Turkishness in terms of citizenship,”242 and as an identifier discussion over the 
definition and whether it encompasses the ethnic minorities or not (an ongoing 
discussion in Turkey). 
The new education system was influential for the creation of national unity 
and the elimination of different ethnic groups starting from the mid-1920s. Since 
the Anatolian population engaged in a very difficult period of wars starting with 
the Balkan Wars, there was no unity and efficiency in education. Moreover, the 
literacy rate was quite low and there were different spoken local dialects all 
around the country. First the campaign titled “Citizen Speak Turkish” (Vatandas 
Türkçe Konus) started on 26 April 1927 when Inönü gave a fiery speech at the 
annual convention of the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları), an organization of 
mostly intellectuals that served as a hotbed of Turkish nationalism. In his 
remarks, the Prime Minister emphasized the need for everybody in Turkey to 
speak Turkish. The government was going to transform all those who lived inside 
Turkey into Turks, “no matter what happens.”243 A British diplomatic 
correspondence from 1934 noted that Arabs, Circassians, Cretan Muslims, and 
Kurds in the country were being targeted for not speaking Turkish, and in many 
provinces people who spoke different languages and dialects were fined and 
even as many as hundreds were arrested.244 
However, the usage of terms such as “Kurd, Laz, Circassian, Kurdistan 
and Lazistan” was banned in 1925 with the proclamation of the Ministry of 
Education, long before the “speak Turkish Campaign” and the declaration of the 
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system was an efficient school for Turkification. “Kurdish soldiers who were sent 
to western Anatolia” were “taught to read and write Turkish.” Accordingly, these 
people were being “turned into good Turks.245 
The idea of resettlement and the resettlement law of 1934 were used as 
an important element to create a homogeneous nation. Then Prime Minister 
Sukru Saracoglu commented about the law; “The assimilation of these 
immigrants (Balkan and Caucasus immigrants) is one of the goals of this law.”246 
Within the implementation of the law, the population was divided into a class 
system, with ethnic Muslim Turks regarded as the primary group. Then the 
second group was regarded as not speaking Turkish, but belonging to Turkish 
culture (especially Circassians) who were considered Turkish but “whose 
Turkishness in terms of language and culture needs to be enhanced by 
resettlement policies.”247 Also, an official report by the temporary committee for 
the resettlement law, dated on 27 May 1934, cited Albanians, Circassians, and 
Abkhazians as examples of Muslim groups that failed to integrate into the Turkish 
nation.248 
An executive act from the 1930s, “Circular on the Speedy Disposal of 
Resettlement and Population Matters” (Iskan ve Nüfus Islerinin Süratle Ikmali 
Hakkında Tamim) established five hierarchical categories among the immigrants, 
similar to previous classifications. The first was ethnic Turks, who were to receive 
their documents immediately. The second group included Crimean Tatars and 
Karapapaks, who were welcome since they were ethnically related to Turks. The 
third category comprised Balkan Muslims: Pomaks and Bosnians. The fourth 
category comprised the Circassians. The last category comprised Kurds, Arabs, 
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Jews, and Christians.249 Thus, the same committee ordered that the Circassians 
would receive their identification paper only after having been investigated.250  
With the development of the Turkish History Thesis in the 1930s, Turkish 
nationalism became “rationalized” and the synthesis that Ziya Gokalp was trying 
to achieve between Islam and westernization was abandoned in favor of a radical 
interpretation of “laicism.”251 By order of Mustafa Kemal in 1932, the first Turkish 
History Congress was organized mainly with the contribution of teachers and 
intellectuals.252 The Congress ended with the declaration of the “Turkish History 
Thesis” and the official view of what constituted Turkishness: Race, ethnicity, and 
a long glorious history were the tripods of Turkishness; second, only people who 
spoke Turkish would be eligible for membership to the nation; and third, religion 
was deemed irrelevant for defining Turkishness.253 With all these achievements 
the position of the ethnically different groups tried to be harmonizing within 
Turkishness. 
With the rise of Communism in the Soviet Union, a watchful attitude 
against the Circassians also played a significant role during the 1930s. For 
example, the government ordered, on 2 November 1937, that refugees from the 
Soviet Union were not admitted into Turkey; in case of a fait accompli, those who 
managed to enter the country were to be “resettled at least 50 kilometers away 
from the Soviet border.”254 
E. CIRCASSIAN ELITE  
The role of the Circassian elite within the creation of the republic was 
significant and proportionately high. The leadership cadres of the national 
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resistance were mostly figures from the late Ottoman era. During the national 
resistance three groups were important: The first was the politically active military 
officers, such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kazım Karabekir, Ismet Inonu, Refet Bele, 
Deli Halit, Seyfi Duzgoren, Kazim Ozalp, and Cefer Tayyar Egilmez. The second 
group was composed of CUP party bosses, such as Yenibahçeli Nail, Mazhar 
Mufit Kansu, Celal Bayar, and Filibeli Hilmi. And, the third group was the 
members of the former fedaiin from the Special Organization.255 The number of 
Circassians among the commanders of the resistance and their role in the 
creation of Turkey were remarkably high: Halit, Ali Fuat, Refet and Rauf were all 
members of immigrant families from the Caucasus. For example, when Mustafa 
Kemal was igniting the national resistance movement at Samsun on 19 May 
1919, Circassian descent former Navy Minister Huseyin Rauf Orbay, who had 
close relations with the head of the Karakol Kara Vasif,256 was visiting Special 
Organization veterans in the western parts of the country and making Special 
Organization arms caches available for the resistance.257 
Rauf Orbay was among the first activist to take part in the planning and 
organization phase of the National Forces, especially in the western parts of the 
country.258 Especially, Rauf Orbay played a significant role in the recruitment of 
Circassians to support the efforts of the regular army with regional paramilitary 
forces. Many Circassian officers served during the crucial stage of the War of 
Independence, both as commanders and recruiters.259 At the end of the war in 
1922, the Turkish Grand National Assembly awarded eleven North Caucasians, 
out of twenty recipients, the honorific title of veteran (gazi).260 
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The participation of the Circassians in the Sivas Congress, on the way to 
the War of Independence, is significantly more than the other representatives. 
“Out of a possible 38 men who joined the gathering, twelve were of North 
Caucasian decent.”261 Circassians also provided security for Mustafa Kemal and 
the other participants on their way from Amasya to Erzurum and then Sivas. At 
the behest of Rauf Orbay, a small unit was prepared under the command of two 
Circassian commanders, Semsettin Sulara and Osman Onarak, and was ordered 
to protect Mustafa Kemal whatever the cost.262 In a similar fashion, Emin Marsan 
Pasha, the paramilitary leader of the Sivas region, assured Mustafa Kemal that 
the congress in Sivas would be held without any disruptions.263 At end of the 
congress stage, when Mustafa Kemal reached Ankara with representatives of the 
Anatolia (Heyet-I Temsiliye), five out of eleven representatives were also 
Circassians.264 The number of Circassians in the first Turkish Grand National 
Assembly on 23 April 1920 was in lieu of their previous contributions: 25 out of 
120 representatives were Circassians.265 
F. PARA-MILITARISM AND THE CERKES ETHEM AFFAIR 
Para-militarism is an important issue within themes of violence and identity 
in modern Turkey. Circassians played definitive roles to defy as well as 
cooperate with the CUP and the nationalist movement in Western Anatolia. They 
have been known for their courage and warrior instincts throughout history. 
However, there are some instances that blemish this courage, and even until 
today, this stigmatization has caused negative approaches towards the 
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Circassians. The notorious events of Circassian involvements date back to the 
early years of Circassian existence within the Ottoman Empire. 
On 5 June 1876, ex-Sultan Abdülaziz committed suicide. Then, on 15 
June, a Circassian army captain called Hasan, motivated by personal hatred, 
shot and killed Hüseyin Avni Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs Resit Pasha, and 
several others during a cabinet meeting. This event was linked to the vague 
statement of the Imperial Degree (Hatti Humayun) and later changed the balance 
of power in favor of more radical reforms in the Ottoman Empire.266 In a similar 
fashion, in 1889, the first organized opposition to the Ottoman administration was 
ignited in the Military Medical College under the name of Ittihad-i Osmani 
Cemiyeti (Ottoman Unity Society), which aimed to reinstate the constitution and 
parliament. The founders of this opposition were four Albanians, a Kurd, and a 
Circassian.267 
Similar to previous events, in April 1876, in the aftermath of a Christian 
uprising in Bosnia, Bulgarian nationalists based in Romania and Russia 
organized a rebellion to the south of the Danube, which was suppressed by the 
Ottomans with the help of militias (the so-called Bashibozuks). These irregular 
forces constituted mostly Circassians, many of whom were resettled in the area 
after they were chased from the Caucasus by the Russians a decade earlier.268 
On 2 August 1903 (Ilinden or St. Elijah’s Day) the central government in 
the Macedonia province of Manastir exploded in rebellion that was organized by 
the guerillas under the name of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (VMRO). Throughout the southern regions of the Manastir, Greek 
and Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire were exposed to the violence of the  
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VMRO. In response, Ottoman forces again used basibozuks or irregular forces to 
suppress the violence, and many local landless and unemployed men joined 
these local fighters.269 
As in the Abdülhamid’s era, the politics of Muslim solidarity held a special 
attraction for the large immigrant communities, especially from the Balkans and 
the Caucasus, who considered themselves victims of religiously inspired 
persecution. That is why shared Muslim identity was a perfect path towards 
integration of these groups, and it should thus cause no surprise that immigrants, 
especially Circassians, were so prominent among the CUP militants (especially 
in the so-called ‘Special Organization,’ the Teskilat-i Mahsusa).270 
Elite officers rose in the Ottoman military schools, such as Enver, Kâzım, 
Fethi, and Mustafa Kemal, clearly established a separate subgroup, but at the 
same time bonds of friendship, often based on a shared history as classmates, 
tied them personally to lower-ranking officers. These ties were mobilized most 
spectacularly by Enver at the start of World War I, when he created the Special 
organization (Teskilat-i Mahsusa) out of the loosely defined group known as the 
fedaiin (volunteers). Some officers volunteered also for this undercover 
organization and participated in the war of Tripolitania in 1911 against the 
Italians, and one year later, during the Balkan War, they were charged with 
setting up a guerrilla movement, and even an ostensibly independent Muslim 
republic in Western Thrace. They would later play important roles with the 
persecution of the political figures. A great deal of literature has been written 
about this group; however, it has exposed very little about the background of 
most of its members, people such as Kusçubasızade Esref, Sapancalı Hakkı, 
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one-million-strong Circassian émigrés in the Ottoman Empire, the children and 
grandchildren of nineteenth century refugees from the Caucasus, played a key 
role in this group.271 
The Special Organization was famous for its personal networks.272 At the 
top of the organization, there were powerful individuals and families, such as 
Rauf Orbay, Cerkes Resit, and Esref Kuscubasi. These people were also 
responsible for recruitments from the less distinguished Circassians.273 
This underground network was also influential in the post-war period and 
the preparation phase of the Republic for the War of Independence. Members of 
the organization, especially those of Circassian origin, seem to have formed the 
backbone of these networks. The most important of the networks was Karakol 
(The Guard), founded in October 1918 with the order of Enver and Talât Pashas. 
Karakol was ordered to recruit and maintain pre-existing Muslim gangs in the 
Izmit region and eventually with the help of personal connections the Karakol 
started to control a wide range of territory starting from Izmit to Istanbul.274 This 
network smuggled significant amounts of weaponry and equipment as well as a 
large number of people to Anatolia during the period between November 1918 
and March 1920. According to the memoirs of Halide Edip, Karakol managed to 
steal 320 machine guns, 1,500 rifles, one artillery gun, 200 boxes of ammunition, 
and 10,000 uniforms from the depots of the invading forces, and they managed 
to transport these weapons to the National Resistant Forces.275  Many of those 
smuggled to Anatolia were people who brought vital skills to the emerging 
resistance movement, but who could also be expected to be arrested for alleged  
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war crimes. In 1919–20, Karakol also nursed political ambitions, trying to 
determine the course of the national resistance in Anatolia and establish 
independent relations with the Bolsheviks.276  
Besides their significant contribution to the underground structure, 
Circassians were considered to be the seminal actors of the Ottoman state 
structure,277 and later played a definitive role with the cooperating Committee 
and Union and Progress (CUP) and the Nationalist Movement.278 Also, Mustafa 
Kemal realized their courage and independent characteristics and tried to use 
them as important force multipliers of the Turkish Independence War. Especially, 
he saw the Circassians as a community in Anatolia that preserved their unity as a 
different entity, and this entity should be part of the War of Independence.279 The 
regular Army units were so weak that, until 1921, the nationalists had to rely on 
bands of Turkish and Circassian irregulars for resistance to the Greek invaders in 
the Western part of the county.280  
However, later this band structure, in the western part of Anatolia, became 
a significant problem for the new republic, and played an important subtext within 
the definition of identity. While Mustafa Kemal was utilizing the band structure, 
the Istanbul government also tried to organize armed resistance against the 
Nationalists, with the support of the British. They used exactly the same kind of 
bands of irregulars as the Nationalists, and the Circassian gang leader Ahmet 
Anzavur was one of the most influential leaders in the region of Balikesir. Yet, 
they were suppressed by another band led by another Circassian influential 
figure, Cerkes Ethem, on behalf of the Nationalists.281 
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Based on the Islamic, anti-imperialist, anti-western, corporatist, and 
socialist ideas, the Green Army (Yesil Ordu) was established in May of 1920 with 
the approval of Mustafa Kemal. It was not a real regular army, but a political 
organization designed to improve morale within the Nationalist structure and to 
support the activities of the Ottoman Sultan who operated under the name of 
‘Army of the Caliphate.’ Rauf Orbay had a significant importance with the 
creation of this army and himself established first contact with Ethem and his 
brothers Tevfik and Resit. He described them as the previous Special Operation 
Agents, and partisan fighting experts.282 Ethem and his cetes, composed of 
nearly 3,000 volunteers, played a significant role against the 30,000-strong 
Greek forces, and caused a huge amount of casualties to them.283 When Ethem 
came to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, he was welcomed as a national 
hero, and including Mustafa Kemal every member showed their gratitude to 
Ethem with a long standing ovation.284 Then, he was ordered to suppress the 
anti-Kemalist uprising in Yozgat.  
When Çerkez Ethem, at the head of his Circassian fighters, joined the 
Green Army, it became a force to be reckoned with and a potential threat, which 
later forced Mustafa Kemal to disband it in July. But, the radicals in the 
organization reorganized as the Halk Zümresi (People’s Faction) the same 
month. Mustafa Kemal reacted by gathering a number of people he trusted from 
among the People’s Faction to found an officially approved “communist” party 
(Türkiye Komünist Fırkası), which was tightly controlled by people close to 
himself.285 
Mustafa Kemal took steps to crush this left-wing movement in January of 
1921 by ordering Çerkez Ethem to disband his troops and allow them to be 
integrated into the regular army. When Ethem refused, troops were sent against 
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him. On 27 December 1920 Inonu and his troops defeated the Ethem forces, 
took most of the members as prisoner, and Ethem himself fled and went over to 
the Greek side.286 With the strong arm of the left thus cut off, Mustafa Kemal 
dissolved the Popular Socialists.287  
The Circassians did not welcome the Kemalist policy after the creation of 
the Republic, and it created disappointment among the non-Turkish Muslims in 
Turkey, since it encouraged the creation of Turkishness as a new nationalist 
idea.288 The speech of Inonu, just after the Said rebellion, increased the tension 
between minorities in Turkey. He mentioned that: “Compared with the ethnic 
Turks, no other nationality is important for us. Our goal is to make everybody 
Turk who lives in this Turk homeland. Whoever opposes this idea will be cut off 
from this state.”289 The propaganda activities of the group Turkish Hearths (Turk 
Ocaklari) helped the creation of Turkishness, and activities of state-sponsored 
organizations were not welcomed among Circassians. For many Circassians, 
Muslim identity was still an important factor for their connection with the state, 
and its dissolution with the ban of The Caliphate in 1924 shook relations with the 
new state.  
The Cerkes Ethem affair has turned out to be important in the narratives of 
Circassians in Turkey, due to the ways this historical event is represented in 
history books and media. Despite Ethem’s uprising and seeking refuge in 
Greece, most Circassians remained loyal to the Kemalists. Yet, the republic 
explained Ethem’s treason through his national origin.290 This event was an 
elimination of the local guerilla forces in favor the regular army in 1920s during 
Turkey’s War of Independence; however, it is attributed to all Circassians. Even 
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Mustafa Kemal, in his famous speech Nutuk, mentioned little about Ethem’s help 
during the War of Independence and stressed about his traitorous activities.291 
G. NATIONALISM AFTER MUSTAFA KEMAL 
During the 1930s, Circassians and other ethnic minorities in Turkey 
suffered a lot under the homogenization policies and the stigma of being a “traitor 
nation” in the minds of the subsequent ruling elite.  
The Minorities are rapidly disappearing as entities. This program of 
Minorities is essentially the latest phase of a conflict between the 
radically opposed political ideals; Ottomanism or federation of the 
heterogeneous, and Turkish or homogenous nationalism. The idea 
of nationalism and the idea of the race are the ideas of new 
Turkey.292  
No Matter what happens, it is our obligation to immerse those living 
in our society in the civilization of Turkish society and to have them 
benefit from the prosperity of civilization. Why should we still speak 
of the Kurd Mehmet, the Circassian Hasan or the Laz Ali. This 
would demonstrate the weakness of the dominant element...If 
anybody has any difference inside of him, we need to erase that in 
the schools and in the body politic, so that man will be as Turkish 
as me and serve the homeland.293 
In 1931 the CHP party program started to create definitions for the 
Nationalist concept. First, it described the “millet” (nation) as a “social and 
political community of citizens connected to one another through language, 
culture, and ideals.”294 This asserted that becoming Turkish was primarily 
cultural-linguistic, and then voluntaristic.295 Recep Peker, of Circassian descent, 
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also spoke about the non-Turkish Muslims’ position vis-à-vis the nation, ignoring 
linguistic differences with them, and arguing instead that they could be 
considered Turks: 
We accept those citizens in the contemporary Turkish political and 
social community, as part of us, those citizens who accepted the 
ideas such as Kurdism, Circassianism, and even Lazeism and 
Pomakism. It is our duty to correct these false conceptions [among 
them]. (Recep Peker, CHF Programının Izahı, 7)296 
While Kemalism acted more harshly to assimilate the Kurds, it used more 
benign means toward the lesser Muslim minorities, such as Circassians. The 
new government watched non-Turkish Muslim groups with caution and monitored 
any nationalist activities, which was usually called a cultural policy. First, the 
government banned publications in different languages. Then, on 9 June 1932, it 
outlawed the entry of a Circassian primer in Latin characters into Turkey. Also, 
the government banned national Circassian publications, such as “The Caucasus 
Quarterly,” a Circassian journal published in Paris.297 
On 14 August 1935, the British government informed Ambassador Loraine 
that, according to some intelligence, a terrorist group mostly composed of 
Kurdish minorities would assassinate the Turkish president. When the Turkish 
government learned about the report, it issued an alert about this issue to its 
local authorities. Ankara also noted that a band of Circassian assassins from 
Trans-Jordan, and an Armenian from Athens would enter Turkey to join these 
efforts.298 
Consequently, the Republic became extremely wary toward the Circassian 
diaspora in Turkey. The government started to follow suspicious Circassians, 
both in Turkey and in other diaspora countries. For example, Ankara requested 
information from the Syrian government about the activities of the Circassian 
Sadettin, and in Turkey, it requested information from the governor of Izmir about 
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“Circassian Kemal Rıza.”299 Similarly, on 5 September 1935, Ankara asked the 
governors of Kocaeli, Balıkesir, Aydın, and Çanakkale to report their estimate of 
“firearms in the hands of civilians, especially in those areas, populated by the 
Lazes, Georgians, Abkhazes, Lezgis, and Circassians.”300 
H. EXTREME NATIONALISM IN TURKEY AND CIRCASSIANS 
The role of ethnic identity within the imagined binding term of “Turkish 
National Identity” was suppressed until the democratization movements in the 
1960s. Generally, they have been situated at different societal levels. Ethnicity 
has been observed through “minority” cultures, whereas nationalism has been 
interpreted through state ideology. While all minorities are represented under the 
terms of Ottoman Muslims during the late years of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Kemalist nationalist definition did not include ethnic groups during the first 
decades of the Republic. Hence, national identity was structured by banning the 
use of ethnic languages and banning the demonstration of ethnic cultural figures 
in the community. 
Extreme nationalism started to emerge as a Nationalist movement in the 
1930s with the Turkish Hearths, and was later politicized in the 1960s as the 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP). The first founders were 
Huseyin Nihal Atsiz, Riza Oguz Turkkan, Zeki Velidi Togan, and others who 
embraced the racial idea of Turkishness. This group defined Turkish nationalism 
based on the Turkish race rather than the previous definitions of Ottomanism, 
Muslim identity, and the lingua-cultural definition of Turkish identity. For Nihal 
Atsiz, Turkish nation means Turkish race, and he defined this idea in 1931: 
Then what is a nation? We should first accept this: According to us 
there is only Turkish nation...For Turks nationalism is foremost a 
blood issue. The person who would say I am Turk should be from 
the Turkish descent...But a person with foreign blood even if s/he 
does know any language other than Turkish, s/he is not a 
Turk....The person whose form looks Turkish is not also Turkish....It 
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is necessary to avoid those who resemble to the Turks in form 
more. As it is known, the most dangerous of the snakes is the one 
that has the same color with its setting. ….But they either know or 
sense that their blood is different. This is why I call them like-Turks 
(Türkümsü)...We can state hundreds of examples on how 
Türkümsüs harm the Turk. It is easy to prove this historically:...why 
did Abdullah Cevdet try to destroy the notions of nation and 
religion? Because he was a Kurdish nationalist...Why did Rıza 
Tevfik betray the county? Because he was a hybrid with an 
Albanian father and Circassian mother. Why did Ali Kemal work for 
the enemy? Because his grandfather was a converted Armenian. 
Why did ceteci Ethem unite with the Greeks? Because he was a 
Circassian...The defect in their blood makes them do that. 
Therefore, their treasons should be considered natural.301 
Thus, many non-Turkish ethnic groups were regarded as those that 
looked like Turks, yet they were ethnically different and they were the real threat 
to the Republic. This idea also rejected the Turanist definition of Ziya Gokalp of 
the Republican era, as well as the previous Muslim identity until the idea of 
“Turkish-Islamic synthesis”302 in the 1960s with Alparslan Turkes, founder of the 
MHP.  
Since treason was associated with non-Turkish ethnic groups, they were 
all considered responsible for the failure of the Ottoman state and for attempts to 
resist the new Republic. Within this narrative, the idea of “Grey Wolves” 
emerged, and the popular idea among the Grey Wolves that “only Turks can help 
the Turks, and there is no friend for Turks but the Turks” emerged as the popular 
nationalist narrative in Turkey.  
During the 1930s, there were different narratives about the Circassians in 
Turkey; some defined them as Turks, and some placed them into the category of 
internal enemy. While the Kemalist government was committed to the creation of 
a new national identity based on the integration of non-Turkish minorities in the 
Republic, it also stayed cautious towards them. On the other hand, in December 
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1938, the then Interior Minister Refik Saydam wrote: “Unconstitutional phrases 
such as ‘...is being investigated as a member of the Circassian race...’ have been 
attracting our attention. The Circassians are Turkish citizens and are Turks by 
race.”303 
General Fevzi Cakmak, Ataturk’s fellow soldier, founded the Republican 
Peasant-Nation Party (Cumhuriyetci Koylu Millet Partisi, CKMP) in 1948. The first 
party program was based on the corporatist, developmental, and modern 
ideology that Ataturk used to define the baselines. In 1965, Alparslan Turkes was 
elected as the party chair, and anti-communist rhetoric eventually became the 
main party ideology under the Nine Lights Doctrine (Dokuz Isik Doktrini, DID) 
accepted in 1967. The same year, Turkes publicly declared the extremist 
statement, “Whoever joins the cause and then becomes a traitor, kill him.”304 
Also he quoted from Hitler’s book Mein Kampf in many of his speeches.305 Thus, 
many writers place the party into the fascist group. 
The idea of Turkishness was more of an encompassing term for Alparslan 
Turkes; he refused the ethnic differences in Turkey starting from the 1940s. With 
the trials of 1944, the Turkist political movement was transformed from a political 
doctrine to a political opposition and located vis-à-vis Kemalist nationalism. 
Strangely, the members of the court were non-Turkish and Alparslan Turkes 
stated on this issue that: 
The files of Turkism, Turanism was now delivered to a Circassian 
and an Albanian. Leading them is a son of an Arab...Ismail Berkok 
was a Circassian and he was not a random one. He wrote books on 
this nation and studied a lot. What would become the result? 
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...the incident showed that neither Alkan is Albanian, nor Berkok is 
Circassian and Erden is Arab. All three of them are the Turkish 
children of Turkey and they are Turkish generals.306 
The rise of right-wing extremism in Turkey led to repression of the Circassians, 
although the political atmosphere of the 1950s and 1960s was more relaxed than 
the 1930s. Although there are many different features to define right-wing 
extremism, five of them (nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democratic 
sentiment, and support for a strong state)307 are considered the basic features by 
many right-wing writers; these features correspond to the MHP’s DID, which is 
based on nationalism, idealism, moralism, communitarianism, positivism, 
ruralism, libertarianism and character building, modernization and populism, and 
industrialism.308 
Turkish nationalism defined DID as “the love of Turkish nation, and loyalty 
and service to the Turkish state;” and sacrificing themselves for the well-being of 
the national community is depicted as the primary mission of citizens in the party 
agenda.309 DID’s doctrine of party was based on the glorification of Turkish 
history and traditions. This is why his definition of nation is not an ethnic 
definition. Yet his emphasis on not having “the aspiration or pretension for any 
other nation in his heart” automatically excludes any diasporic formation, or any 
long-distance politics. The famous slogan of the party, as the signifier of the 
expultionist policy, “love or leave the country” reveals the goal of creating a 
sterile society. Turkes added more to the definition and stated that, “…our 
nationalism means Turkism. Ideologically, this means conforming in all spheres 
to the Turkish spirit and traditions and to assistance to all Turks and the Turkish 
nation in everything.”310 
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Although it is not clearly mentioned in any party documents, racist ideas 
are deeply structured in the rhetoric of some party members and supporters. 
Muhsin Yazicioglu, an avid supporter of racist superiority and later a founder of 
the second right-wing extremist party—Great Unity Party—in Turkey, wrote that, 
“We firmly believe in the theory of superior race…Turkishness is an essence 
comprised of religion and race…the Turkish race is more precious than all 
others.”311 A pamphlet distributed to Turkish workers in Germany by MHP prior 
to the 1977 elections showed that there was a clear racist hatred of minorities. It 
stated that, 
Those who have destroyed (The Ottoman Empire) were Greek-
Armenian-Jewish converts, Kurds, Circassians, Bosnians, and 
Albanians. As a Turk, how much longer will you tolerate these dirty 
minorities? Throw out the Circassian, that he may go to Caucasia, 
throw out the Armenian, throw out and kill Kurd, purge from your 
midst the enemy of all Turkdom.312  
During the 1970s, two political platforms began to revive: The 
revolutionaries (Devrimci) believed the social movement in Turkey would be the 
best route to secure Circassians rights, and the returnists (Donuscu) favored 
repatriation to the North Caucasus. The Deverimci movement eventually lost its 
support but the Donuscu idea is still active. The 1980 military coup resulted in a 
new wave of repatriation talk as a favorable topic among Circassians. Later 
events in the Soviet Union would soon make repatriation a real possibility for 
Circassians, yet this time conflict in the region became an impediment for many 
Circassians in Turkey.313   
Among this nationalistic discourse there were some features that made 
the integration of Circassians into the new state structure. First was the concept 
of Turkish national identity. As long as Circassians identify themselves as a  
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branch of Turkishness or a part of Turkishness, and even sometimes-hyphenated 
identities, such as Caucasian-Turks, nationalists considered them as part of 
Turkishness. 
The second factor that connected Circassians to MHP ideology as a 
political movement was the anti-communist rhetoric of MHP. Throughout the 
1960s, the signifier of anti-communism served to provide coherence among the 
categories of Turkishness, as did being a Sunni Muslim.314 As far as Circassians 
were concerned, this anti-communist ideal overlapped with the anti-Russian 
ideal. 
The third important factor that connected Circassians with MHP ideology 
was the legend of Turanism inherited from the Ottoman Empire, based on the 
creation of geographically larger Turkic communities. The operations of Enver 
Pasha in the North Caucasus during World War I, and the support of the 
Ottoman Empire by the Republic of the Northern Caucasus are the instances 
where Turanism and Circassian nationalism overlapped. Within this concept of 
Turanism, Circassians from time to time were regarded as an extension of Turkic 
communities in Russia, as part of the “oppressed peoples.” 
The fourth factor that was parallel between MHP ideology and Circassian 
nationalism is the concept of loyalty. Loyalty to the state structure and promotion 
of a strong state ideology is the ideological legacy of the Ottoman Empire to 
Turkish nationalism.
 
Similarly, Circassians since the nineteenth century have 
been associated with the Ottoman and later Turkish state as loyal soldiers and 
bureaucrats. Stigmatizing Cerkes Ethem and the association of the “cerkes” to 
the entire community was an exception that needed to be erased from the 
memories for the Circassians. Thus, going hand-in-hand with nationalist 
discourse was important for Circassians.  
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The threat of non-Turkish ethnic identifications and the fear that other 
groups would follow Kurdish nationalism vis-à-vis the Turkish nation have 
become general themes in Turkish nationalist discourse. In this context, 
Circassians are either regarded as the “loyal element” or as “the next” ethnic 
group that tends to follow the Kurds, and hence, betray the Turkish nation and 
state. However, the current trend in Turkey and the demands of the Circassians 
from the state are limited mostly on a cultural perspective, and the heads of the 
associations have reiterated their loyalty to the state in many instances. 
I. IDENTITY IN TRANSITION: KEMALISM UNDER STRAIN (1990S AND 
2000S) 
Since the creation of the Republic of Turkey, the evolution of Turkish 
society and politics has been based on Kemalist ideas that were defined by the 
founder of the republic. In domestic politics, this has meant a strong attachment 
to the state and the norms of the state defined in the constitution. Both ideas of 
the Founder and the basics of the constitution paid very little attention to ethnic 
and religious identity; however, there were different cleavages supporting 
different approaches to identity based on Turkishness, Ottoman heritage, and 
Muslim heritage.  
On the other front, Turkish policy has turned her face to the western world 
to reach modern values of civilization as well as economic recovery of the war-
torn new country. 
The binding forces for the new Turkish Republic were Islam and Turkish 
nationalism in the 1990s. In reality, it was difficult to distinguish where one 
phenomenon ended and the other started, because they have had close 
interactions and interdependence in politics. This policy is still applicable in 
Turkish politics and has become more prominent with the reducing role of the 
military in Turkish politics, and is seen by many supporters as a balancing force 
between Islam and the secular structure of modern Turkey. The rise of the Refah 
Party in July of 1996 and later the rise of the AKP during the beginning of 2000s 
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greatly intensified debates about the direction of Turkish democracy. Even if 
Refah is left out of politics by an act of the Turkish Supreme Constitutional Court, 
the sentiments that brought Refah and the AKP to power will be a force to be 
reckoned with in Turkish politics for some time to come.    
Another potentially important force for change in Turkish society exists in 
the form of rising ethnic awareness within Turkish society—most prominently in 
the Kurdish example. The national revivals are making themselves felt in foreign 
policy within Turkey’s path to the EU, as well as in domestic policy settings with 
the rise of representation of these groups in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. The result of these forces is the deepening identity crisis affecting the 
process of Turkey in terms of democracy and relations with the West and East.  
J. RISE OF THE ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (1990S AND 2000S) 
Starting from the 1990s, Turkey has faced the steady rise of Islam as a 
political force. The rise of Islam goes far beyond the number of headscarves in 
the streets; it is the rediscovery of Islam as a cultural support, expression of class 
frustration, expression of economic support, and political outlet.315  
The main political actors have played an important role in religious revival 
as a political identity, since the religious vote is simply too high to ignore. 
Therefore, since the 1950s, leaders such as Erbakan, Ozal, Ciller, Yilmaz, and 
even Alparslan Turkes reached for the religious card in political rivalry. Especially 
in the 1990s, the increase of political Islam created questions of the failing of 
secular structure of the country until 28 February 1997, when the military forced 
the government out in a deliberate, but indirect fashion—a soft coup.  
The current ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi, AKP), led by PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has helped 
consolidate a new dominant national identity that has grown since the mid-1980s, 
during the reign of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), led by Turgut 
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Ozal. This dominant national identity reflects the synthesis between Turkey’s 
Ottoman-Islamic histories and culture with its nationalist, secular, Western, 
modern traditions that the state was founded on by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 
1923. This dominant national identity is usually called “neo-Ottoman”316 or even 
previous definition of “Turkic-Islamic synthetic” (with more emphasis on the 
Islamic side). Recently, with its predominantly Muslim population that had once 
been the epicenter of all Sunni Muslims, Turkey has started to return to its 
Islamic and Ottoman past, showing a deeper regard for its Muslim culture.317 
“Since Islam lies at the core of the symbolic structure of Turkish society and is 
the main source of shared moral understanding, Islam is the repository from 
which Muslim actors draw values, critiques, and judgments.”318 
K. CONCLUSION 
After a detailed examination of the Circassian community within Turkish 
society, it can be seen that diaspora politics is based on the resistance or strong 
struggle against the hegemonic community, but also comprises a variety of 
strategies to sustain identity.   
From 1800 to the 1920s there was a serious population change in 
Anatolia. Many of the immigrants were already Turks in culture and language. 
Others, such as the Circassians, Bosnians, and Albanians kept many of their 
ethnic traditions, but became Turkish in language and loyalty. Also, the Russian 
exodus of Circassians from the North Caucasus created a communal trauma for 
the immigrated Muslim Circassians in Ottoman lands. Thus, “this confrontation 
forced the order to treat Islam as an identity of resistance and restructuring.”319 
However, they were forced to forget their languages, since the Turkish language 
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was seen as one of the most significant binding factors of Kemalist nation-
building policy. Eventually many of the immigrants forgot their languages. Even 
some dialects of the North Caucasian language became extinct, such as the 
Ubykh dialect.320 They have become part of Turkish nationalism. However, 
despite the continuously changing discourse of Turkish nationalism of non-
Turkish Muslims, the historical and ideological matrix of Turkish nationalism 
enabled multiple points of entry for Circassians in social and political life in 
Turkey. 
The relations of Circassians within Turkish society are complex, a 
constantly reshaped and intermingled situation. However, there are certain things 
that show Turkish nationalism as a hegemonic concept rather than democratic 
and egalitarian. Thus, this nationalism has multiple and different discourses 
within ethnic minorities. 
The collective memory of the 21 May 1864 exile is analyzed as the basis 
of Circassian identity and as a component of contemporary identity with certain 
cultural characteristics, transmitted over generations. Today, Circassians claim 
as many rights as other ethno-cultural minority groups without expressing any 
separatist objectives, expressing their difference basically focused on their 
culture and their “exile” memory. Identity recognition comes first with these 
claims, since they, as well as the other minorities, have not expressed their 
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IV. NORTH CAUCASUS ORGANIZATIONS AND 
ASSOCIATIONS IN TURKEY 
After presenting the history of Circassians and their relations with the 
Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey, this part of the thesis will examine the 
construction of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey, also covering the late Ottoman 
era, with a special emphasis on the discourse of Circassian 
associations/organizations and intellectuals from different historical periods in 
different political contexts. This part is organized as follows: The first part 
analyzes the Circassian organizations in the Ottoman Era, up to their closure 
with the declaration of Republic; the second part covers the period from the 
1950s to 1980; the third part covers from 1980 to the 2000s; the fourth part 
examines from the 2000s to the present, while presenting the ideologies of the 
associations, their aims, programs, publications, and influence over Turkish 
foreign policy towards the North Caucasus. 
Starting from the early days of the “Great Exile” of Circassians to Ottoman 
lands, two basic ideas have always stayed in the minds of the Circassians. First 
one is the “returnist” (Donuscu) ideology that aims to return to the homeland, and 
make every effort on behalf of this policy. The supporters of the ideology feel 
themselves to be guests in host countries that still have considerable Circassian 
populations. The second basic ideology is the idea of Diaspora (Kaliscilik) and 
living in a different country, embracing the values of the country rather than 
turning back to the homeland.  
Today, the Circassians largely live in the south Marmara region, from 
Istanbul, to Izmit, Adapazari, Duzce, Bursa, Balikesir, and Canakkale. Another 
significant group is scattered from the Black Sea coast of Sinop and Samsun to 
Adana in the southern part of Turkey with specific concentrations in Samsun, 
Tokat, Yozgat, Sivas, Amasya, Corum, Kayseri and Adana. The associations are 
also scattered in different parts of the country in similar fashion, and Circassians 
established their own local associations in each city where they live. The study of 
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the associations is imperative in order to understand the political diversity and 
intensity of contemporary Circassian diaspora activism as well as its dynamics. 
The study shows that the political environment the state provided to the 
associations, roles of the leaders, and different ideologies among the Circassians 
are influential for the determinations of the political influence over domestic and 
foreign policy. 
A. CIRCASSIAN ASSOCIATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN ERA 
The Circassians did not exist as a distinct ethnic group in Anatolia until 
their Great Exile, in huge numbers, to Ottoman territories in the 1860s. Especially 
from that date, Circassian intellectuals played a significant role within the 
Ottoman elite, and occupied many important positions, especially in the close 
circle of the Sultan and the military, compared to the other minority groups. 
However, there were no associations until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 
and the restoration of the 1876 Constitution brought (relatively) more democratic 
rights. Circassians reacted quickly in this environment by establishing a number 
of associations such as the Circassian Union and Support Association (Cerkes 
Ittihat ve Teavun Cemiyeti or CITC), Caucasian Political Committee (Şimali 
Kafkas Cemiyeti or SKC), and Circassian Womens’ Mutual Aid Committee 
(Çerkes Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti or CKTC). The basic objective of these early 
associations was the protection of Circassian culture and its passdown to newer 
generations, improvement of relations with the homeland, improvement of 
solidarity among Circassians, improvement of economic conditions for poor 
Circassians, and organization of “returnist” policies to the homeland.321 In short, 
protection of the North Caucasus identity by fostering social solidarity was the 
main target of the associations, for which they had carried out intense 
activities.322 However, all these association were closed down and the 
publications were banned upon declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. 
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Among these organizations, the British Army closed down the SKC after the 
Armistice of Moudros in 1918, and the rest had to stop their activities in 1923 with 
the establishment of the Republic.323 
The Circassians were planning to execute an efficient and effective route 
of reform for years and to spread the history of their language, culture, and 
identity to the world. With the establishment of the Second Constitution of the 
Ottoman Empire on 23 July 1908,324 freedom of thought and speech amplified 
among the Circassians. Prior to the official date of its founding, in August 1908 
Gazi Mehmet Pasha, the son of Imam Shamil, laid the foundation of the CITC in 
Kosha, Istanbul, with the participation of over 100 members at the first 
meeting.325 Many of the attendees were historical and intellectual figures of the 
time (including, but not limited to, people such as Ahmet Cavit Therket Pasha, 
Marshal Merted Abdullah Pasha, Marshal Berzeg Zeki Pasha, Gazi Muhammad 
Fazıl Pasha, General Pooh Nazmi Pasha, General Shaplı Osman Pasha, Loh 
Ahmet Hamdi Pasha, Met Çunatuko Izzet Pasha, Ismail Berkok, Ahmet Mithat 
Efendi and Professor Aziz Meker).326 Ahmet Cavit Therket Pasha was elected 
chairman of the society and remained in office until his death in 1916. After the 
enactment of the Law of Associations on 16 August 1908, sufficient legal 
structure was provided in the Ottoman Empire, and on 4 November 1908 the 
CITC was officially founded in Koska, Istanbul (later moved to Aksaray, Istanbul 
(1913–1917), Sariguzel Fatih and finally Divanyolu, Istanbul).327 The CITC was 
the first of its kind, reflecting the transition taking place for Circassian awareness 
and equality. The by-laws of the society explained the goals of securing religious, 
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moral and civil relations among the Circassians. Furthermore, it defined the 
terms and vision to ensure advancement of Circassians socially and 
economically. Article 2 of the by-laws states the main objective of the society: 
securing religious, moral and civil relations among the Circassians 
and, moreover, building commercial, agricultural and industrial 
relations to ensure advancement in financial and social terms and 
researching and studying past and today of the Circassians in 
terms of history, language, and traditions.328  
The CITC were attempting to gain a closer relationship with the 
government in hopes of solving the conflict correlating with their society, and 
aiming to “follow Islam and live with other communities in a brotherly manner.”329 
Interestingly enough, the diversity in personalities often led to differing 
opinion on serious matters such as supporting the palace or denying its reign. 
For example, Dr. Mehmet Resid (one of the founders of the CUP) and Tahir 
Hayrettin, who were elected Parliament Members in the 1908 elections, opposed 
the CITC’s policies and resigned their obligations to the CITC, as well as 
publishing journals such as Sehrah and Tanzimat.330 
During the years of 1908 to 1923, The CITC demonstrated initiative and 
success in most of its attempts. The members of the association first aimed to 
end Circassian slavery, the system of which operated in a feudal society of 
classes broken into princes, feudal aristocrats, free villagers, and slaves. They 
sent letters to the Grand Vizier and Ministry of Internal Affairs to find a solution, 
and on the other hand tried to influence public opinion by releasing articles and 
journals about slavery.331 Prohibition of the Circassian slave trade was enacted 
on 25 May 1911, breaking a decades-long bind on its people.332 
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The CITC started to publish a newspaper called Gûâze (meaning “guide”) 
on 2 April 1911, and offered further historical material on Circassians.333 The 
purpose of Gûâze was mentioned in the first issue with a short essay titled “Our 
Profession.” In this essay, The CITC proclaimed its message and purpose: “to 
promote peace, fraternity and union among different components of the Ottoman 
Empire, and thus to serve for our honored and sacred country with the help of the 
God.”334 This publication reached all the main Circassian populated areas of the 
time such as Syria, Jordan, and Caucasia. The most outstanding of its articles 
were written by gentlemen with the anonymous name of Don Quixote; much of 
the paper’s material remained anonymous. Fundamental topics such as social 
deportation, slavery, and the alphabet were discussed, and eventually the 
publication only printed in the Circassian language. The association was 
encouraging education and knowledge to its people through articles and 
postings. Readers’ letters would often be released to the public, giving the culture 
a voice and a hope. Petitions and even articles demanding the abolishment of 
slavery made the newspaper extremely significant during these times. Gûâze 
continued to print until 1914 and in total released fifty-eight issues.335 
The CITC was able to make massive improvements on the already 
existing efforts to create a Circassian alphabet. There were different 
presentations of proposed systems to the designated alphabet commission. The 
first of its significance was the one prepared mostly of Arabic letters by Met Izzet 
Pasha. Doctor Mehmet Ali Pçihaluk introduced a whole new system with its own 
unique structure. The association created its own versions of the alphabet 
comprised mostly of Latin. These variations of alphabetical systems sparked 
debate over whether or not it should contain more Latin or Arabic influence. In an 
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effort to mediate the two parties, the association decided to combine the two 
styles of both languages. This created confusion and the inability to follow 
through with a designated system, leading to less and less popularity. Despite 
the people’s sincere effort to spread this alphabet it failed due to grammar issues 
and political limitations. Although this CITC did not establish substantial change 
in the alphabet, its efforts helped spark the evolution of a much-needed social 
statement.336 
In response to this new state emerging in the Caucasus, the North 
Caucasus Society (Simâlî Kafkas Cemiyet-I or SKC) was created in 1917 (1335 
in the Hijri calendar) in Istanbul.337 The same people, although defined as 
separate from the CITC, founded the SKC, which dealt with basically the political 
political issues, while the CITC handled more cultural affairs.338 
The CUP financially supported SKC,339 so much so that many members 
of its management worked directly in conjunction with the SKC. Unfortunately, 
CUP took a turn for the worse, leaving the North Caucasus Society detached 
from financial backing. Despite the massive loss, SKC changed its name to the 
North Caucasus Political Society and continued its efforts of organization. On 24 
February 1919, SKC held a meeting to discuss the latest developments; 108 
individuals participated, including Hüseyin Rauf Bey. Upon thorough observation 
and debate, members focused on counseling violent and hostile individuals who 
spread negativity among the patriots and disturbed peace among the 
Circassians.340 
Due to the political atmosphere and more of a free environment for all 
Circassian people, women began to reap the benefits. The declaration allowed 
the Circassian Womens’ Support Association (CKTC) to form with support from 
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the CITC. It could even be considered to be the women’s branch of the CITC. 
The goals of this association were to help Circassians in need, defend the 
welfare of girls and boys at orphanages, and provide education through schools 
and occupational schools. The CKTC was formed on 18 May 1919 on Istanbul’s 
Akaretler Hill, at the Circassian Girl’s School.341 Five Çerkes women established 
it: Seza Pooh Hanım, Makbule Berzek, Emine Reúit Zalique, Faika Hanım and 
Hayriye Melek Hunç.342 All of the founders were knowledgeable, educated, and 
of prominent backgrounds. Before the collaboration of the founders to form 
CKTC, they were all heavily involved with the CITC. 
Hayriye Melek Hunç Hanım, president of the CKTC, was the sister of 
historical war hero Ali Sait Akbay Togan Pasha who was a commander on the 
Yemen front for a long time.343 He was later appointed as the commander of the 
25th Ottoman Army and Istanbul Guards in 1919, and during this duty he worked 
with many influential Circassian commanders to prevent the Circassians from 
joining the forces of Anzavur in the Marmara region.344  
Hayriye Melek Hanım was the first Circassian woman novelist. She was 
also one of the first women novelists of the Ottoman Empire. She contributed 
many articles and submissions for Gûâze and left her mark in the CKTC’s own 
magazine Diyâne. She released her first novel, Zühre-i Elem, in 1910 and again 
in 1926 with Zeyneb. Hayriye Melek Hunç Hanım had relations with many 
bureaucrats and militiamen, and played a vital role in political and social 
events.345 
The CKTC was short-lived, and was suspended in 1924. The intent and 
focus of initiative behind its activities were similar to that of the CITC, with more 
attention towards Circassians, particularly Circassian women. It was described 
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as being among the minority women societies that participated in and 
encouraged separatist activity. Its by-laws promoted a business/charitable non-
profit organization to be built for struggling men and women. There was also the 
means for providing employment and offering free workshops in crafts such as 
embroidery and tailoring. Activities such as contests, concerts, and plays were 
also organized and catered to. These events were about uniting the people in 
celebrations of dance and music. Numerous publications, articles, and 
advertisements were displayed for the public to educate and get together. 
Charitable concerts such as Fevkalade Konser were advertised, attracting 
attention to Circassians all over the map.346 
The CKTC managed to open up its own school called Circassian Girl 
School (Çerkes Kız Numune Mektebi or CKNM), educating both Islamic boys and 
girls. The private school was the first of its kind,347 and hosted six classes, each 
of which contained about twenty-five to thirty students.348 It began to run one of 
the only kindergartens in the territory and even had Mustafa Butbay as its 
principal. Intellectuals from all over the world notably taught there, bridging the 
gap between culture and well-needed education.349 
The publishing body of the magazine, Diyâne, (meaning “our mother”) 
formed in March of 1920 as the CKTC’s other activity.350 The first article of 
Diyâne was written by none other than Hayriye Melek Hunç.351 In the article, 
“Diyâne’nin Meslegi, Gayesi,” she wrote how Circassians needed to unify their 
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efforts towards intellect and innovation rather than war. This magazine played a 
major role in the recognition of women in Circassian culture and helped form 
social and philosophical transitions.352 
B. RE-CREATION OF CIRCASSIAN ASSOCIATIONS: 1950S TO 1980 
The period between 1923 and 1950 was characterized as the muted 
period for the associations/organizations, since the republican elite were highly 
engaged in the idea of creating an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation 
while disowning the heritage of the empire as well as the idea of pan-Turanism 
and relations with outside Turks and Caucasians.353 As a result of the policies 
implemented by the government, which are described in the previous chapter, 
the Circassian elite incorporated themselves into the Turkish Nationalism 
discourse, avoided any ethnic activities and tried to preserve some figures of the 
culture in their private lives. Some Circassian emigrants were forced to leave the 
country, and continued their organizational activities in European cities—in Paris, 
Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin—together with other émigrés who had escaped from 
Soviet rule.354 
The reorganization of the Circassian associations and resumption of their 
activities dates back to the first democratization movements with the 
establishment of Democrat Party rule in Turkey in May 1950.355 The first 
association established in this environment was the Dosteli Solidarity Association 
(Dosteli Yardımlasma Dernegi or DYD) in 1946. Following this first association, in 
1953, the Caucasian Cultural Association (Kafkas Kultur Dernegi or KKD) was 
established in Istanbul. This association included both members of the North 
Caucasians and Azeris, and starting from 1954, operated under the Turkish 
Federation of Immigrants and Refugees (Turk Gocmen ve Multeci Dernekleri 
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Federasyonu or TGMDF). In the following years, this umbrella organization 
diversified with the appearance of new cultural associations (Kultur Dernekleri). 
Later in 1961, The North Caucasian Cultural Association of Ankara (Ankara 
Kuzey Kafkas Kultur Dernegi or AKKKD) joined this first group. These 
associations are recognized as the nucleus of today’s active diaspora 
organizations in Turkey.356 
These first organizations had limited resources and were ineffective in 
political activities. They were not involved in any lobbying activities and their sole 
purpose was to sustain the ethnic identity among the Circassians through cultural 
activities. Thus, the founders of the associations were in alliance with the Turkish 
national policy.357 According to Bezanis, “North Caucasian activism after 1950 
served several purposes: to connect, inform and help preserve the North 
Caucasian community in Turkey, to counter assimilation, to fight communism 
within and beyond Turkey, and to accomplish this within the parameters of 
acceptable political behaviour in Turkey.”358 The objective of the Dosteli 
Association clearly demonstrates this aim: 
first we would like to mention that our association established as a 
support foundation and has no political view to influence the politics 
in Turkey. Our aim is to create sufficient platforms for our members 
to meet and solidarity, to spread cultural influence among 
Circassians, to create sufficient conditions for the creation of new 
generations with the Circassian culture and language, to provide 
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poor, to publish journals, to look after sick members of the 
community, and to deal with their funeral ceremonies in cases of 
their death.359 
These entire objectives were adopted as the official aims of all Caucasian 
organizations until the 1970s. These objectives have three basic characteristics. 
First was the consequence of the globalization in Turkey, and the immigration 
from rural areas to the more urban areas. The aim was to establish and preserve 
the solidarity to the Circassian community in urban cities, as well as the small 
communities in rural areas. Secondly, these organizations aimed to provide 
health and education support to the immigrant communities in the urban cities. 
Finally, they aimed to transform Circassian culture for the new generation. The 
basic concern of preservation of Circassian culture in the 1970s had become the 
primary objective since the associations had understood the difficulty of 
preservation and recreation of Circassian culture even in the rural areas as a 
result of the democratization and globalization linked to the mass immigrations 
from rural to urban areas.360 
Many associations were created in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
efforts of the Circassian organizations established in the 1950s were limited only 
to cultural activities such as folk dances and cultural meeting. Although the 
importance of social support and solidarity were mentioned many times by these 
associations, they were unable to make common cause. During the 1970s and in 
response to the democratization and mass mobilization in Turkey, the 
preservation of culture once again became the primary issue for the associations. 
With the increased immigration from rural to urban areas, the objective of the 
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associations became the preservation of culture in urban areas by establishing 
contacts among the Circassians who found themselves in the urban areas.361 
During the 1970s, cultural activities started to vary among the community. The 
associations organized language courses, amateur theater shows, folk dances, 
and publication of journals. However, all these activities were closed to the public 
and other members of the Turkish society. At the end of the 1970s, the lack of 
interaction between the host nation and the Circassian community led the way to 
the creation of more public activities to introduce the Circassian culture to the 
Turks. With democratization, people started to see their history and some taboos 
fade in the society. First, discussions on the assimilation of the Circassians 
among the Turks began, yet all associations and their members stayed away 
from politics and preserved their cultural objectives. 
The change in the area of activities reflected the goals of the associations: 
“compilation of traditional Circassian values, synthesize them with the world 
values and increase the cultural awareness of the members within these values, 
guide them to respect the traditional cultural values of the country and know the 
realities to become more useful to society as citizens, intellectuals; within social 
assistance and solidarity to help increase the level of welfare of the society.”362  
With the increase in cultural awareness among the society, returnist policy 
became significant among the members during the 1970s.363 The very first 
publication mentioning the returnist policy was the Kamci journal.364 Although its 
publication was banned with the military coup on 12 March 1971, it mentioned 
the difficulties of creating a cultural community away from the homeland, and 
supported a return to the North Caucasus. Later, the Yamci journal pursued the 
same policy, as did other journals. During the end of the 1970s, Circassian 
diaspora was shaped around five basic themes by the help of Circassian 
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associations: 1) homeland is the source of culture, 2) separation of community 
from their homeland, exile, 3) forced to live in a different geography, diaspora, 4) 
assimilation in diaspora, and 5) return to the homeland and merge with own 
community.365 These were the main ideas by which Circassians defined 
themselves; however, with the military coup of 1980 and subsequent events, 
diaspora shaped around different ideas.  
C. MILITARY COUP IN 1980 AND CIRCASSIAN DIASPORA POLITICS 
THEREAFTER 
With the military coup on 12 September 1980, all associations were 
closed, and the military government banned their activities. However, this tension 
was relieved after 1984, and associations started to emerge again in the public 
sphere.366 Establishment of the “Caucasus Association” (Kafkas Dernegi-
KAFDER) combining many other Caucasus organizations under one structure in 
1993, was a critical turning point for the establishment of common policy in an 
organized manner towards the people in the homeland and diaspora. This 
merger also proved that the association may create significant political impetus 
within the diaspora to influence the politics as a social pressure group.367 
There were significant differences between the activities of the association 
in the 1950s and the 1990s. The former was totally based on the cultural 
activities, whereas the latter started to include political participation (starting from 
the lobbying activities under the association structure). However, lobbying 
activities were hampered for three different reasons. First, some elite and high-
level members of the association started it without taking the public support of 
the Caucasian peoples in Turkey. Second, the aim of the lobbying activities was 
not defined clearly. Many members did not understand whether it would serve for 
the needs of the Circassians in the homeland or in diaspora. Third, some 
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members understood the lobbying activities as a substitution for the cultural 
activities, and the significance of these activities diminished during this period. 
Reconciling past turmoil with current objectives under a unified umbrella 
offered a chance to perform a unified function with a singular objective. This was 
not all-encompassing, due to the lack of understanding on the part of particular 
influential individuals or groups. It did, however, maintain a forward progression 
towards a modernization and union of former associations. This progress was 
made possible because of the progression and improvements in information and 
communications technology (ICTs) in the region due to the collapse of the walls 
of the Eastern bloc. 
One of the most important achievements for the Circassian associations 
after the military coup was the commemoration of the 125th anniversary of the 
Circassian exile. The commemoration program in Ankara was the first organized 
activity with the participation of many domestic and foreign members of 
associations and the Circassian people, both in the diaspora and the homeland. 
It facilitated the meeting of the Circassians all over the world and as a result of 
this initial contact the International Circassian Association (ICA) was created in 
1991.368 
The 1990s brought about a renewed awareness of issues that lay dormant 
during the period of the Cold War.369 The progression of ICTs was attributed to 
the renewal of awareness, but it was made clear that these issues were ever-
present, but not recognized. The addressing of these issues was manifest in 
1993, in Ankara, during the organized symposium held by the Caucasian 
Association (Kafkas Dernegi) on “Socio-Cultural Change in Circassians of 
Turkey.”370 
                                            
368 Taymaz, “Kuzey Kafkas Dernekleri,” 455–456. 
369, Nuran Savaskan Akdogan, “The Roots of Circassian / Chechnian Identity in Turkey,” 
(2008), 1. 




After the military coup of 1980, three distinct features fostered a big 
increase in both the number of the Circassian organizations and the varieties of 
their activities. These are the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the wars in 
Abkhazia and Chechnya, and the creation of the Caucasus Association in 
Turkey.371 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and resulting improvements in the 
information, communication and transportation technologies, have unfolded new 
dimensions to the roles of Circassians in the Turkish community, such as 
awakening ethnic Circassian identity, establishment of Circassian associations in 
many parts of the country, and direct communication with the homeland. Many 
Circassians returned to their homeland; eventually, the increased relations 
between the autonomous republics in the North Caucasus brought to the table 
the question of who will represent the Circassians in Turkey. During this era, 
many associations were created as an alternative to the old and deeply 
constructed associations to obtain this responsibility as an opportunity. In 
response to the war in Abkhazia in 1992, and in Chechnya starting from 1994, 
associations had started “humanitarian aid and solidarity” activities in the 
diaspora. The first meeting organized by the association was organized as a 
social movement against the war in the Caucasus and gained the attention of 
Turkish politicians.372 However, this wave of social movement and organization 
attempts ended with both relative success of their fights in North Caucasus and 
reluctance of the organizations to a social movement in Turkey as a pressure 
element. Russian-Turkish relations based on many different perspectives also 
affected the scale of the Circassian diaspora activism in Turkey. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey realized that she had to change the 
Moscow-centered foreign policy in light of changes in the former Soviet 
territories, especially in the Caucasus. Under Soviet rule, a political event in 
Central Asia or the Caucasus was considered as the internal affairs of the Soviet 
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Union and Turkey did not take part in any political activity. However, after the 
dissolution, Turkey had to start political activities, and with the political vacuum 
Turkey emerged unwillingly as a regional power establishing relations with the 
newly emerging states.373  
Turkey at first treated the Caucasus/Central Asia region as a whole 
without considering local differences. Turkey’s boastful assumptions caused 
suspicion in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. In 1992, Turkey promised a 
huge amount of financial support to the region, which was not available in 
reality.374 In February 1992, Turkish PM Demirel declared that a “gigantic Turkish 
world” was emerging from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. That same 
year, President Ozal announced that the next century would be “the century of 
the Turks.”375 The main reasons behind this reckless policy were lack of 
knowledge and continuous changing in Turkish political actors. All kinds of 
resources were needed in order to rectify this initial policy failure and initiate an 
effective policy.  
At this lack of resources, the diaspora organizations, which continued only 
cultural and solidarity activities till that time, turned into an important source of 
foreign policy given their accumulated knowledge and existing or potential ties 
with their homelands. Within this information vacuum, Caucasus associations 
initiated lobbying to increase Turkey’s involvement in the regional events. Initial 
and amateur activities at the initial phase later turned to more organized lobbying 
activities. Turkey recognized the North Caucasus as a part of Russia, and they 
signed the “Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey 
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and the Russian Federation” on 25 May 1992,376 mentioning the territorial 
integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, as a result of the activities and 
demands of the diaspora organizations Turkey had started to develop an 
independent North Caucasian policy.  
At the same time, returnist policy among the North Caucasus émigrés in 
Turkey started to get more interest among the Circassians. Associations started 
to establish close relations with the autonomous republics, Circassian 
organizations, and people in the North Caucasus; and continued lobbying with a 
close interest in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies.377 Associations 
demanded that Turkey, as the new emerging regional power, should take more 
active policy in the Caucasus since Turkey accommodated a significant 
percentage of the Circassian population and since it was recognized as a 
regional power whose involvement in the regional developments could affect the 
balance of power in the Caucasus. In order to achieve these aims, diaspora 
associations in Turkey tried to influence the Turkish foreign policy, especially 
during the Georgian-Abkhazian and Russian-Chechen Wars. In some ways, they 
were successful in their efforts, yet they were in all limited extent.378 
In every official meeting, the Turkish government declared that they were 
supporting the territorial and political integrity of the countries in the region, yet 
nearly in all speeches and declarations Turkey continued her concerns about the 
conflicts in the region and human rights violations emerged from the conflict. 
Since openly opposing Russian policy in the region was not at all in parallel with 
the interest of Turkey in the region, the official policy about the region was shifted 
to acting in cooperation with the international organizations for ensuring stability 
in the region. Parallel to this approach, in the Organization for Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Istanbul Summit in 1999, The Caucasian 
Stability Pact suggested by Suleyman Demirel, the then President of Turkey, 
could be considered as an attempt within this framework.379 
Besides these initiatives, Turkey acted unofficially on behalf of the peoples 
of the North Caucasus and their organizations. The North Caucasus émigrés in 
Turkey created positive public opinion on behalf of the Chechens when they 
declared the independence of Chechnya in November 1991.380 Moreover, on 9 
November 1991, when four Chechen guerillas including Shamil Basayev, 
hijacked a Russian plane in order to announce the world Chechen fight against 
Russia and landed the plane in Ankara, the hijackers were not allowed to 
organize a press conference. However, they were allowed to return to Chechnya 
despite strong Russian pressure for their arrest.381 Moreover, direct relations 
with leaders of the republics, including Cohar Dudayev of Chechnya, continued; 
Chechens were given the permission to open an unofficial representation in 
Istanbul to establish links with the Turkish émigrés; and Turkey continued to 
provide humanitarian aid to the region during the Chechen Wars.382  
While these events were happening, the North Caucasus diaspora in 
Turkey continued its lobbying activities parallel to the Turkish foreign policy. After 
the independence of Georgia, Turkish PM Suleyman Demirel and Foreign 
Minister Hikmet Cetin conducted their first official visit in July 1992. On the same 
days, Abkhazian leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, visited Turkey and held effective 
meetings with the help of diaspora organizations. In the absence of the Turkish 
Foreign Minister and PM, Ardzinba met officials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
and had interviews with the press declaring the independence of Abkhazia.383 
This caused troubles between Turkey and Georgia, yet the Turkish government 
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did not restrict the activities of North Caucasus associations in Turkey. As a 
result of lobbying activities of these associations, Turkish public opinion mostly 
supported the Abkhazian side in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict. However, the 
analogy between the Abkhazian issue and the Kurdish population in the 
southeast part of the country forced Turkey to support the territorial integrity of 
Georgia in the Abkhazian issue, and Russia in the Chechen issue. 
However, the North Caucasus diaspora in Turkey wanted to see a more 
active and decisive Turkey in the region. The first reaction was the creation of the 
Caucasus-Abkhazia Solidarity Committee (Kafkas-Abhazya Dayanisma Komitesi, 
KADK) in Istanbul on 23 August 1992, with the participation of forty-two 
Caucasian Cultural Associations.384 During the first years of its creation, the 
Committee aimed to provide humanitarian and economic aid to the entire region, 
in particular to Abkhazia, as long as the war continued. Secondly, the committee 
tried to create public opinion on behalf of Abkhazia in Turkey by presenting the 
Abkhazian issue and the war of freedom fought in Abkhazia by all means 
applicable. Thirdly, they collected all the necessary information concerning 
Abkhazia and broadcast them to the relevant people, institutions, and 
organizations. Finally, they tried to ensure sound communication between the 
Caucasus and Abkhazia and the people and organizations within the diaspora to 
carry out all kinds of activities to promote Abkhazia and the Caucasus.385 
In 1992, KADK organized demonstrations in Istanbul and Adapazari to 
influence the public opinion about the Abkhazian issue, and on 27–28 September 
1992, they held a walking protest from Istanbul to Ankara in order to draw 
attention. Later, they organized a protest outside the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
demanding the independence of Abkhazia and resignation of foreign minister 
Hikmet Cetin. As a result of these mass protests, PM Demirel had a meeting with 
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the representatives of the protest group.386  This meeting showed the concerns 
of the North Caucasus diaspora to the politicians and public opinion, and the 
committee aimed to change the Georgia-centered Turkish foreign policy in the 
region. 
One of the most important activities of the Committee was the 
parliamentary debate on the Abkhazian issue in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly on 13 October 1992.387 During these discussions, with constant 
communications held with parliament members of the assembly, the issue was 
kept alive and actively presented in every suitable environment. The committee 
detailed files about the Abkhazian issue presented to parliament members 
submitted to the international organizations such as UN and OSCE.388 
During the war between Georgia and Abkhazia, KADK organized relief 
activities on the Black Sea coast, and 37 people from the diaspora went to 
Abkhazia to fight on the side of their homelands. Four of them lost their lives in 
the war.389 During the war, Turkey, on the one hand, provided humanitarian aid 
via the Turkish Red Crescent (Turk Kizilayi) to Abkhazia, and on the other tried to 
find peaceful solutions to the problem.  
In the post-war period, KADK continued its active role in the negotiations 
between Georgia and Abkhazia. In June 1999, Turkey undertook the role of 
negotiating between Georgia and Abkhazia with the participation of OSCE and 
UN representatives in Istanbul. Each side had 25 members in the talks, however, 
there were 10 members representing the Georgian and Abkhazians living in  
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Turkey. This achievement can be seen the role of diaspora in Turkey.390 With 
this meeting, diaspora organizations for the first time gained an official sanction 
to take part in the regional conflicts.  
Today, KADK still works actively to create public opinion and political 
pressure over the Abkhazian issue. KADK’s priorities are to create opinion on the 
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia after the 2008 war between Russia 
and Georgia, to implement a non-violation pact between Abkhazia and Georgia 
to sustain peace, and to abolish the embargo imposed on Abkhazia.391 All these 
are significant developments as they show that the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey 
was an effective instrument during the 1990s in the development and shaping of 
the events. However, later with the rise of bilateral relations between Turkey and 
Georgia, and also Turkey and Russia, Turkey abstained from involvement in 
regional conflicts and supported the territorial integrity of the countries in the 
region. 
The Chechen problem is another sensitive issue for Turkey, with its 
resemblance to the Kurdish issue. This prevented Turkey from implementing 
independent policies although the associations in Turkey were active in terms of 
creating public awareness on behalf of the Chechen side. The Turkish–Chechen 
relations that can be said to have started relatively well within that framework, 
later on deteriorated and became the status quo, heavily criticized by the 
diaspora.392 
Turkey followed the developments in Chechnya during the disintegration 
phase of the Soviet Union. After 27 October 1991, when Cohar Dudayev was 
elected President of the Chechen–Ingush Republic, Turkey started bilateral 
unofficial relations with Chechnya and Dudayev, but refrained from officially 
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recognizing the independence of Chechnya that was declared in November 
1991.393 The North Caucasus diaspora criticized the Turkish government for not 
sending a representative to the swearing-in ceremony of Dudayev. However, 
Dudayev made his first visit to Turkey and to the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) in September 1992, giving a symbolic message to Russia and 
the whole world about the Chechen issue and its similarity with the Cyprus case. 
Later, in 1993, Dudayev came to Turkey as a guest of President Suleyman 
Demirel and had talks with the Chairman of the National Assembly and the Chief 
of the General Staff as well as the President, thereby telling the world that Turkey 
cared about Chechnya.394 This meeting increased the Russian concerns, which 
were conveyed to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow by adding that such kind 
of meetings should not be repeated in the future.395 In terms of Turkish-Chechen 
relations, Turkey criticized Russia for using disproportionate force in Chechnya, 
yet behaved in a cautious manner to stress that it was an internal problem of 
Russia, and thus should be solved within this concept.396 In response to the 
Russian criticism about Turkey’s involvement in the issue, Turkey froze bank 
accounts holding funds raised by aid organizations for Chechnya, but remained 
silent about the support activities of the associations about Chechnya.397  
After the start of the Russian-Chechen conflict, diaspora organizations 
established the Caucasian–Chechen Solidarity Committee (Kafkas-Cecen 
Dayanisma Komitesi, KCDK), similar to KADK. The Chechens were allowed to 
establish an information office in Istanbul. Also, the committee raised funds for 
humanitarian aid, helped refugees by setting up camps for the Chechen 
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refugees, and organized demonstrations in front of Russian embassies and 
consulates. While organizing all these activities, KCDK received support from 
many political parties, and to show that support to the Chechens, parks, streets 
and avenues were named after Dudayev in many cities such as Ankara, Istanbul 
and Izmir.398 
In the early stage of the Chechen issue, the official political posture was 
pro-Chechen in Turkey. For example, foreign minister Murat Karayalcin said in a 
press conference, “we have family relations with Chechnya, and for this reason 
we cannot see this problem as the internal problem of another country.”399 
Similarly, during his official visit to Azerbaijan Husamettin Cindoruk, the 
Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, declared “if the Caucasus is 
Russia’s back garden it is also Turkey’s front garden.”400  
The PKK-affiliated structures “Kurdistan Committee and Kurdistan 
Liberation Front” organized a conference in Moscow in February 1994 under the 
name of “Kurdistan at the Crossroads of History and Politics,” in which the 
Russian Ministry of Nationalities and Regional Policy took part as co-
organizer.401 This issue strained Turkish-Russian relations, and the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry sent a protest note through diplomatic channels; however, 
Russia denied all the attributed claims.402 
The seizure of the ferry boat named “Avrasya” with its 211 passengers by 
the Chechen sympathizers led by Muhammed Emin Tokcan403 on 16 January 
1996 ended on 20 January 1996 with the telephone message of Dudayev 
conveyed to the militants indicating that they must stop their acts in coordination 
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with Turkish authorities because the hostages did not have any value for 
Russians, and the activities putting Turkey into a difficult situation must be 
avoided.404 During his meeting with Turkish media on 26 February 1997, 
Russian Ambassador Kuznetsov declared Russia’s concerns with regard to the 
trial of the ferry incident since the hijackers could be freed.405 About the same 
issue, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov, attending the Organization of 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) meeting in Bucharest on 28 April 
1996, answered Turkish journalists’ questions with regard to Turkey’s Chechen 
policy as that “Turkey’s official policy is in the manner of not supporting the 
Chechens but it is a fact that the Chechens are using Turkish lands.”406 After the 
end of the First Chechen War in August 1996, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Viktor Posuvalyuk threatened Turkey and other Muslim countries with the 
cessation of diplomatic relations in the case of extending recognition to 
Chechnya.407  
When the Second Chechen War started in September 1999, Turkey acted 
in accordance with the territorial integrity of Russia, since the Turkish 
government did not want to face with the Russian support to the Kurdish issue in 
Turkey, although the diaspora associations criticized Turkish foreign policy. 
Moreover, the 9/11 events were influential over the debates about terrorism. The 
continuous Russian propaganda to the effect that the Chechens had become 
Wahhabis, and were trying to establish Sharia law by promoting Islamic terror 
was backed up by a number of individual events, and it had necessarily some  
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negative reflections in Turkey and in the wider world. Many supporters started to 
debate whether the Chechens were terrorist or not, and this effected the public 
opinion negatively for the Chechens in Turkey. 
During this period the Turkish government stayed indifferent, and this was 
found inadequate by the North Caucasus diaspora in Turkey, clearly with the 
declaration of 21 November 1999, The Caucasian Associations Assembly 
(Kafkas Dernekleri Toplulugu) stating: “We are content and hopeful as regards 
the decisive attitudes of the Westerners at the OSCE summit. However, the 
lands on which the Chechens live and which they defend to the death are historic 
lands bequeathed by their ancestors; and we are extremely offended by our 
governments who cannot openly say that defending their homelands...is the 
vested rights of Chechens’; they demanded active intervention on the issue of 
Chechnya by the civilized world.”408 Starting from this event, diaspora 
associations have tried to carry the issue to the international arena in parallel 
with the official policy of Turkey. 
The bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia in the 1990s followed a 
fluctuating tendency and were mainly strained because of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
problem, Turkish activism in Central Asia, Turkish Straits, PKK and Chechen 
issue. However, the relations between two countries began to improve in the end 
of the 1990s. Three factors played important roles: Turkey’s acknowledgement of 
the political and economic limits of its power in filling the vacuum created by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s relinquishment from great power status 
by accepting the limits of its power and the standpoint of both that the seemingly 
never-ending rivalry between them could be harmful for their own national 
security besides having negative impact on their relations with the West. “It was 
the limitations in their capacities that pushed both countries to a more balanced 
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and a generally positive relationship.”409 Thus, carrying out a policy that is based 
on the national interests rather that the influence of ethnic groups and historical 
ties assumed more appropriate in terms of Turkey’s interests. As a result Turkey 
has tried to remain distant to the Abkhaz and Chechen problems, which were 
similar to her domestic problems. Associations in Turkey later defined their 
policies in view of EU and the developments that showed that the political 
involvement of diaspora will not be limited to the Caucasus and Russia but will 
raise the influence of the general policy of Turkey.410 
D. CIRCASSIAN DIASPORA FROM 2000 TO PRESENT 
During the 2000s, three different processes have identified the content 
and the influence of the Circassian associations in Turkey: democratization 
movements with the EU membership; improvements in the North Caucasus, and 
federation process of the Circassian associations in Turkey emerged from the 
internal dynamics of the associations.411 
The European Union (EU) officially recognized the candidacy of Turkey for 
full membership on 12 December 1999, at the Helsinki Summit of the European 
council and a new era has started for Turkey in its long-term aim of 
westernization efforts dating back to the early years of the Republic. This 
decision increased the hopes on positive transportation on the human rights and 
democratization efforts, which requires more rights to the ethnic groups and 
organizations than they had before. At least, people expected these changes and 
have seen the potential of change in the domestic dynamics of Turkey. 
Today, Caucasian Associations Federation of Turkey (Kafkas Dernekleri 
Federasyonu-KAFFED) plays a significant role to shape the Circassian diaspora 
in Turkey and plays a bridge role between the Circassians and the government to 
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shape the future of the community. On 4 March 2007, a daily national newspaper 
published an article titled “Circassians initiated a cultural uprising” in Turkey, 
focusing on the transformation of Circassian identity parallel with the changing 
political structure with the EU accession talks and demanding to learn Circassian 
language, to preserve Circassian culture and to have right to visit the homeland 
without any restriction. The article also mentioned the real meaning behind this 
request by the words of the KAFFED president stating that: “Turkish citizenship is 
prior and indispensable for us. There is no family that did not have martyrs or 
veterans during the foundation of modern Turkey. Hence the protection of the 
secular and democratic indivisible structure of Turkey that we built together is 
very significant.”412 
On 5 January 2009, KAFFED, representing 54413 Circassian associations 
in Turkey, met the Turkish President Abdullah Gül and demanded Circassians’ 
requests on behalf of the community listed in three titles: first, Turkish citizens’ 
freedom of travel to Abkhazia; second, the inclusion of Circassian language and 
literature in the university curriculum, and third, sufficient TV and radio 
broadcasting in their own languages and cultures.414 Later, on 19 January 2010, 
KAFFED president and the deputies met with the deputy PM, responsible for the 
“Democratic Opening Project” of Turkey under the westernization efforts, and 
requested same demands including the Circassian view of democratization that 
should encompass all the ethnic and religious groups in Turkey and not be 
specific just for the Kurds.415 
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The formal acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership in 
Luxemburg Summit in October 2005416 created a pessimistic atmosphere in 
Turkey in terms of civilian association (Sivil Toplum Orgutleri, STO). The EU 
requirement on the minority rights—usage of minority languages, encouraging 
cultural activities—diminished the government tension on the association. This 
process required some conditions for the Circassian associations. First, the EU is 
based on the multicultural structure and encourages this specification within 
every platform and requires the candidate countries to respect these features of 
the Union. Second, with accession talks the legal condition in Turkey started to 
become compatible with the EU legal structure on civilian organizations. In that 
respect, associations in Turkey have to adapt themselves into these new 
emerging legal criteria and follow their activities without conflicting with the new 
regulation not to be harmed within this evaluation. Third, the EU is an opportunity 
for the associations in Turkey to present the problems of the Circassian both in 
homeland and in diaspora since the role of the civilian associations is quite 
important to influence the Union’s and individual state’s policies. Fourth, with the 
accession process Circassian associations will have a chance to integrate with 
the other Circassian organizations in different countries and this interaction will 
enlarge the area of activities both in geographic dimension and variety 
dimension. And finally, the EU accession process will encourage the federation 
process of the Circassian association to create a common policy within this 
window of opportunity.417 
Cultural relations between Caucasus associations and North Caucasus 
before the dissolution of the Soviet Union have ratified many dimensions. 
Lobbying activities have been initiated by associations to get the support of the 
Turkish government against the war in Abkhazia and Chechnya and previous 
cultural role of the association turned to cooperation with the Turkish state 
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institutions to provide humanitarian and diplomatic support to Abkhazia and 
Chechnya on their wars. However, the Turkish government stayed silent against 
these situations close to its borders and even supported the territorial integrity of 
Georgia and Russia and abstained from creating a similar situation with the 
Kurds in its southeast region. During the Abkhazian war, Turkey rejected the 
asylum demands of the Chechen refugees in Georgian territories. With the 
relatively stable environment in the North Caucasus after the second Chechen 
war, with the rise of Putin to power and new Russian Chechenization or 
Kadirization policy, Turkey’s influence in the region had diminished gradually. 
Until the 2007 International Olympic Community decision to allow Russia to host 
the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Circassian communities both in homeland 
and in diaspora remained relatively silent and focused on cultural activities.418 
Another important step that would determine the activities of the 
Circassian associations and their efficiency was the creation of the Circassian 
Associations Federation (Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu, KAFFED) on 3 July 
2003 in Ankara.419 Comprised of more than 60 member associations throughout 
Turkey, and representing more than six million Circassians, the primary function 
of KAFFED is to conserve and advance the Circassian culture, language, and 
identity. This is emboldened through the unification and organization centered 
around the many cultural associations and corresponding foundations. 
Although KAFFED has been perceived by many to be an ineffectual force 
within the Circassian political confines throughout the homeland and diaspora 
districts, these acts of cultural and social activities have vindicated their inactivity 
in the political realm. The recognized construct of KAFFED, to preserve cultural 
identity within the Circassian people, has been seen as a success and an 
influence on other Circassian organizations and foundations. 
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Being a founding member of the International Circassian Association 
(ICA), and the World Circassian Association (WCO), which is based in Nalchik, 
Russia, capital of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, KAFFED has maintained 
strong political ties with Russia. This in itself being attributed to the fact that in 
2000, the ICA fell under the complete discipline of the Russian state design. 
During this period, KAFFED demonstrated full cooperation, despite the criticisms 
of other diaspora associations and foundations. 
Despite several issues pertaining to their relations, KAFFED demonstrated 
restraint in voicing opposition. This was demonstrated yet again in 2005, when 
Adygheya experienced the crisis of facing elimination as a national republic. The 
announcement of the Olympic Winter Games to be held in Sochi did not ignite 
the response from KAFFED as it did other diasporas. They recognized 
“Circassian Genocide,” yet they did not oppose the games being held in Sochi, 
rather, there be recognized Circassian themes in place at the event.420 
KAFFED has lobbied for Circassian rights and development since the 
early 2000s, during the challenges of creation of the Justice and Development 
party (AKP), taking a stance for Circassian language teaching, Circassian 
television broadcasts on state-owned channels, and various Circassian cultural 
rights to be extended throughout the region. It has been realized that other 
organizations and foundations had more of a vocal and clear approach to gaining 
these cultural dignities; KAFFED was not seen as extending their influence to a 
degree that was seen as strong in comparison. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, its counterparts have seen KAFFED as 
an ineffectual influence, despite its attempts at bringing about social recognition, 
order and unity to the Circassians in every region. Unable to bring about a 
tangible response concerning democratic reform program started by the Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP), unofficial Circassian 
groups initiated a willingness to practice and take part in these processes. 
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The matter of KAFFED in relation to Abkhazian association is a matter of 
situational obligation, versus regional goals. Beginning at the forefront of the 
Abkhazian-Georgian war, KAFFED and its forbearers invoked the responsibility 
of overseeing war efforts in order to focus political, monetary, and strategic 
outlines. This war was perceived as an internal Circassian effort. 
For years diaspora associations lobbied for the Turkish government to 
acknowledge Abkhazian independence, even unofficially. This, however, failed, 
as the Turkish government has only deemed Georgia’s establishment as tangible 
in terms of territorial rights. This lobbying, although unfruitful in many areas, 
eventually gained recognition through KAFFED representation resulting in the 
transnational organization of Circassian-Abkhazian interests in Turkish 
parliament.   
KAFFED has since been contacted by representatives of the EU, U.S., 
and other states, addressing current events and issues regarding Abkhazia. They 
are also looking for a stance in relation to situations revolving around Abkhazia. 
KAFFED also remains credited with keeping the elements of vital matters 
grounded in the forefront of Ankara, despite an increasingly chaotic and turbulent 
conciliatory program. 
E. ROAD TO SOCHI 
The reawakening of the Circassian identity across the diaspora and 
homeland with the new claims to the recognition of Circassian exile, and in some 
countries as Circassian Genocide, with the announcement of international 
Olympic Committee’s (IOC) decision on 4 July 2007, selecting Sochi as the 
location for the 2014 Winter Olympics Games.421  “By an irony of history, the 
2014 Winter Games will mark the 150th anniversary of the Circassian defeat in 
1864, when after over a century of fighting, Tsar Alexander II declared victory for 
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Russia”422 and ordered the exile of remaining Circassians from the port of Sochi 
to the Ottoman ports. More dramatically, “a victory parade was held on the Black 
Sea coast just north of Abkhazia, called Krasnaya Polyana (Red Glade)”423 to 
commemorate the end of the Russian-Circassian War, and this place coincides 
with one of the main venues of the 2014 Winter Olympics. Second, Sochi was 
the home for the Ubykh, one of the Circassians tribe driven totally from the 
Caucasus and about to become extinct.424 Third, the Olympic venue is full of 
many significant archeological sites concerning the Circassian history.425 
In 1999, IOC provided an article for a reconciliation of ethnic disputes in 
the future Olympic locations by “recognizing and strengthening the role of the 
indigenous people in organizing and conducting Olympics.426 According to this 
article in 2010 the Canadian government involved natives on multiple 
organizational levels not only to raise the cultural awareness but also to honor 
this native people.427 However, the Russian government declared that the 
“Circassian nationalism” is the biggest threat428 in the region, and Putin on 5 July 
2005 made a speech annotating the Greeks as the ancestors of the region, 
without mentioning the Circassians.429 Putin’s attempt clearly can be explained in 
famous Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s words: “Violence can only be 
concealed by a lie, and the lie can only be maintained by violence.”430  
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The Circassians are generally stereotyped as being “peaceful and 
nonviolent” groups in Russian “internal abroad”431 when compared to the other 
ethnic groups, yet there is real concern for Russia that this attitude could change 
leading up to 2014.432 A prominent Circassian leader, Murat Berzeg, has stated 
that if the Russian leadership continues to ignore their protests and re-write 
history, this could be a “platform for irresistible escalation.”433 He also claims that 
this ignorance may drive the youth into the rebels’ ranks, eventually making the 
Circassian-populated republics of Adige, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-
Balkaria follow the volatile path of Ingushetia and Dagestan.434 The Kabardino-
Balkaria outpaced Ingushetia in 2010 in terms of the number of attacks and their 
gravity, becoming the second most deadly republic in the North Caucasus after 
Dagestan.435 Clearly, there is suitable room for different ethnic groups to 
organize a terrorist attacks in order to show their anger to Moscow. 
Over the past decade, a wide variety of terrorist activities took place in 
Russia. The 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis; the February 2004 metro 
bombings that killed 50 people; the Beslan Hostage Crisis in Vladikavkaz, North 
Ossetia on 1 September 2004 that killed 387 people most of whom were 
children; the November 2009 explosion that derailed an express train; the March 
2010 Moscow metro bombings that killed 38 people; and, most recently, the 
January 2011 bombings of the international terminal at Domodedovo 
International Airport, which claimed the lives of over 30 people and left 200 
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injured.436 These show that militant groups can involve in attacks in every parts 
of Russia, and it will be all the easier for them to do so in their own territory like 
Sochi. 
Russian reliance on strictly aggressive military solutions in the region has 
not only been largely unsuccessful, but has also increased the violence in the 
region.437 The formation of new North Caucasus Federal District in 2010 also did 
not bring any stimuli to the region. The Caucasus community anticipates the 
future with skepticism and it is said, “the people live in anticipation of a war 
following the winter Olympics.”438 Thus, Russia behaves in a cautious manner 
and increases its military presence in the region both for the protection of the 
Olympics and for the further scenarios.439 Kremlin does not change its policy—or 
the lack thereof—towards the North Caucasus, basically relying on military 
measures. Russia should first reach out diplomatically to the Caucasus to 
establish legitimate relations with the various republics and ethnic groups based 
on something other than military action.440 Yet, so far there is no improvement in 
Russian policy, and military measures in the Caucasus increase day by day. 
The demonstrations against the Sochi Olympics continue all around the 
homeland and diaspora. Today, the battle over Sochi continues. On 19 
November 2011, Adyge Hase/Circassian Parliament chairman Khapay called for 
2014 to be declared a year of “memory and mourning” in remembrance of the  
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150th anniversary of the “the Great Exile.”441 Protests and plans to publicize the 
event continue apace. The issue was even discussed on the pages of Time 
magazine on 28 November 2011: 
Before this region became part of the Russian empire, an 
indigenous group known as the Circassians had lived there for 
millennia. Defeated by the Czar in 1864, they were herded to the 
same Sochi shore where the Games will be held and waited there 
for death or exile. In all, some 300,000 died, victims of disease, war 
and famine. Many fled to the U.S., Turkey and the Middle East. 
Now a large Circassian community in New Jersey has organized 
the No Sochi 2014 campaign, which included protests at the 2010 
Vancouver Games. YOU’LL BE SKIING ON MASS GRAVES is one 
of the more pungent warnings in its literature.442 
Although dangerous for the establishment of the Circassian political 
agenda, the opposition against the Circassians from Moscow is an expected 
behavior. The unexpected thing is how the Circassians in terms of individual and 
association are divided over the topic both in homeland and in diaspora. In the 
homeland, while a significant number of Circassian organizations oppose the 
games, on 2 September 2011 a group of Circassians in Kabardino-Balkaria 
announced a memorandum in support of the Olympics, and the coordination 
council of Circassian organizations, Adyge Khase, and the Union of Abkhaz 
Volunteers also signed the memorandum. Circassians Congress is the only 
significant organization in the region that opposed this decision.443 Parallel to this 
discussion, International Circassian Association’s cultural demands were found 
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not sufficient and were not concerning the views of all Circassians, both in the 
homeland and diaspora.444 
The diversity on the Sochi Olympics represents the similar attitude in 
Turkey. Many Circassians oppose the Sochi Olympics in 2014, but their reasons 
and demands vary in a big spectrum. Turkish Circassian associations, with the 
lead of KAFFED, commemorate the anniversary of “the Great Exile” every year 
starting from the 125th one at 1989.445 KAFFED’s official stand for the Sochi 
Olympics declared as “the recognition of the Circassian Genocide and Exile, 
repatriation of Circassians to the homeland without any obligation and allowing 
the émigrés dual citizenship who want to return homeland, promotion of return to 
the Caucasus, and preparation of rehabilitation programs for the ones who want 
returned to the region.446 
Demonstrations across the diaspora countries attract more people and 
enlighten the public about the denied rights of the Circassians. Demonstrations in 
Turkey signify the onset of the coming of a modernization of principles and 
moralization of activism in contrast to rebel or radical movements within the 
region.447 Also, Circassian activism revives hopes and serves as a unifier for all 
Circassians all around the world. This activism sparks new interests in the 
Circassian world, stirs the consciousness of people and reawaken the identity 
politics both in homeland and in diaspora. After the 21 May commemorations in 
2013, for the first time the Turkish president and PM sent letters to KAFFED 
mentioning their grievances about the Circassians’ deportation from their native 
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lands.448 However, no significant politician participated in the ceremonies 
organized in Samsun, on the Black Sea coast. 
When Turkey-Russia relations are considered during the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP), it would be difficult for 
Circassian associations to convince the current government to accept the 
Circassian exile as genocide and to expect the recognition of the independence 
of Abkhazia. The intellectual architect of the Turkish foreign policy vision during 
the AKP rule defined by the foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s five principles to 
establish balance between security and democracy in the country to “have a 
chance to establish an area of influence in its environs,” to follow “zero problem 
policy toward Turkey’s neighbors,” “to develop relations with the neighboring 
regions and beyond,” “adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy” as 
complementary not as competitive and the pursuance of a “rhythmic 
diplomacy.”449 Based on these foreign policy guidelines Turkey-Russia relations 
eventually developed during the AKP rule and in 2004 “Joint Declaration between 
the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Deepening Friendship and 
Multi-Dimensional Partnership” covering cooperation in various fields was signed 
in 2004.450 Later, the “Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the 
Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further 
Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership” was signed in 
Moscow on 13 February 2009.451 Until now, the bilateral relations did not get 
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affected by Russia’s confidently growing resurgence to become a ‘global power’ 
and Turkey’s new pro-activist foreign policy vision aspiring to become a ‘global 
actor.’ Paradoxically, overlapping objectives between Turkey and Russia made 
them cooperate more in various fields. Lately, slow EU negotiations and the 
government insistence to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a 
substitution to the EU defined in the Turkish media as the new foreign policy 
advancements. Even the Turkish PM, said to the Russian president to “Take us 
to Shanghai and save us from the trouble,” referring to the trouble with EU.452 
F. CONCLUSION 
The first important contribution of the associations/organizations was their 
support for the recreation of Circassian culture and language, and subsequently 
Circassian nationalism. In the first period, the associations’ activities were heavily 
engaged in cultural and social parts, seeking to stop further immigrations of the 
Circassians from the homeland to the Ottoman Empire and establish solidarity 
among the Circassians who were scattered all around the Ottoman lands. 
However, with the establishment of the Republic, all associations were shut down 
and their activities were banned until the 1950s. The political atmosphere of the 
1950s and 1960s led to the creation of associations again, yet this time they 
engaged only in cultural activities until the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
creation of a diverse network of relations between North Caucasus, Turkey and 
Russia in the 1990s. 
Associations (Dernekler), establishing language courses, cultural 
evenings, and short trips to the Caucasus, started to appear in every city and 
town in small scale. Also, international organizations with ties to the Caucasus 
started to appear beyond Turkey. For Circassians in Turkey this increased 
accessibility to their homeland has allowed them to “live on both banks of the 
river,” as Ayhan Kaya has put it. Rather than militantly demanding a complete 
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right of return, many have found the status quo an acceptable compromise.453 
Circassians are not among the most pro-active ethnic groups towards autonomy 
or independence, and this silent posture effects the content of activities 
organized by the associations. All demonstrations and activities organized by the 
Circassians in Turkey ended up without any violent actions.  
The second important conclusion is that different approaches of the 
associations towards the Circassians, both in diaspora and in homeland, created 
diversity among the Circassians. For instance some groups, sometimes called 
United Caucasianist, or Returnist, basically advocate the mass return to 
Caucasus, while the KAFFED emphasize the unity of the North Caucasus groups 
in diaspora. This shows that different ideologies have been internalized to a large 
extent by the majority of political actors. For KAFFED, Circassians in Turkey are 
state-linked diaspora, and thus it follows an accommodationist or moderate 
approach to the situation. By contrast some other groups like Caucasus Forum 
and United Caucasus Association (UCA) do not regard these three autonomous 
republics in the North Caucasus as proper entities or as an embodiment of 
homeland, and do not consider themselves as a diaspora with a state of its own. 
Therefore, they reject the moderate or more accommodationist approaches 
supported by KAFFED in relations with Russia, and follow political strategies that 
directly target Russia, specifically regarding it as a colonialist power and a 
suppressor in the region. Based on this diversification, KAFFED abstains to put 
Russia as a target and acts more responsibly following different approaches to 
homeland, even meeting with Russian foreign minister in his visit to Turkey in 
and supported the appreciated the Russian recognition of the independence of 
Abkhazia as the representatives of the Circassians in Turkey.454 
Since the lack of political authority or ethnic representation, every situation 
or problem tried to be solved with the association, which hampered to focus on 
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one or more specific objective(s) about the Circassians. Associations have 
become the places for cultural activities, for language learning, for meeting with 
other Circassians, providing scholarship to the students, organizing tours to 
homeland, organizing exhibitions, and even organizing blood donations for the 
Circassians who need them. Within these variety of activities associations have 
so far established a clear level of consciousness among the Circassians, yet 
these activities and political stand have to be clearly defined and associations 
have to focus on clearly defined objectives to create a common dynamic. 
Third, Islamic groups have achieved significant support in politics 
throughout the Muslim world and within the Ottoman Era in the past, but the 
impact of Islam on the Circassian diaspora is rather limited. It is clear that there is 
no single well-established Circassian association in Turkey, and the Caucasus 
Trust (CT) cannot be put into that category though it has Islamic aspects of 
Circassian diaspora. Activists with Islamic sensitivities have organized CT and 
they constitute a smaller number of intellectuals, the majority of whom do not 
practice Islam in a political way. 
Fourth, the stigmatization of exile is still important for Circassians minds to 
form a collective identity. For the last couple of years Circassian organizations, 
basically the KAFFED, have organized commemoration ceremonies for the 
anniversary of the exile on 21 May of each year. These ceremonies have turned 
to protest movements, as the 2014 Sochi winter Olympics gets closer. In 2007, 
the World Olympic Committee declared that the 2014 Winter Games would be 
conducted in Sochi, Russia. This place has a significant importance for the 
Circassians. As time passes, opportunities arise for problematic political issues, 
as do the opportunities for diplomatic resolutions represented by the unified voice 





This thesis aims to examine the historical background of Circassians in 
the Ottoman Empire and Turkey; their identity discourse within these two state 
structures; their social and mutual aid organizations/associations and their effect 
on the public as well as the government vis-à-vis the relation between Turkey 
and the North Caucasus Republics under the superior structure of the Russian 
Federation. The Circassians are a relatively under-researched ethnic group 
compared to the other groups who came to the Ottoman lands as a result of 
Russian expansionist policy in the Northwest Caucasus (which is called by the 
Circassians in Turkey as “the Great Exile (Surgun)”) that gradually increased 
after the Crimean War (1853–1856) and reached its peak on 21 May 1864, which 
has been commemorated in Turkey, especially starting from 1989 (125th 
anniversary) as the anniversary of this tragic event.  
To understand the formation of the Circassian identity within the Ottoman 
Empire and Turkey, there are some pillars each of which has its own effect over 
the identity that this thesis based upon. The first and most important 
conclusion is the Circassian identity or diaspora as a historical phenomenon 
with its positive achievements and limitations, shaping and reshaping within 
the constantly changing political limits that have been set by the politicians 
and ruling elite. Within this changing discourse, Circassians identity could not 
manage to create a homogeneous block to represent the group in Turkey and to 
uphold the problems of the people in diaspora, to create a bridge role between 
the diaspora and homeland, or to influence the policy in lieu towards the right of 
the ethnic minorities in the North Caucasus with their relations to Russia.  
From the very first years of the exile of 1864 to 1923, there has been no 
agreement or consensus on what it meant to be Circassian, let alone Turkish. 
There were some elites in the political sphere and in media who discussed the 
meaning of being a Circassian, but this, in political terms, meant different things 
to different groups. This particularly came up with the Anzavur uprising in 
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Western Anatolia, and showed that there were some people who were loyal to 
the sultan, and there were some who were loyal to the republicans. For this 
dichotomy over loyalty, personal ties played a great role. The significance of the 
slaves, both men and women, in the Ottoman state carried many Circassians to 
the important positions both in government and in military. Thus, there were a 
significant number of the Circassians who were loyal to the Sultan.  
However, there were some other groups that had different views. There 
were some who were trying to form an independent state in Balikesir region 
alongside with the Greeks and Armenians. Also there were another significant 
amount of Circassians who returned to the North Caucasus after their exile the 
1860s.  
Moreover, with the various approaches of the state towards the ethnic 
groups and the measures that the ethnic group takes against the state policy and 
to preserve the ethnic identity is a complicated topic. Through state policies in 
settlement, education, military service, jurisdiction system, and the intense 
discourse to create a new national identity and its transformation to a more ethnic 
Turkish nationalism which is based on various ways to homogenize the 
population via assimilation and exclusion, Circassian identity continuously 
constructed and reshaped vis-à-vis the Turkish nationalism  
The lack of the Circassian elite after the creation and the reform phase of 
the Republic of Turkey increased the pressure of ethnic Turkish nationalism over 
the Circassian community. Circassians were influential figures in the state 
structure, especially in the military after their forced immigration to the Ottoman 
Empire. One of the reasons that the Ottoman government encouraged the 
immigration of the Caucasus Muslims to its territories was their reputation as 
brave soldiers. Thus, the role of the Circassians in the military was 
proportionately higher than the other groups in the empire. Their strong family 
ties as well as military capabilities were also influential in the creation of the 
Ottoman Special Organization (Teskilat-i Mahsusa), which was known as the 
secret clandestine service to carry out undercover activities. Eventually the role 
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of the Circassians decreased in this organization and in the state structure with 
decreasing role of the important figures such as Rauf Orbay, Recep Peker, Fuat 
Cebesoy, and many other Circassian in politics.  
Later on with the strict rules to create homogeneous structure, minority 
politics were suppressed by the state between 1923 and the beginning of the 
1960s, and state-sponsored nationalism increased. This period in Turkey for the 
ethnic group can be called as a silent period. However, even relatively less in this 
period, Circassians have found ways to sustain the ethnic identity in a peaceful 
way, including strategies and maneuvers other than being an exact opposition to 
the state. 
Maneuvering within the Turkish nationalism, and claiming to participate to 
the public sphere of the population, Circassians on one hand try to eliminate the 
blemishes that attached to them with the stigmatizing identification of the Cerkes 
Ethem with all Circassians, and on the other hand claim the significant 
participation of their ancestors in the wars of the Ottoman Empire and Republic 
of Turkey to show the importance of this group in the creation of the Republic 
and their right to as much honor as the ethnic Turks and other minority groups. 
Many Circassians prefer to keep silent against the state policies and try not to 
contradict with them, yet this behavior caused the narratives of rootlessness, 
loneliness, and inbetweenness among the Circassians for years. Mutual aid 
organizations and cultural associations have been a significant role to decrease 
this attitude among the Circassians and lately, this inter-communal dialog started 
to evolve and take the role of representing Circassians and their peaceful 
coexistence in the contemporary domestic and foreign affairs in the eyes of the 
ethnic Turks and other minorities in Turkey. 
The second conclusion of this thesis is the relation between the state 
and the ethnic group, which is not simply to identify. The hegemonic 
characteristic of the Turkish National Identity and the relation with the sub 
identities are not easy to define such as higher versus lower, nationalistic versus 
ethnic, or suppressed versus suppressor. Simultaneously changing the political 
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order in Turkey and the fear of internal and external enemy idea on the one hand 
and the claiming of national and diasporic identity on the other hand have caused 
these maneuvers into a dilemma.  
Just supporting the idea that Circassians are superior in the state structure 
in terms of their relations with the Turks is a misleading concept. Likewise, 
claiming that Circassians’ relations with the Turkish state are pro-state or in 
league with the state is an oversimplified allegation. Their relations with the state 
structure have been far from being homogeneous, and these relations range 
from inclusion, exclusion, trust, loyalty, neglect, fear, and harmony. 
Some Circassian activists define the Circassians in Turkey as in-between, 
fearful, and not brave, in contradiction to the bravery, loyalty and gratitude of the 
ancestors. However, all these definitions are the consequences of their long 
existence in Turkey starting from the Ottoman Era as a non-Turkish Muslim 
community. Most Circassians feel incompetent in terms of political and 
organizational participation in the state structure. Still, when someone says s/he 
is a Circassian, the insult of “Cerkes Ethem, Circassian girls and Circassian 
chicken”455 is a usual response. These are the only common figures that have 
survived throughout Circassian history; however, the public images of 
Circassians have fluctuated between the migrant, the Muslims, the fighter, the 
citizen, the founder, and the traitor; and have constituted elements of the nation-
state by the ruling elite and media. This policy or the lack thereof, in terms of 
defining the Circassians, is one of the formations of Circassian diaspora in 
Turkey. 
Moreover, this undecided structure of the nation-state has been shaped 
since the end of the nineteenth-century, and still is one of the major discussions 
in Turkey with the democratic openings under the European Union (EU) 
membership process. The inclusion of the non-Turkish Muslim ethnic groups in 
the nation-building process has been conditional, yet much more contributory 
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than the non-Muslim groups since they are always defined as “the others” in the 
society. Being a Sunni Muslim has been the facilitator for Circassians since the 
late era of the Ottoman Empire and was generally based on the Muslim identity; 
this binding force had been used during the War of Independence and for a short 
time after the declaration of independence on 29 October 1923. During the 
nation-building process, one of the important steps was the definition of the 
people of the new country. This time what differentiated “the people” from the 
others could not be the religion, or the ethnic Turkic discourse. Thus, loyalty 
attributed to the Circassians, which is a fragile and sensitive topic for 
Circassians. Eventually, this sensitive connection became more fragile with the 
rise of the ethnic Turkish nationalism in Turkey, starting from the 1960s.  
The third important conclusion is the homeland for the Circassians, and in 
the Circassian case homeland is a dynamic construction of political 
developments, memories, narratives, and various perceptions of individuals as 
to the nature of “homeland.” Influencing both from internal and international 
relations, Circassians in Turkey constantly re-construct and re-shape the idea of 
homeland. Salman Rushdie’s words about the imagined diaspora homelands are 
helpful to understand the real meaning. “My today is foreign to me. My past is 
also waiting for me to hug in the lost city among the fog that I left behind years 
ago…from now on; we will create imaginary cities and villages, unseen imaginary 
homeland, not a real cities and villages.”456 Significantly, the change of the 
political atmosphere in 1990s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
democratization movements based on the EU norms in Turkey, and rise of the 
nationalities as a result of these changes in Turkey contributed to the 
transformation of Circassian activism in Turkey. The transformation of the 
Circassian diaspora changed relations both with homeland and Turkey. In June 
1998, Prince Ali Ben-El Huseyin of Jordan visited many Circassian villages in 
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Turkey on his journey from Jordan to the North Caucasus. He was welcomed 
with great enthusiasm in all villages as the mystical hero of the Elbruz Mountains 
of the Caucasus. This showed the existence of a collective and imagined 
homeland ideal among the Circassians. Experiencing commonalities and 
differences, joy and sadness, enthusiasm and disappointment about the 
homeland, Circassians in the 1990s became part of the real diaspora with access 
to homeland. Today, there are ferry shuttles from Trabzon and Samsun to Sochi 
and Sukhumi; and regular flights from Istanbul to Krasnodar, Sochi and Maykop. 
The increased web of communication techniques also facilitates the 
communication between homeland and diaspora that helps the creation of more 
concrete relations.  
Furthermore, since the 1990s, Circassians have become involved in more 
political relations with the Turkish state to define multicultural citizenship. They 
started to regard themselves as located in two geographies compared to the 
previous relations with the state and eventually some groups started to request 
dual citizenship to really define themselves as a diasporic community. However, 
there were some impediments for the Circassians to increase the desired 
relations between homeland and diaspora. The 1990s also brought new 
problems and difficulties for integration. The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, 
Chechen Wars, and Georgia-Russia War caused the reputation of the region as 
an unstable area compared to its relative stability during the Cold War. This 
stigmatization of the region has created questions in the minds of the returnists in 
Turkey.  
The fourth important conclusion of this thesis contributes to the 
understanding of nationalism without nation-states, showing how Circassians 
imagined themselves, in the absence of state but in the presence of an 
imagined homeland with which they had had limited connection for many 
years. Examining the ways that the diaspora imagined a homeland and 
Circassian community and the internal dynamics of the people (how they 
continued their identities) are crucial for social science on diaspora and 
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nationalism. In this sense, it is one step farther than Anderson’s definition of 
“imagined communities” of a state and how people form a community and form a 
state based on this community. Circassians, in this term, form a community in 
lack of state structure, and even lack of any political or mythical leader. However, 
their creation of a different state (an autonomous region) within the boundaries of 
Turkey is clearly not a desire for them, as is clearly defined by the associations in 
many platforms. Yet, the relationship between diaspora and homeland and how 
diaspora can contribute to the survival of the homeland is the main problem.   
Examining the Circassian situation during both the Ottoman and Republic 
periods, this thesis contributes to the literature on ethnic groups in Turkey and 
their relations with the state. Circassians are one of the communities that have 
been studied considerably less than the other ethnic communities (especially the 
Kurds) in Turkey. Since they never were part of the Ottoman rule as a state or 
khanate, and they were exiled to a land that was not their homeland in any part 
of the previous history, they usually lived in a quest concept and until the 1950s 
did not build houses to live many years. The idea of return and their scattered 
positions in Anatolia reduced their significance as a different community that had 
to be examined. Social studies in Turkey have mostly studied the other ethnic 
groups whose nationalism discourse is more visible and united, and whose 
relations with the state are defined by overt opposition. 
The fifth important contribution is that exploring Circassian nationality 
and identity gives some notions about the evolution of Turkish nationalism. 
The methods, strategies and discussions of Turkish nationalism on non-Turkish 
Muslim communities and non-Turkish communities, the layered structure of the 
state and its approach to each layer show the approach to create a 
homogeneous nationality. The legal discourse on ethnic differences, and 
population exchange program after the Lausanne Treaty was a part of nation-
building rather than protecting the right of the non-Muslim minorities, or giving 
them the freedom of being part of a different nation, though it was the same 
nation for many years. In the end, the new republic used many suitable tools to 
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create a nation-state. During this process, Circassians in urban places suffered 
much more than the ones in rural places still struggling to integrate the local 
Turkish culture. Associations were closed and members of them as well as the 
significant elite were forced into silence and inactivity between 1923 and 1950. 
Most of them were under state observation for years. The disbarment of these 
first immigrants from the political activity and the silence period in the first years 
of the Republic created a lack of leadership for the further years in diaspora. 
Moreover, defining Circassian nationalism in Turkey contributes to the 
understanding on how an ethnic group locates itself vis-à-vis the Turkish 
nationalism. 
The sixth important conclusion is the contributions of the 
associations/organizations for the creation of Circassian nationalism. In the 
first period, the associations’ were heavily engaged in cultural and social parts, 
seeking to stop further immigrations of the Circassians from the homeland to 
Ottoman Empire. Associations (Dernekler) establishing language courses, 
cultural evenings, and short trips to the Caucasus started to appear in every city 
and town on a small scale. Also, international organizations with ties to the 
Caucasus started to appear beyond Turkey. For Circassians in Turkey this 
increased accessibility to their homeland has allowed them to “live on both banks 
of the river,” as Ayhan Kaya has put it. Rather than militantly demand complete 
right of return, many have found the status quo an acceptable compromise.457 
The seventh important conclusion is that different approaches of the 
associations towards the Circassians, both in diaspora and in homeland, 
created diversity among the Circassians. For instance some groups, sometimes 
called United Caucasianist, or Returnist, basically advocate the mass return to 
the Caucasus, while the KAFFED emphasize the unity of the North Caucasus 
groups in diaspora. This shows that different ideologies have been internalized to 
a large extent by the majority of political actors. For KAFFED, Circassians in 
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Turkey are state-linked diaspora and thus it follows an accommodationalist or 
moderate approach to the situation. By contrast, some other groups like the 
Caucasus Forum and United Caucasus Association (UCA) do not regard these 
three autonomous republics in the North Caucasus as proper entities or as an 
embodiment of homeland, and do not consider themselves as a diaspora with a 
state of its own. Therefore, they reject the moderate or more accommodationalist 
approaches supported by KAFFED in relations with Russia and follow political 
strategies that directly target Russia, specifically regarding it as a colonialist 
power and a suppressor in the region. Based on this diversification, KAFFED 
refuses to put Russia as a target and acts more responsibly following different 
approaches to homeland, even meeting with the Russian foreign minister in his 
visit to Turkey and supporting Russian recognition of the independence of 
Abkhazia as the representatives of the Circassians in Turkey.458  
Lacking political authority or ethnic representation, the association tried to 
solve every situation or problem, which hampered focus on one or more specific 
objective about the Circassians. Associations have become the places for 
cultural activities, for language learning, for meeting with other Circassians, 
providing scholarship to the students, organizing tours to the homeland, 
organizing exhibitions, and even organizing blood donations for the Circassians 
who need it. Within these variety of activities associations have so far established 
a clear level of consciousness among the Circassians, yet these activities and 
political stand have to be clearly defined and the associations have to focus on 
clearly defined objectives to create a common dynamic.  
Eighth, Islamic groups have achieved significant support in politics 
throughout the Muslim world (and within the Ottoman Era in the past), but the 
impact of Islam on the Circassian diaspora is rather limited. It is clear that 
there is no single well-established Circassian association in Turkey, and the 
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Caucasus Trust (CT) cannot be put into that category though it has Islamic 
aspects of the Circassian diaspora. Activists with Islamic sensitivities have 
organized CT and they constitute a smaller number of intellectuals, the majority 
of whom practice Islam in other than a political form.  
Ninth, the stigmatization of exile is still an important factor for the 
Circassians’ minds to form a collective identity. For the last couple of years 
Circassian organizations, basically the KAFFED, have organized 
commemoration ceremonies for the anniversary of the exile on 21 May of each 
year. These ceremonies have turned to protest movements, as the 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics gets closer. In 2007, the World Olympic Committee declared 
that the 2014 Winter Games would be conducted in Sochi, Russia. This place 
has a significant importance for the Circassians. 
After all factors and circumstances are considered, Circassians identify 
themselves with different historical events. The exile is the most prominent one, 
and Circassians should annotate not just feeling the grief of the event but also 
teach this history to the next generations and the other groups in Turkey where 
they all live together peacefully.  
These are the main conclusions that the thesis has reached, but there are 
different subjects that are not covered deeply in this thesis. One of them is the 
Russian policy towards the North Caucasus. The region has always been 
important in Russian history. Although the first chapter of this thesis summarizes 
the history of the North Caucasus, there are many significant events that 
determine Russian-North Caucasus relations. The region has started to deal with 
its instability and Islamic terrorism. Previously these activities concentrated on 
the eastern part of the region. However, starting from the end of the 2000s, there 
was an increase in the terrorist activities in the western part, especially in the 
Kabardino-Balkaria Republic. The reasons behind this rise of political Islam in the 
eastern part of the region, terror and its effect on Russian-Caucasus relations 
can all be listed as possible topics for further research. 
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Second, the gender dimension of Circassian activism is not discussed in 
this thesis deeply. The role of the Circassian women in the Ottoman palace is a 
well-known phenomenon. And, certainly, the wives of the Ottoman Sultan were 
influential on the politics between the Empire and the North Caucasus, as well as 
the position of the North Caucasus émigrés in the Ottoman lands. On one hand, 
Circassian women recognized with their beauty and gained the consent of many 
Ottoman sultans to enter the Imperial Harem. On the other hand, they were 
subjects of the slave trade both in the Caucasus and Ottoman Empire. After the 
“Great Exile” and the difficult consequences that the exile created, the female 
slave trade increased in the rural areas. Most of the Circassian women living in 
Anatolia did not participate in the Circassian activism, yet prominent figures such 
as Hayriye Melek Hunc and Sezai Pooh, who played important roles for the 
abolition of Circassian slavery, made great contribution to the Circassian 
activities in the Empire. Therefore, all these different aspects of the gender 
dimensions and activities of Circassian women must be considered as part of the 
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